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ABSTRACT 
Is hired labour a perfect substitute for family labour as inputs in farm production? Are 
these two types of labour equally productive? A negative answer to either question has 
important implications for the analytical modeling and empirical estimation of the 
labour demand and supply decisions of farm households, and for deriving welfare 
measures based on the implicit valuation (shadow price) of family labour. Significant 
policy implications also arise with imperfect substitutability and/or productivity 
differences because aggregate outcomes will be sensitive to changes in the distribution 
of individual endowments of land and labour. 
This study uses a production function based approach to test for heterogeneity between 
family and hired labour in crop production in the tarai (southern lowland) region of 
Nepal. It develops an appropriate analytical framework and carries out the empirical 
estimation of an aggregate farm household model that allows for the heterogeneity 
between family and hired labour. A sequential estimation strategy is adopted. The 
Iabour heterogeneity detected in the first step of the production function estimation is 
incorporated, at the second step, in the labour supply estimation in a theoretically 
consistent manner The methodological novelty is to relate the shadow wage rate for 
family labour to the observed market wage rate for hired labour. This is done on the 
basis of the differential productivity of family and hired labour detected in the 
production function estimates. 
The production function estimation results, based on a translog equation, indicated that 
although family and hired labour are perfect substitutes, they are not equally 
productive. A linear labour aggregator function, with a constant efficiency difference 
between family and hired labour, is the preferred specification to describe the nature of 
labour heterogeneity. When measured in effective units, one unit of hired labour 
substitutes for 0.75 units of family labour. This efficiency difference is statistically 
significant and robust to alternative specifications and assumptions on parametric 
restrictions. 
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The lower efficiency of hired labour, which is independent of other input levels, 
implies that farm households should not generally engage in simultaneously hiring in 
and hiring out of labour. This prediction is indeed borne out by the sample data from 
Nepal. 
The linear form of the efficiency difference between family and hired labour maintains 
the recursive structure of the conventional farm household model structure. However, 
the effective wage rate for family labour differs according to the market exposure of the 
household in the hired labour market. In the labour supply estimation results, model 
specifications that account for the wage gap between households that are net sellers and 
buyers of labour are preferred to specifications that assume a common wage rate for all 
households. This result provides an independent corroboration of the efficiency 
difference between family and hired labour derived from the production function. 
The factor demand elasticities and labour supply elasticities, derived from the farm 
household model with labour heterogeneity, are all within reasonable bounds and have 
expected signs. Accounting for the efficiency related wage gap is important in the 
labour supply estimation because it leads to differences in the elasticity of male and 
female labour supply with respect to wage, although these differences are not dramatic. 
The efficiency difference between family and hired labour provides an alternative 
explanation for the relatively lower per hectare input of labour on the bigger farms, 
without relying on labour or other factor market failures. It would be very useful to 
direct further research to discriminate between alternative explanations for the 
underlying source of the Iabour heterogeneity so that firm implications for land reform 
and rural labour market policies can emerge. 
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Family based agricultural /farm households are the principal form of economic 
organization in most developing countries. Their economic decisions on farm 
production, labour use and consumption and leisure choices can be quite complex 
because the farm/household acts both as a producer and consumer unit. In 
conventional economic analyses production and consumption decisions are treated 
independently. A firm's decisions on optimal input use are not affected by the utility 
maximizing consumption decisions of the owners of the firm. But in the traditional 
agriculture setting, where production inputs are primarily supplied by the farm 
family, household preferences over the consumption bundle, including leisure, can 
directly affect production decisions. Conversely, production technology and 
outcomes can directly affect consumption choices, in addition to the conventional 
income effects. 
When decisions on production and consumption are systematically inter -linked, 
behavioural responses to output and factor price change, and to other policy 
interventions, can be quite different from those suggested by conventional analysis. 
Hence, detailed empirical models of the agricultural household that recognize its 
dual role as a producer and consumer unit in a theoretically consistent manner have 
become essential tools for policy analyses. 
The methodological approach to analyzing farm- household decision making that 
explicitly accounts for the inter -relationships between production, consumption and 
labour supply decisions is referred to as a farm (or agricultural) household model. 
The empirical application of this approach was pioneered in the late 1970's, building 
on the theoretical work on the "subjective equilibrium" of the family farm household 
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developed by Nakajima (1969) and Sen (1966), among others.' There is now a large 
literature on the estimation of farm household models for developing countries and 
their empirical applications for a wide range of policy questions.' 
A key feature of most empirical applications of farm household models is that the 
many kinds of human labour inputs observed in traditional agriculture are simply 
added together into an aggregate homogeneous labour input category. The aggregate 
labour input is then assigned a "price" equivalent to the prevailing market wage rate 
at which labour can be sold on the local hired labour market. In some few cases the 
relative productivity differences of labour categories (e.g., male and female, or adult 
and child) may be indirectly incorporated by creating an aggregate labour input with 
fixed conversion factors. For instance, when the labour input data is dis- aggregated 
by gender, a common technique is to create an aggregate labour input by specifying 
that one unit of female labour is equivalent to, say, 0.8 units of male labour. Such 
conversion factors can be ad hoc or can be based on the ratio of the observed market 
wage rates for male and female labour. 
Another important dimension to the dis- aggregation of total farm labour input is the 
distinction between labour supplied by family members of the farm households and 
the labour input provided by labourers hired at a given wage rate. The distinction 
between family and hired labour in farm household models is relevant not just from 
an empirical perspective of capturing any productivity differences between these two 
types of labour inputs. This distinction is also important for methodological reasons 
also because it determines the analytical structure of the farm household model and 
the manner in which the household equilibrium can be determined. 
The initial theoretical reference to farm household models was a 1923 book by the Russian 
economist, A. V. Chayanov, of which an edited English version was published as Chayanov (1966). 
There were also several important non -English publications of Japanese economists - Tanaka (1951), 
Nakajima (1949). Early examples of the empirical estimation of farm household models are Lau, Lin 
and Yotopoulos (1978) for Taiwan, Kuroda and Yotopoulos (1978, 1980) for Japan and 
Adulavidhaya, et.al. (1979) for Thailand and Barnum and Squire (1979) for Malaysia. 
2 Two important collections of theoretical and applied work on farm household models can be found 
in the edited volumes Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986) and Caillavet, Guyomard and Lifran (1994). 
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In the classification scheme adopted in Nakajima's classic treatise (1986) on farm 
household models, the ratio of family and hired labour use is one of the two key 
dimensions according to which farm households can be classified.' 
At one extreme are settings where no local hired labour market exists and all farm 
cultivation is done by family labour. In this situation, where the household is in a 
state of "autarchy" (i.e., neither buys nor sells any labour), the household labour 
supply and labor demand equilibrium is characterized by a "subjective equilibrium" 
(Nakajima, 1986). Such an equilibrium implicitly defines an unobserved "virtual" or 
"shadow" price of labour, which, if it existed in reality, would be the price (the wage 
rate) that would induce the household to equate the demand and supply for its own 
family labour, taking that implied market wage rate as exogenously given 
(Strauss 1986:77). The key analytical feature of the autarchic farm household is that 
its preferences over leisure and consumption of goods, together with the farm 
production function, jointly determine the optimal demand for labour in farm 
production. Optimal production and consumption plans are formulated 
simultaneously. 
At the other extreme are farms that rely completely on non -family labour employed 
at a specified market wage rate. These are "farm firms ". The decisions on labour 
allocation for farm cultivation (and other optimal input choices) are exactly 
analogous to the textbook version of the profit maximizing firm. The consumption 
choices of the farm -firm household can also be modeled as in the textbook version 
of a consumer household. It chooses an optimum consumption bundle, given its 
budget constraint (which in this case includes income from farm profits) and 
exogenously given market prices, including the market wage for hired labour as the 
appropriate price of leisure. The only special condition to take account of is the 
revealed preference for zero amounts of family labour supply. The non -labour 
participation of the household members indicates that the subjective valuation placed 
The other dimension is the proportion of farm output consumed by the farm household. Various 
categories with a distinct analytical structure of the farm household model result from their different 
exposure to the hired labour and farm output markets (Nakajima 1986, Chapter 1). 
f1 
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on family leisure must exceed the market wage rate at which family labour could be 
sold. Such non -participation kinks are readily handled in labour supply models 
(Killingsworth 1983). The production decisions of the farm -firm household are 
separable from the consumption choices. 
The vast majority of farm households in both developing and developed countries 
fall into the intermediate category where both family and hired labour are used in 
farm cultivation. In addition, with active rural labour markets, farm households have 
the option of allocating family labour to own farm cultivation or to wage labour 
employment in the local off -farm labour market. 
The conventional approach to empirical estimation of a farm household model 
which has both family and hired labour inputs has been to treat family and hired 
labour as homogeneous inputs which can be substituted for each other on a one for 
one basis. Total labour input on the farm is simply taken to be the sum of family and 
hired labour days. It is also widely assumed that the local (or village) wage rate at 
which labour can be hired in is also the appropriate wage rate applicable to family 
labour. Such an imputation is often made even if family labour is fully devoted to 
own farm work and does not supply any labour on the hired labour market 
(Rosenzweig 1980). 
These twin assumptions about the equivalence of a unit of family and hired labour 
(homogeneity) and an inferred, exogenously given market wage rate for family 
labour have the effect of making family labour equivalent to a tradable input with a 
price that does not depend on the farm -family's own decisions. If all other farm 
inputs and outputs are also tradable commodities with exogenously given market 
prices that the farm household takes as given, then the analytical structure of the 
farm household model is considerably simplified. The production and consumption 
decisions need not be modeled jointly (which makes empirical estimation relatively 
difficult) but can be solved recursively, so that the production and consumption 
decisions can be determined separately. 
5 
In the recursive framework, the farm- household utility maximization problem is 
solved in two stages. In the first stage, the household acts as a profit maximizing 
producer which chooses optimal levels of farm inputs (including total labour which 
is a homogeneous composite of family and hired labour), given the exogenously 
given prices for all inputs and outputs that it faces. The solution to this first step 
determines farm profits and the full income of the farm household. Given this 
income level, in the second stage the farm household acts as a pure consumer, 
choosing the optimal consumption bundle, including Ieisure, subject to the full 
income budget constraint conditioned on the optimal production side choices. A 
simple interpretation of the recursive property of the farm household model is that 
the profit maximizing production input and output choices are independent of the 
household's utility function (Strauss 1986). 
An intuitive way to understand the recursive property is that it necessarily holds as 
long as there are markets for all commodities and inputs and the household is a price 
taker in all these markets. Then the amount of, say, the food crop to be produced by 
the household can be determined independently of the preferred level of household 
food consumption, because the household can always buy and sell any amount of 
food at the going market price. Similarly, household preferences about leisure 
relative to the other consumption goods together with the market wage determine 
labour supply independently of the labour requirement on the production side. 
Again, any difference between household labour supply and on -farm labour demand 
can be costlessly equilibrated through hiring in outside labour or hiring out family 
labour at the going wage rate. 
Although the treatment of family and hired labour as homogeneous inputs greatly 
facilitates empirical estimation of farm household models, there are important 
reasons for carefully assessing whether family and hired labour are indeed 
homogeneous inputs in a given setting. 
The main reason why family and hired labour may differ in terms of efficiency units 
is due to the "principal- agent" type of relationship inherent in most hired labour 
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contracts (Binswagner and Rosenzweig 1986). Because of the difficulty inherent in 
monitoring the effort applied by hired labour with a limited stock of family labour 
available to the farm household "shirking" on the effort applied by hired labour may 
be commonplace (Feder 1985). On the other hand, family labour has an incentive to 
work intensively because on the owner operated family farm it is the residual 
claimant to output. Many of the institutional structures of traditional agriculture - 
for instance, multi- generation joint families, sharecropping contracts, piece -rate 
wages, labour exchanges - seem designed to get around the problem of monitoring 
the work effort of hired labour.' Hence there is implicit recognition that the 
efficiency differences between family and hired labour related to the effort applied in 
farm work can be large. 
Apart from the implications for an analytical understanding and modeling of the 
labour demand and supply decisions of farm households, any observed efficiency 
differences or heterogeneity between family and hired labour can also have 
significant policy implications. With efficiency differences between family and hired 
labour related to work incentives, aggregate outcomes - e.g. total production, total 
labour demand (labour absorption), and equilibrium rural wage rates - are sensitive 
to changes in the distribution of individual endowments of land and labour. 
If, for instance, family labour is more productive because it applies more effort per 
unit time than hired labour, then a re- distributive land reform program which 
transferred land from big farms relying primarily on hired labour to small family 
labour- operated farms would increase the average labour intensity of cultivation, and 
hence total absorption of labour in the agricultural sector. On the other hand, the 
increase in aggregate labour demand could be associated with a reduction in the 
demand and supply for hired labour such that the equilibrium market wage rate for 
hired labour could be reduced. This would adversely affect landless households 
which were not beneficiaries of the land transfers. The direction and exact 
° In broader terms these arrangements in traditional agriculture can be seen as an institutional 
response to the high likelihood of incomplete or missing markets, particularly with respect to labour 
(de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet 1991). 
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magnitude of such general equilibrium effects depend on the precise values of the 
various elasticities of labour demand and supply for the different classes of farm 
households (Rosenzweig 1978). Hence, from a policy perspective, it is useful to 
devise a suitable framework and methodology to estimate the parameters of a farm 
household model that allows for the heterogeneity between family and hired labour. 
The empirical literature on testing whether family and hired labour are 
heterogeneous inputs, and, if so, what determines their relative efficiencies, is rather 
scant. Moreover, existing studies mainly look at the heterogeneity and efficiency 
issue solely from the production function perspective, without relating the 
heterogeneity to the labour -leisure utility maximization problem faced by the 
household in the presence of labour heterogeneity. Examples of the production 
function approach are Bardhan (1973), Deolalikar and Vijbergen (1987) and 
Frisvold (1994). These previous studies on the efficiency differences between family 
and hired labour have been limited to a production focus only. They do not 
incorporate an integrated a farm household model structure where the labour supply 
implications of the observed heterogeneity have also been derived in a consistent 
manner and verified empirically, as is done in the approach taken in this thesis. 
1.2 The Research Question and Methodological Approach 
The specific research question addressed is whether, in the setting of Nepalese 
agriculture, family and hired labour are equivalent (or homogeneous) inputs in farm 
production. If not, what is the nature and extent of heterogeneity between family and 
hired labour? And how can one amend the conventional recursive farm household 
model structure to estimate a theoretically consistent labour supply equation for 
family labour, taking account of the specific form of the heterogeneity between 
family and hired Iabour detected empirically. 
There are two distinct though related questions regarding family and hired labour 
being homogeneous inputs: 
(i) 
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Are family and hired labour perfect substitutes for each other in the 
production function? Is the elasticity of substitution between family 
and hired labour infinitely large ?5 
(ii) If so, are the marginal products per unit of labour time of these two 
types of labour equal to each other, everything else held constant? 6 
If the answer to either question above is no, then family and hired labour become 
heterogeneous inputs. The total effective labour input on a farm utilizing both family 
and hired labour work -days will be something different than the simple sum of the 
labour days put in by family and hired workers. More importantly, with labour 
heterogeneity the wage rate for family labour that applies to the determination of the 
farm household's labour- leisure equilibrium will differ from the market wage rate 
paid for hired labour. With this "shadow" wage rate for family labour being 
unobservable, as well as possibly endogenous to the household's labour allocation 
decisions, the recursive or separable property of the farm household model is lost 
and estimation becomes cumbersome. 
In the presence of labour heterogeneity, the analytical challenge is to seek ways in 
which separability could be restored in a theoretically consistent way by relating the 
"shadow" wage rate of family labour to the observed market wage rate for hired 
labour, taking into account the precise nature of the efficiency differences between 
family and hired labour. If the appropriate shadow wage rates for family labour can 
be recovered from the observed market wage rates and from the fixed parameters of 
5 In a production function with more than two inputs there are many alternative measures of the 
degree of substitution between two specific inputs (Chambers 1986, ch.1). A commonly used 
measure is the partial Allen Elasticity of Substitution (AES) which gives the effect on the quantity 
demanded of one factor due to a change in the price of another factor, holding output and other 
factors constant (Squires 1994:186). A positive value of the AES implies the two inputs are 
substitutes, or more formally, price or p- substitutes (Seidman 1989). The higher the value of the AES 
the greater the degree of substitutability. For perfect substitutes, the AES is infinitely large. This 
implies a linear aggregate labour composite of the form Le = aF + bH, where Le is aggregate labour, 
F is family and H is hired labour, and a, b are constants. 
6 Since marginal products of inputs vary with the levels of other inputs, the comparison of the 
marginal products of family and hired labour has to be made at some average level of all inputs in the 
sample of farm households. But if the production function is separable in the labour inputs, in which 
case the ratio of the marginal products of family and hired labour depend only on the levels of the 
labour inputs (Chambers 1986:43), the comparison of marginal products can be made only in 
reference to some average level of the labour inputs. See Chapter III for details. 
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the production function which describe the extent of the efficiency differences, then 
separability of the farm household model is restored. The labour supply component 
can be estimated with the shadow wage rate generated in this manner. Whether such 
an approach is feasible will depend on the type of the labour heterogeneity indicated 
in the data and on how the marginal products of hired and family labour behave. 
An important limitation of this thesis needs to be noted at the outset. It does not 
delve into the underlying sources of the efficiency differences between family and 
hired labour implied by the production function estimation results presented in 
Chapter VI. This research is not intended to discriminate between alternative 
explanations for such differences may arise - e.g., whether they are due to the 
principal -agent incentive problem for hired labour, or the farm- specific experience 
of elderly family members (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1986), or some undetected 
labour market imperfections. That would be an altogether different thesis, and one 
which cannot be adequately supported by the type of survey data used in this study. 
Estimation methodology 
The empirical estimation strategy adopted is based on a two -step procedure 
suggested by H. Jacoby (1993) for estimating non -separable farm household 
models.' In the first step Jacoby estimates a farm production function with family 
labour as a distinct labour input, and in the second step a structural labour supply 
equation (which represent the household's utility maximization equilibrium over 
leisure and goods consumption) is estimated. The labour supply equation is based on 
an unobservable shadow wage rate for family labour. Relying on the optimal first 
order conditions, Jacoby uses the estimates of the marginal product of family labour 
derived from the production function parameters to identify the unobservable 
shadow wage rates. 
' Jacoby's approach is a general methodology for estimating a structural labour supply equation for 
workers who are self -employed. It is analogous to the treatment of labour supply in the presence of 
progressive income taxes that was pioneered by R. E. Hall (1973) and which involves "linearizing" 
an underlying non -linear budget constraint. 
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Jacoby's prime interest is not to test for efficiency differences between family and 
hired labour. The same sequential approach, however, can be used to estimate a farm 
household model structure in which is embedded a test for the heterogeneity of 
family and hired labour. In the second step the labour supply functions are estimated 
in a manner which is theoretically consistent with the type of labour heterogeneity 
indicated in the production function estimation. 
The heterogeneity of family and hired labour is tested through several alternative 
specifications of the production function that allow for imperfect substitution 
between family and hired labour and for differences in their marginal products. The 
rejection of the parametric restrictions that lead to a model with homogeneous labour 
inputs is statistical evidence for labour heterogeneity. 
In the second step, some of the variables used in the labour supply regressions will 
be generated from parameters estimated in the production function.' The main 
variable of interest derived in this way is the appropriate "shadow" wage rate that 
reflects the true opportunity cost of family labour at the equilibrium labour supply 
position. A key question is how this shadow wage rate is related to the off -farm 
market wage for family labour and the wage for hiring in labour on the farm. 
The first order conditions for equilibrium of farm household in a model with 
heterogeneous labour inputs can be used to relate the shadow wage rate to the 
observed market wage rates and the parameters which describe the extent of the 
labour heterogeneity. The labour supply equations can then be estimated with the 
appropriate shadow wage rates derived in this manner. The resulting labour supply 
regression parameters then describe the true labour /leisure choice of the farm 
household that is consistent with utility maximization in a setting where the specific 
type of labour heterogeneity modeled in the production function is observed. 
s The sequential estimation of models that contain variables that are unobservable but can be 
estimated from an auxiliary statistical model is a standard procedure. Early examples from many 
areas of applied econometrics are cited in Murphy and Topel (1985). Pagan (1984) refers to these as 
models with "generated regressors ". The sequential estimation strategy yields consistent estimates of 
second stage parameters under fairly general conditions, requiring only a simple adjustment of the 
standard errors for the second step equation (Pagan 1986 and Murphy and Topel 1985). 
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1.3 The Setting 
The data used in the empirical section of this thesis comes from a sample of farm 
households from the southern plain (or tarai) region of Nepal. The household level 
survey data used for the estimation are drawn as a sub -sample of a nationally 
representative Household Budget survey conducted by Nepal Rastra Bank (the 
Nepalese central bank) in 1985/86. This survey had a farm management module in 
which data on output and input use was collected on a crop basis over a multi -round 
survey period. The data separately identifies inputs of family and hired labour, 
which are further broken down into male and female categories. This survey also 
included a module on family labour use by household members aged ten or above, 
with which labour supply estimation can be done at the individual level. 
The sample size of the data used for the estimation of the farm household model is 
1007 households drawn from five of the twenty districts of the tarai region of Nepal. 
(See Figure 1.1). Data for a larger sample of households from the northern hill and 
mountain regions of Nepal is also available in the 1985/86 Nepal Rastra Bank 
survey. But these households have been excluded from this study because of the 
very limited use of hired labour in the northern hill and mountain regions of Nepal. 
Farm sizes in these northern regions are very small, production is mainly subsistence 
oriented, and there is only a limited form of economic differentiation among farm 
households in this region. 
The agrarian structure in the southern plain region of Nepal more closely follows the 
classical structure in which most villages will have a few large landlords dependent 
primarily on hired labour, a middle group of owner -cultivators and a large group of 
landless households who supply the hired labour on the larger farms and may also 
typically rent in small plots of land. Hence, in the tarai region it becomes feasible to 
distinguish between households that are net buyers and sellers of labour on the local 
village labour markets. 
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The rural labour markets in the tarai region are quite active. In peak periods there is 
also considerable in- migration of agricultural labourers from India. Rural households 
in the tarai region of Nepal are less likely to be constrained quantitatively on either 
the labour demand or labour supply side than farm households in the northern hill/ 
mountain regions. Hence the modeling of efficiency differences between family and 
hired labour and the implied correctly specified labour supply behaviour is best 
addressed in the context of the tarai region only.' 
The productivity of agricultural labour is a central theme in any policy discussion of 
rural development and poverty alleviation in Nepal. Agriculture still accounts for 
about 60% of GDP. About 90% of the Nepalese live in rural areas and more than 
80% of them depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Agricultural production 
technology is still very backward in Nepal. Human labour is the main farm input, 
typically accounting for more than 50% of the total cost of farm cultivation.10 
The parametric estimation of a farm household model structure for Nepal with a 
specific focus on labour productivity is useful work in itself, apart from the 
methodological concerns of separability under labour heterogeneity. There has been 
little quantitative work of this nature on Nepalese agriculture utilizing large sample 
surveys. Obtaining more precise estimates of these parameters - for instance, labour 
supply and factor demand elasticities - would be valuable inputs for the analyses of 
many agricultural policy issues in Nepal, including applications of general 
equilibrium simulation models. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
Chapter II provides a brief discussion of the background issues related to the 
question of labour heterogeneity. It also reviews the literature on the methodology as 
well as the findings on the tests of the heterogeneity of family and hired labour 
9 A comparative analyses of farm household behaviour and model parameters for the tarai and 
northern hill regions of Nepal would be of interest, but this has been left for subsequent research. 
10 See Costs of Production for Major Crops in Nepal 1985/86 (Ministry of Agriculture, Kathmandu). 
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carried out in previous studies; and on related aspects of the larger literature on 
Iabour supply behaviour of farm households that are relevant for this study. 
Chapter III develops the analytical framework of a farm household model with 
heterogeneous labour inputs and the labour supply estimation implications of 
specific forms of heterogeneity. This chapter also shows how the correct 
specification of the labour supply equations differs among households in the 
presence of labour heterogeneity. 
Chapter IV develops and discusses the specific econometric estimation methodology 
adopted in this thesis. The approach essentially follows the sequential two -step 
procedure proposed by Jacoby (1993) with a specific adaptation that relates in a 
theoretically consistent manner the variables in the labour supply estimation to the 
type of labour heterogeneity that was detected in the production function estimation. 
Chapter V briefly describes the Nepalese agriculture setting from which the survey 
data used in this thesis is drawn. It also provides an overview of the survey data 
itself and the derivations and definitions of variables used in the estimation chapters. 
Chapter VI contains the estimation results on the tests for labour heterogeneity and 
alternative aggregator functions to create an effective labour composite combining 
family and hired labour. It also discusses the test for separability of the labour input 
from other inputs, as is required in order to create consistent labour aggregates. 
Chapter VII presents the labour supply estimation results consistent with the nature 
of labour heterogeneity detected in Chapter VI. It also compares the model fit and 
parameter estimates of alternative specifications of the labour supply models with 
and without the heterogeneity adjustments. 
Chapter VIII contains the summary and conclusions. It also briefly draws out some 
implications of the research and provides suggestions for future work. 
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BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
This Chapter has two main objectives. The first part contains a brief discussion of 
several themes in the development economics literature which draws attention to the 
question of heterogeneity between family and hired labour. The main themes 
explored are labour market dualism and the celebrated inverse relationship between 
farm size and land productivity. The second part reviews the literature that is directly 
related to the tests of labour heterogeneity and the implications of heterogeneity for 
the analytical structure and estimation of a farm household model. This literature 
review has three sub -sections: (a) a summary of the previous specification and 
results from production function based tests of heterogeneity between family and 
hired labour; (b) a brief review of the labour supply estimation work that is relevant 
from the perspective of labour heterogeneity; and (c) a review of the Nepal- specific 
farm household model estimation and other relevant studies related to the empirical 
analysis of this study. 
2.1 Background Issues 
One of the key "stylized facts" about agricultural production in developing countries 
is that small farms are cultivated more intensively (i.e. with higher levels of variable 
inputs used per hectare) than bigger farms; and this leads to an observed inverse 
relationship between farm size and productivity (output per hectare).' The relatively 
greater application of inputs on smaller farms is most pronounced in the case of 
There is a large literature on this topic and it is not feasible to review it adequately in this Chapter. 
The older literature is surveyed in Sen (1975) and Ghosh (1979) mainly from an India -specific focus, 
and also in Berry and Cline (1979) with a Latin American focus. The size and productivity 
relationship has been clearly established in all other major South Asian countries: Bangladesh 
(Abedin and Bose 1988), Nepal (Grabowski and Belbase 1990), Pakistan (Mahmood and Hague 
1981). The inverse relationship is also robust to newer approaches to estimating farm production 
functions, including the random coefficient method (Hoque 1988). For a dissenting view on the 
genuine nature of the inverse relationship see Rudra (1992). 
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labour inputs. The labour input per hectare on small farms is consistently higher than 
on bigger farms over a large range of farm sizes; and this result holds whether or not 
average yields on small farms are higher (Berry and Cline 1979). 
Based on the above stylized facts of traditional agriculture, many authors went on to 
claim that a re- distributive land reform policy would be desirable not only from an 
equity point of view, but also from an efficiency consideration because breaking up 
hired -labour -based large farms into smaller family based farms would also increase 
agricultural output (Berry and Cline 1979). Such a line of ceteris paribus reasoning 
can be quite misleading. Everything else is unlikely to be the same after the land 
reforms. The early literature also did not address precisely what were the sources of 
the labour market dualism leading to higher intensity of cultivation on the smaller 
farms, and whether they would still be maintained after the land transfers. 
Traditionally three general explanations have been offered for the observed inverse 
relationship, with regard to both labour input and yields: 
a. decreasing returns to scale; 
b. omitted variable bias due to unobserved higher quality of land on small 
farms; and 
c. factor market imperfections, especially in rural Iabour markets, that induce 
small farmers to apply too much family labour on their own -farm cultivation, 
relative to the market wages they face. 
Of these three explanations, the empirical evidence for decreasing returns to scale in 
traditional agriculture is quite weak (Bardhan 1973, Moll 1990). Also, it is not a 
very plausible explanation in settings of extremely small average farm sizes. For 
instance, Benjamin (1995) documents a strong inverse relationship in Java within a 
sample of farms where the mean farm size is 0.71 hectares with a standard deviation 
of 0.01. There would be few a priori reasons to expect decreasing returns to scale in 
the technology available to farmers within such a narrow distribution of farm size. 
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More recent work on the inverse size and productivity relationship has focussed on 
land quality heterogeneity (Bhalla and Roy 1988). This new evidence, especially 
from India, indicates that smaller farms tend to be more productive because of better 
irrigation facilities and other innate land quality differentials that in turn induce the 
higher labour input. In such a setting, breaking up the big farms into many smaller 
ones would not have any output increasing effect. 
The evidence is mixed about the relative importance of these two main explanations 
for the inverse relationship - unobserved land quality differences or factor market 
imperfections. Where the data allow for controlling the effects of possible 
correlation between farm size and unobserved land quality, the inverse relationship 
with respect to output sometimes disappears, as in Bhalla and Roy (1988) with 
Indian data, or still remains strong, as in Carter (1984), also with Indian data. 
The traditional explanations focussing on labour market imperfections were based 
on a hypothesized difference in the "mode of cultivation" between small and big 
farms, leading to a form of labour market dualism within the agricultural sector. The 
causes and consequences of labour market dualism in developing countries has been 
an important strand in the development economics literature for a long time. While 
inter- sectoral wage gaps (i.e. a gap between the rural agricultural labour wage rate 
and an urban sector labour wage rate in real terms) have been the main focus of this 
literature, following Harris and Todaro (1970), the presence of dualism within the 
rural /agricultural sector is also widely recognized (Mazumdar 1975, 1989; Iqbal 
1981). 
In a farm household model framework, the essence of labour market dualism líes in 
the simple presumption that the real cost of unpaid family labour - measured as the 
rate of utility substitution between leisure and consumption - is not equated to a 
common market wage rate for labour (Sen 1975). Consequently, the real cost of 
(identical) labour can differ among rural households even in a localized village 
labour market. 
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This line of explanation, while plausible in the institutional setting of traditional 
family based agriculture, is not wholly consistent with the empirical facts that small 
farms also rely to a considerable extent on hired labour; and that a large part of the 
hired labour on big farms is supplied by self -cultivating small farmers. In addition, 
there is a growing general acceptance and empirical support for relatively well 
functioning rural labour markets (Rosenzweig 1986, Benjamin 1992) which goes 
against the main grain of Sen's explanation. One should note that the existence of 
some form of labour market imperfections also implies that there are related 
imperfections in the land rental markets that prevent the wage gap being erased 
through changes in the scale of operation of the small and big farms (Binswagner 
and Rosenzweig 1986). 
An extreme form of the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity 
occurs when the output per hectare is strongly declining in the size of a plot within 
the same farm- household. Udry, et al. (1995) estimate a farm production function 
using the very detailed plot Ievel data collected by ICRISAT from Burkina Faso. 
With a panel data estimation framework they show that, controlling for household 
and annual fixed effects, output is strongly declining with the size of the plot within 
a farm. The usual factor market imperfection story cannot explain such a relationship 
since it occurs among plots cultivated within the same household, and not across 
households that may face different opportunity costs of labour. Among a variety of 
possible explanations, Udry, et al. note that this may be an indication of labour 
monitoring problems on bigger plot within a household. 
An alternative explanation for the lower labour input per unit of land on bigger 
farms, which does not rely on labour market failure, is to explicitly account for the 
differences in the efficiency of hired and family labour time due to difficulties in 
monitoring the effort applied by hired labour. Feder (1985) has formalized a model 
with supervisory costs of using hired labour (and with credit constraints) which 
gives rise to an inverse relationship between farm size and labour use and output, 
even with well functioning land and labour markets. Incentive related differences in 
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the effort applied by farm labour in other forms of agricultural organizations, such as 
collective farms, has also been noted (Sicular 1986). 
However, there has been very limited work on empirical testing for heterogeneity 
between family and hired labour. Still less work has been done to show whether any 
observed heterogeneity can be related to the principal -agent type of incentive 
problem (Douglas 1989), or to the related costs of monitoring the effort applied by 
hired labour (Binswagner and Rosenzweig 1986). If labour heterogeneity is related 
to work incentives, with family labour being more productive, this would offer an 
alternative explanation for the inverse relationship between labour use and farm size 
without explicitly relying on factor market imperfections. 
Even when there is clear evidence for labour heterogeneity, with family labour based 
small farms being more productive, the efficiency based argument for land reform is 
not clearly established without knowing in detail the sources of the labour 
heterogeneity. It could be that family labour is more productive solely because the 
family members in households that own or operate some land are better fed than 
hired workers who usually come from landless households. There is some evidence 
that nutritional status does affect the effort expended in farm work (Deolalikar 1988). 
Hence, for example, if nutritional deficiencies are at the source of labour 
heterogeneity, the incentive related analytical categories of family and hired labour 
are not relevant. The nutritional deficiencies of the landless workers could be 
remedied without turning them into owner -cultivators (although doing so through a 
re- distributive land reform program would also improve their nutritional status and 
hence productivity). The policy problem becomes one of choosing a first -best option. 
2.2 Literature Review 
This section provides a more detailed review of the specific methodology and results 
obtained in previous studies in relation to direct or indirect tests for heterogeneity 
between family and hired labour. A second sub -section reviews the labour supply 
estimation literature from the perspective of the implications of labour 
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heterogeneity. A third part of this section reviews the Nepal -specific literature with 
respect to empirical estimation of farm household production and labour supply 
decisions. 
(a) Labour heterogeneity 
The main approach to testing for heterogeneity between family and hired labour has 
been through production function estimations that rely on alternative specifications 
of the labour input. Tests for labour heterogeneity in a production function 
framework ask two different but related questions. First, are family and hired labour 
perfect or imperfect substitutes in the farm production process as measured by the 
elasticity of substitution between them? Second, regardless of the degree of 
substitution between them, are the marginal effects on output from a unit increase in 
family labour the same as the effect from an unit increase in hired labour? The latter 
is a test for the equality of the marginal products of family and hired labour from a 
purely technological perspective.' 
These tests can be done with family and hired labour specified as two distinct inputs 
which enter the production function (Jacoby 1993, Squires 1994). Or, the production 
function can have a nested structure in which, at the first step, a composite labour 
services variable can be specified as a function of the observed levels of family and 
hired labour inputs. At a second stage, the composite labour variable enters as a 
single input in the production function with other non -labour variables (Deolalikar 
and Vijverberg 1983, 1987 and Frisvold 1994).' The former is a more general 
specification, but it is not always feasible to implement, especially if there are many 
cases with zero -values for any of the labour categories in the sample data. 
z This is a measure of the technical efficiency of hired and family labour. If there is a difference in 
the wage rates to be paid to family and hired labour, then at the optimal labour allocation, the ratio of 
the marginal product of family and hired labour would, of course, reflect the difference in their 
relative wage rates. 
Testing for labour heterogeneity with a nested production function structure is valid only when the 
main production function is separable in the labour inputs. Otherwise a consistent labour aggregate is 
not defined (Chambers, 19868; Berndt and Christensen 1974). Empirical applications of the nested 
production function structure have not always been based on the required prior test for labour input 
separability. 
21 
Bardhan (1973) is one of the earliest examples of a specific test for labour 
heterogeneity embedded in a production function estimated with farm level data 
(from the Indian Farm Management surveys). Bardhan's production function 
specification was Cobb -Douglas where the ratio of hired labour to total labour 
entered as a separate input. The value and the sign of the coefficient on the labour 
ratio variable provide a test for labour heterogeneity. For most of his different 
samples Bardhan finds that the coefficient for the ratio variable is insignificant, 
implying homogeneous labour. In the few cases where the labour ratio variable is 
significant, its sign is positive, implying hired labour is more productive than family 
labour. 
Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1983) have criticized Bardhan's test as being based on an 
unsatisfactory functional specification, and also for not distinguishing clearly 
between imperfect substitutability and differential marginal effects. In particular, a 
Cobb- Douglas specification with the ratio of hired labour to total labour entered as a 
separate variable implies that hired labour is an essential input. Output is zero if the 
hired labour ratio is zero; and this can possibly bias the coefficient on the ratio 
variable to be positive (Deolalikar and Vijverberg 1983:48). 
Using aggregate district -level data for India, Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1983) used 
a more general functional specification to test for labour heterogeneity. They specify 
a nested production structure in which the overall production function is Cobb - 
Douglas with a composite labour services input. The composite labour input, in turn, 
is specified under various alternatives of a CES or Diewert's generalized linear 
production function. They find strong evidence for limited substitution between 
family and hired labour. Their estimates of the Allen partial elasticity of substitution 
(AES) between family and hired labour ranged from 0.6 to 2.4, under different 
specifications.' They also find substantial difference in the marginal product of 
family and hired labour, with family labour being more productive. 
These are the estimates of AES between family and hired labour in the function for the nested 
labour input. Such an AES is distinct from the AES between family and hired labour in the overall 
production function (Deolalikar and Vijverberg 1983). 
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Using conventional F tests on the restrictions on the model parameters and the 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) J test for non -nested models, Deolalikar and 
Vijverberg conclude that their "best specification" of the agricultural production 
function is a Cobb -Douglas relationship between family and hired labour. This 
specification actually transforms the entire production function also into a Cobb - 
Douglas relationship with family and hired labour as distinct labour inputs.' Such a 
preferred specification is due in part to the nature of the aggregate data which is at 
the district level, and hence, all sample points have non -negative values of both the 
family and hired labour input. In the preferred specification the marginal product of 
family labour is 2.5 times the marginal product of hired labour at the mean of the 
data. While a finding of a higher productivity of family labour is plausible, such a 
large discrepancy in the relative marginal effects is implausible. If it is not due to the 
aggregate nature of the data, which the authors cite as a possible explanation, it is 
likely to be an indication of the mis -specification of a Cobb -Douglas production 
function with family and hired labor as distinct inputs." 
Aware of the potential bias in the results due to the use of aggregate district -level 
data, Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1987) made another effort to test for labour 
heterogeneity using household level data for a sample of Indian and Malaysian 
farms. The estimation methodology is similar, with a quadratic labour services 
function nested into a second level Cobb -Douglas production function. Again, they 
find strong evidence for imperfect substitutability, but the result on the marginal 
effects are reversed, with an estimated higher productivity of hired labour in both of 
5 A Cobb -Douglas labour service "production function" nested within an overall Cobb -Douglas 
production function specified in terms of a composite labour variable is equivalent to a single 
equation Cobb -Douglas specification with family and hired labour as distinct inputs, without any 
additional parameter restrictions. 
6 The data used by Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1983) for the labour input are not in terms of actual 
hours of work but in terms of the average number of persons per farm holding in the family labour 
and hired labour category in a district. If the average days actually worked for each labour category 
are different then the estimates of the marginal products of labour per work -day will differ. If the 
number of days worked on average by one family worker is higher than the number of work days of 
one hired labour, as is to be expected in poor family farms, then the ratio of the actual marginal 
product per work -day of family and hired labour could be substantially less than the 2.5 value 
implied in their estimates. 
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the Indian and Malaysian samples. At the mean of the data, the estimated elasticity 
of substitution between family and hired labour is 0.68 in the Indian sample, and 1.1 
6 in the Malaysian sample. In both cases these estimated values are not significantly 
different from unity, implying again that a Cobb- Douglas specification for the labour 
nest would be appropriate.' 
The ratio of the marginal product of family to hired labour ranges from 0.32 for the 
Indian sample to 0.78 in the Malaysian sample. Even when family and hired labour 
are imperfect substitutes, it is difficult to explain why in the Indian sample the 
marginal product of hired labour is three times higher than the marginal product of 
family labour (at the mean of the data). To reconcile this with profit maximizing 
behaviour the shadow wage rate for these two inputs should vary by a factor of three, 
which is a highly implausible scenario. 
Squires and Tabor (1994) use a translog production function specification to test for 
the degree of substitution between family and hired in a large regionally stratified 
sample of Indonesian farms. Their estimates of the Hicksian elasticities of 
substitution' between family and hired labour fluctuate in sign, indicating a 
substitute relationship in some regions and crops, and a complementary relationship 
in others. Their overall results show a limited extent of substitution between family 
and hired labour, in particular when measured by the direct elasticity of substitution 
between them. These values are usually much smaller than one (the implied value 
from a Cobb -Douglas specification). 
Frisvold (1994) approaches the question of labour heterogeneity from the 
perspective of supervision costs imposed by hired labour. Using a particular 
interpretation of supervision costs by assuming that monitoring of hired labour is 
Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1987) do not actually provide estimates for a Cobb -Douglas labour nest 
because of the problem of zero values for hired labour in a large portion of the sample for India. 
Ignoring this problem of zero values, the result of a unitary elasticity of substitution means the 
generalized quadratic equation could be replaced with the Cobb -Douglas form. 
The Hicksian elasticity of substitution and other related concepts of input substitutability in a multi - 
factor setting are defined and discussed in Section 6.3.4 of Chapter VI. 
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more effective when family members work together with hired labour, Frisvold 
measures the effect of employer supervision on the productivity of hired labour. If 
family and hired labour were perfect substitutes in production with no "shirking" 
behaviour by hired labour, the supervision effect should be insignificant. If 
supervision effects were present then family and hired labour would be imperfect 
substitutes with a certain degree of complementary. Increased allocation of family 
labour, working along side with hired labour and providing supervision, would 
increase the marginal productivity of hired labour. Using the very detailed plot level 
production data collected by ICRISAT for their village level studies from southern 
India, Frisvold reports three major findings: 
(i) family and hired labor are imperfect substitutes, and the elasticity of 
substitution decreases as the ratio of hired to family labour increases; 
(ii) the productivity of hired labour increases with the supervision intensity 
of family labour, but at a decreasing rate; and 
(iii) the labour effort expended per unit of time of family labour is higher 
than that of hired labour, but this differential diminishes with increases in 
supervision intensity. At high levels of supervision, the productivity of hired 
labour approaches that of family labour. 
Because of the very detailed ICRISAT data set used in Frisvold's study, these results 
are very significant. 
The question of labour heterogeneity has also been addressed in the context of other 
labour categories, particularly between the labour input of male and female workers. 
Laufer (1985), using the same ICRISAT data for India, has estimated the elasticity 
of substitution between male and female labour using a generalized quadratic 
production function with male and female labour as distinct inputs. She finds 
evidence for imperfect substitution, but her results, based on separate estimations for 
different crops, give widely divergent values for the AES. Male and female labour 
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are estimated to be complements (negative AES) in rice and sorghum production but 
substitutes (positive AES) in legumes. Laufer explains the wide divergence of results 
by noting that the notional categories of male and female labour may actually be 
capturing the functional nature of the different tasks performed by male and female 
workers, given the strict division of labour by gender. 
Another important result presented by Laufer is the comparison of the ratio of the 
marginal product of male and female labour. The marginal product of female labour 
is always lower than that of male labour. Their ratio ranges from 0.49 to 0.77 and 
this variation is consistent with the range of the observed ratio of the female to male 
wage rates in the sample villages. 
Udry (1996), using the detailed plot level ICRISAT data for Burkina Faso, also finds 
substantial gender differences of a more general nature. Using a nested CES 
production function structure with a multi- factor CES labour nest that specifies four 
labour categories - adult family male, adult family female, family child and non- 
household labour - Udry estimates the elasticity of substitution for each pair to be 
0.63.9 Udry also presents dramatic evidence that in a given household, where some 
plots are under the control of the male husband and other plots under the control of 
his wives, the productivity on plots controlled by women are significantly less than 
the productivity on plots controlled by the husband for the same crop. This result is 
not due to differences in technology or lower efficiency of female labour, which 
tends to be concentrated in plots controlled by women, but to an overall lower 
intensity of cultivation of plots controlled by women. Using the same data set, Udry, 
et al. (1995) actually estimate that the marginal product of female labour is higher 
than male labour over all plots.10 
9 In a multi- factor CES production function the Allen partial elasticity of substitution between each 
input pair must be the same (Uzawa 1963). 
Udry, et al. (1995) acknowledge the higher marginal product of female labour is due partly to 
crop -composition effects since women tend to specialize in high value vegetable crops grown on 
their plot with predominantly female labour. 
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Empirical tests for labour heterogeneity have not always rejected the traditional 
assumption of homogeneity between family and hired labour. Benjamin (1992), 
using detailed SUSENAS survey data for Indonesia and concentrating only on rice 
growing farms, tests for a linear specification of an effective labour composite of the 
form Le = LF + O Lx" He does not reject the null hypothesis of O = I, and hence 
does not reject the joint null hypothesis of perfect substitution and equal efficiency 
between family and hired labour. His tests also support a linear procedure for 
aggregating male and female labour, subject to a relative wage adjustment factor. 
Elizabeth Field (1988) provides an interesting test for the heterogeneity between free 
and slave labour in the cotton plantation economy of the ante -bellum southern 
United States. Using a translog production function with free and slave labour as 
distinct inputs, she finds that the Hicksian elasticity of complementarity (HEC) 
between free and slave labour was positive on both small and large plantations. 
These two labour inputs were q- complements, in that a higher application of one 
increased the marginal product of the other.12 She also tests for the separability of 
these two labour inputs from the other inputs in the production function and finds 
evidence for weak separability. Thus free and slave labor can be combined into some 
aggregate índex of labour input; but a simple linear combination, implying that they 
were perfect substitutes, is not supported by the data. 
Pitt and Rosenzweig (1986) provide a novel indirect test of labour heterogeneity and 
the underlying assumption of the recursiveness of the production and consumption 
decisions of farm households. Using household level data from Indonesia that 
identified the incidence and severity of ill- health suffered by household members, 
they test whether the bouts of illness significantly affect the household's labour 
" Le is effective Iabour, LF is family labour and L5 is hired labour, with O representing a constant 
difference in their productivity in effective units. 
12 The definition and interpretation of the Hicksian elasticity of complementarity is discussed more 
fully in Chapter VT of this thesis, together with the need to mind the p's and g's when talking about 
substitutes and complements, as reminded by Seidman (1989). The empirical tests for the 
heterogeneity and separability of family and hired labour reported in Chapter VI is exactly analogous 
to the specification and tests carried out by Field (1988) for free and slave labour. 
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supply as well as farm profits. They find that while illness significantly reduced the 
labour supply, farm profits are unaffected. This is an indirect test for labour 
homogeneity: market substitutes apparently can he found for the significant illness - 
induced reduction in the farm family's own labour supply on farm cultivation. They 
interpret such a result as proof that family and hired labour are homogeneous inputs 
and also as evidence for the recursive structure of the production and consumption/ 
labour supply components of the farm household model. 
(b) labour supply 
The labour supply decisions of farm households have not yet been as extensively 
analyzed as labour supply functions of workers in developed countries; and reliable 
estimates of the various elasticities of labour supply are few. But the available 
evidence (Singh, Squire and Strauss 1986c1, Bardhan 1979, Rosenzweig 1980) 
show that labor supply responses of farm households are not uniform across 
different asset class and farm size variables. The effects of changes in the wage rate 
and asset income on the labour supply of individuals varies particularly between 
landless /small farm cultivators working mainly on the off -farm wage market and 
larger farm cultivators who may allocate their total labour supply both to own farm 
cultivation and to off -farm wage employment. 
One of the main methodological issues in modeling the labour supply behavior of 
farm households that devote some family labour to own farm cultivation is the 
identification of the wage rate to represent the true opportunity cost of family labour 
at the equilibrium position. There are three general approaches taken on this issue. 
The first and most common approach has been to relate the opportunity cost of 
family labour in all households to the observed off -farm market wage rate, 
irrespective of whether a particular individual actually works off -farm or not. This 
assumption is consistent with a recursive structure of a farm household model with 
homogeneous labour, where the labour supply decision can be modeled separately 
from the production decisions. This is the approach adopted in Bardhan (1979) and 
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Rosenzweig (1980) which were some of the earliest examples of labour supply 
estimation for developing countries using large data sets. Assigning a common 
observed market wage rate as the opportunity cost of family labour is not always 
valid even under the assumption of homogeneous labour. (See the subsequent 
discussion in Chapter III). This assumption is even more suspect if family and hired 
labour are allowed to be heterogeneous inputs. 
A second approach to labour supply estimation for farm households in a developing 
country setting has been implemented by Jacoby (1993) and Skoufias (1994), where 
the opportunity cost for family labour is equated to an estimated value of the 
marginal product of labour in own farm cultivation. This is an adaptation of the 
general methodology for estimating a structural labour supply equation for self - 
employed workers applied to a farm setting. It is analogous to the treatment of 
labour supply in the presence of progressive income taxes by "linearizing" the 
budget constraint as suggested by Hall (1973). In this method the estimation is done 
in a two -step procedure. In the first step, a farm -level production function is 
estimated, conditioning on the optimal levels of family labour supply that is 
observed. From the estimated parameters of the production function the marginal 
product of family labour can be derived for each sample household. These estimated 
marginal products are the appropriate shadow wage for valuing family labour and 
are also used to derive the "shadow" profit of the farm household from land 
ownership, which is included as non -labour income in the labour supply equation. In 
the second step, the labour -leisure equilibrium choice can be modeled as if the farm 
household were a pure consumer household which faced a parametrically given 
exogenous wage and non -labour income. 13 
The third approach has been to jointly estimate the production and labour supply 
components of the farm- household model in a non -recursive structure, allowing for 
the shadow wage rate for family labour to be endogenously determined. This 
`3 Further details of this approach are given in Chapter IV since the estimation strategy used in this 
thesis is a simpler adaptation of the approach suggested by Jacoby (1993). 
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approach, however, is analytically cumbersome and requires complex estimation 
methods. Examples are Lopez (1984) and Newman and Gertler (1994). 
The data set used in Bardhan (1979) is a large sample of nearly 5000 rural 
households in West Bengal from the Indian National Sample Survey. For the sample 
of male agricultural workers the wage coefficient is significantly positive. With the 
same model specification, Bardhan finds an insignificant wage response for male 
labour supply in the sample of own -farm cultivators. The wage elasticity for male 
agricultural workers was estimated to be between 0.2 to 0.3. The wage response was 
particularly insensitive for female workers in both types of households, with some 
indication of a backward bending labour supply curve for female labour supply. 
Other variables such as caste and marital status appear to be more important 
determinants of female labour supply. 
Bardhan (1984) repeats the labour supply specification of his 1979 paper with 
another sample of households in West Bengal from a different round of the National 
Sample Survey. In this sample the wage effect is negative for male labour supply, 
which is opposite of the result obtained in the earlier paper. The wage effect is 
positive but insignificant for female labour supply. In both studies Bardhan develops 
a variety of wage measurements based on the reported market wage to accurately 
reflect the opportunity cost of family and market labour; but the wage sensitivity is 
quite low in almost all specifications. 
Rosenzweig (1980), also using data from India and a labour supply equation 
specified with both male and female village level wage rates, finds that the supply of 
male labour is strongly backward bending for both landed and landless households. 
The labour supply curve for female workers is positively sloped with respect to the 
own wage, and the cross -wage effect is negative and significant. 
Jacoby (1993) applies the sequential estimation method to peasant farms in the 
highland region of Peru where family based subsistence farming is concentrated. In 
the production function estimation Jacoby specifies three labour inputs - family 
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male, family female and total hired. Jacoby tests for the separability of male and 
female family labour from the other inputs and finds the underlying production 
technology exhibits non -separability. Hence a translog function, with different 
interaction terms for these three distinct labour inputs is specified from which the 
marginal products of male and female family labour are estimated. This 
specification, however, results in negative values of the estimated marginal product 
of family labour, particularly for female labour, in nearly 20% of the sample. Jacoby 
is forced to drop these observations from the labour supply estimation step. For the 
subset of the sample with positive marginal products, the mean value of the marginal 
product of female labour is about 60% less than that of male family labour. 
The labour supply estimation results in Jacoby (1993), using an instrumented 
version of the computed marginal products as the shadow wage rate for the 
equilibrium allocation of family labour, are reasonable. Uncompensated own -wage 
elasticities are positive for both male and female workers and the income elasticities 
are negative. This leads to significantly positive compensated own -wage elasticities, 
which is consistent with utility maximization. The cross -wage effects in both the 
male and female labour supply equations are positive (implying male and female 
leisure are complements in the household utility function); but these cross -wage 
effects are small relative to own -wage effects. Male own -wage elasticities are higher 
than for female labour supply, which is counter to the usual result of higher own - 
wage responsiveness of female labour supply, at Ieast in developed country settings 
(Killingsworth and Heckman 1986). Jacoby indicates this result is mainly due to the 
definition of labour supply he has used, which includes domestic household work. 
Such a definition of female labour supply is likely to have a lower wage elasticity. 
Skoufias (1994) has applied the same methodology used by Jacoby to the ICRISAT 
data for India, in a panel data framework with fixed effects. He uses a Cobb- Douglas 
production function with four different labour inputs, distinguished by gender and 
family and hired source. While the fit of the estimated production function is very 
reasonable (the R -sq. is 0.92 in the fixed effects model) the computed values of the 
marginal products of labour at the mean of the data provide very divergent results 
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for the productivity of the four categories of labour. For instance, the marginal 
product of female family labour is estimated to be 4.7 times the marginal product of 
hired female labour. Similarly, the marginal product of female family labour is more 
than double the marginal product of male family labour. 14 There are no clear 
reasons to expect such large divergence in the marginal products by gender at the 
production optimum point. This result is likely to be a problem of the Cobb -Douglas 
specification with the four labour variables as distinct inputs. `5 
The labour supply results in Skoufias (1994) are also not fully satisfactory, 
especially for female family workers. Using the instrumented values of the estimated 
marginal products of family labour as the shadow wage rates, the uncompensated 
own wage effect is positive in the male labour supply equation, but the (female) 
cross -wage effect is negative, indicating male and female leisure are gross 
substitutes in this data set. The income effect is significantly negative for male 
labour supply, which is consistent with leisure being a normal good. Skoufias 
however obtains unusual results for the female labour supply equation - the gross 
uncompensated effect is negative, suggesting a backward bending labour supply 
curve. The explanation offered is the same as Jacoby's - that the labour supply 
variable includes all work activities including housework. But alternative estimates 
for labour supply excluding housework are not provided. 
A backward bending labour supply relation can, of course, be a valid result for the 
gross uncompensated own -wage effect. But in Skoufias' results, because of the 
insignificant value of the negative income effect for female labour supply, even the 
compensated own -wage effect is negative. This is inconsistent with utility 
maximization. These anomalous results are likely to have been caused by the widely 
Skoufias (1994) does not directly report the estimated marginal products of the four labour 
categories in his paper. They can be computed from the estimated parameter values for the 
production function and the summary of the data reported in his Table 1. The marginal products (per 
hour), estimated at the mean of the data, are Rs. 0.87 for family male labour, Rs. 2.19 for family 
female, Rs. 0.27 for hired male and Rs. 0.47 for hired female categories. 
is As reported above in part (a) of the literature review section on labour heterogeneity, Laufer 
(1985), using the same ICRISAT data set as Skoufias, reported a lower marginal product of female 
labour for all her crop- specific equations for the generalized quadratic production function. She 
confirms that her results are consistent with observed lower market wage rate for female labour. 
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divergent estimates of the marginal products of labour from his Cobb -Douglas 
production function specification with four distinct labour inputs. 
Lambert and Magnac (1994) carry out only the first step estimation of the 
production function for a farm household model with distinct labour inputs; but they 
provide direct comparisons of the estimated marginal products and the market wage 
rates. Their results also indicate the problems inherent in deriving the marginal 
product of labour with many categories of labour defined in the production function. 
Using data for the Ivory Coast, they estimate a generalized linear production 
function and compare the estimates of the shadow price (marginal product) of labour 
with the market wage rates. Their production function specification distinguishes 
three different labour inputs - hired labour, family male and family females. Their 
estimates reveal large differences between the marginal product of these three labour 
inputs, which, while indicative of labour heterogeneity, are puzzling. For instance, in 
one set of estimates using instrumental variables, the marginal products of labour per 
day are estimated to be 157.2, 0.62 and 3.14 for hired labour, male family labour and 
female family Iabour, respectively. 16 These large differences remain unexplained 
and are even more puzzling given that the average market wage rate reported in their 
data is 5.76. Again, this is probably an indication of mis- specification of the 
production function with these three different labour input categories. 
Given that Jacoby, Skoufias and Lambert and Magnac all find a very weak 
correlation between the estimated marginal products and observed market wage 
rates, Strauss and Duncan (1995) question the validity of using the estimated 
marginal products as proxies for the shadow wage rate, particularly if the estimation 
is based on survey data that does not have a detailed farm management component. 
Newman and Gertler (1994) develop and apply to Peruvian data the more general 
joint methodology for estimating the labour supply behaviour of self -employed 
16 The units for the marginal products are not clearly reported since the output variable is an index. 
Presumably these are in hundreds of the Central African Franc (CFA), which is the unit in which the 
market wage rates are reported. 
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family members in a non -recursive framework. They specify three different 
equations: a direct specification of the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between 
leisure and consumption to reflect household preferences, a market wage function 
for each individual in specific age -sex categories, and a marginal return to farm work 
function for individual by each age -sex categories." This last equation is specified in 
terms of prices and quasi -fixed inputs and human capital related variables. It can be 
derived as the derivative of an implicit farm profit function with respect to farm 
labour for an individual in a specific age -sex group, conditional on the total 
application of family labour on the farm. This procedure allows them to model the 
heterogeneity in family labour across specific age -sex groupings both in the 
production and consumption components of the model. 
On the consumption side, the MRS between leisure and consumption is, of course, 
not directly observable. But certain imputations can be made based on the first order 
conditions that equate the MRS to the marginal returns to labour. For individuals 
who report working in the off -farm labour market, the wage they receive will be 
equated to the MRS. For individuals who work only on the family farm, the shadow 
wage, which is equated to the MRS, can be computed from the marginal returns 
function. Since there is a dependence in both the underlying profit and utility 
function of one category of family labour on other categories, and since corner 
solutions for non -labor participation have to be explicitly modeled, this method of 
estimating the farm household model involves a great deal of econometric 
complexity, especially as household size and labour categories are increased. No 
other application of this approach appears to have been published to date, testifying 
to the great difficulty in implementing this methodology. 
'Newman and Gertler's estimation procedure could actually be done with a separate marginal return 
to labour and MRS function for each household individual, conditional on the labour supply 
behaviour of other household members. But this will only increase the already stupendous amount of 
time taken to iteratively solve and estimate their model. The authors report that a single run of their 
model took all night on a 486 personal computer. 
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(e) Nepal- specific literature 
The production component of farm household activities in Nepal have been studied 
in a growing number of empirical studies, based on production and profit function 
estimation strategies. But the specific question of heterogeneity between family and 
hired labour has not been directly addressed before. The labour supply and consumer 
demand system estimation for Nepalese rural households have been relatively 
neglected. When it comes to an integrated farm- household model estimation 
strategy, this author is aware of only one other study, Acharya (1987), which has 
adopted such a theoretically consistent framework. Even then, due to deficiencies in 
the data, the production and labour supply components in Acharya (1987) were not 
consistently linked in the actual estimation. 18 
Agricultural production function based studies at the household level in Nepal reveal 
a great deal of divergence in the regional patterns of production and input use both 
between the northern hill and southern lowland (tarai) region, as well as among the 
five development administrative regions which are defined on a east to west basis 
(NRB /ADB 1994). This variation indicates that in any large sample, with nationally 
representative data, regional fixed effects on productivity and labour use patterns are 
going to be important factors to consider. 
Because of a higher man -land ratio, the northern hill area agriculture is labour 
intensive and several studies have estimated a very low marginal productivity of 
labour in hill agriculture - i.e. Belbase (1985). Similar direct estimates of the 
marginal product of labor for the tarai region agriculture are not available. Belbase 
and Grabowski (1985) and Grabowski and Belbase (1986) show divergences in 
technical efficiency of farms varying according to farm size; but they do not 
8 Acharya had to use a different data set to estimate the production function and labour supply 
components of the farm household estimation. In addition, her labour supply data is of limited 
quality since it does not have information on the actual hours or days of work. 
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discuss the underlying causes.19 The issue of the work intensity of hired labour in 
particular, and the more general question of heterogeneity between different labour 
categories in Nepalese agriculture, have not been adequately addressed. 
Mudhbary (1989) estimates an AIDS consumer demand system focussed only on the 
demand for various food categories. Labour supply /leisure demand is not 
considered. Several other studies look at labour supply in the limited sense of off - 
farm market employment, ignoring the labour supplied on own farm cultivation. An 
example is Rauniyar (1986) who provides labour supply estimation results for the 
off -farm work days only from a small household sample drawn from two districts in 
Nepal. He reports significant positive own wage coefficients for the labour supply 
behaviour of both men and women. As expected the incidence of off -farm labour 
supply is negatively related to farm size 
The farm production component in Acharya (1987) is modeled with a quadratic 
profit function from which the first order conditions for the optimal factor demands 
provide the estimating equations. Acharya treats family labour as quasi -fixed inputs 
and estimates only the demand for hired labour conditional on the available stock of 
family workers. She finds that the demand for hired labour is negatively correlated 
to the own wage for both male and female labour. The cross -wage elasticities 
suggest male and female labour inputs are complements - an increase in the male 
wage rate also reduces the demand for female hired labour. She attributes this result 
to the strict gender based division of labour so that an increase in any wage reduces 
the demand for all types of labour. Within both gender categories, family labour is a 
substitute for hired labour. She estimates the hired labour demand system separately 
for two crops and four regional samples, and there is no clear uniformity in the 
relationship between the four labour categories. Also some of elasticity estimates are 
unreasonable - for example, the own wage elasticity for male hired labour demand is 
in excess of (plus) 5.0 (Acharya 1987: 153, Table 5.3). 
19 Moll (1990) has raised a strong objection to the findings reported in Grabowski and Belbase 
(1986), claiming their results of lower technical efficiency on large farms is due to the curve fitting 
nature of their estimated production function, and not due to a test of the hypothesis of lower 
efficiency on larger farms. See Grabowski (1990) for a response. 
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On the labour supply estimation component, Acharya estimates labour force 
participation and days of work equations separately for male and female household 
members. The dependant variable in the labour supply equation is not a scale 
variable that reflects the actual amount of time spent on specific work activities. The 
dependant variable was assembled from time allocation data that recorded only the 
frequency with which an individual engaged in specific activities within the 
observation period. The actual duration of each activity was not recorded. Even with 
such a limited proxy variable for labour supply, Acharya reports very reasonable 
results. Both the labour market participation decision and the frequency of work 
variables have positive wage effects and negative income effects. 
The own -wage elasticity of labour supply was estimated to be 0.17 for males and 
slightly higher at 0.24 for female family members. The non -wage income effect, 
represented by the value of farm assets, is also significantly negative for both 
genders. These theoretically expected results, especially for female labour supply are 
significant, since in many other settings female work force participation and total 
working hours have been found to be unresponsive to wages and asset income (Ho 
1980), or perhaps even having a backward bending relationship with respect to the 
wage rate (Bardhan 1979, Skoufias 1993). 
Apart from wage and non -labour income, Acharya's results indicate that ethnic and 
caste grouping and demographic characteristics, such as family size and the number 
of adult workers per household also affect individual level labour supply decisions. 
Cooke (1998) provides an example of a cross -sectional estimation of the demand for 
labour in the hill region agriculture of Nepal, using the observed market wage rate 
to value family labour. The main focus of Cooke's analysis is to determine how 
labour allocation of the family farm is affected by the scarcity of environmental 
goods - such as firewood, fodder and drinking water - that rural households have to 
collect with family labour, especially of women. She estimates a labour demand 
system that includes as regressors the wage rates for male and female labour, as well 
as the shadow price of the environmental goods, which are the wage -based valuation 
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of the time taken to collect them. She assumes that male and female labour inputs 
are imperfect substitutes in production, but within each gender family and hired 
labour are perfect substitutes. With this specification she finds that the demand for 
labour is either insensitive to the human labour wage or increasing with the wage.20 
The latter result is theoretically inconsistent. Hence, the market wage may not 
accurately reflect the opportunity cost of family labour on the demand side as well. 
The studies noted above provide a scattering of empirical work on rural households 
in Nepal. A complete farm household estimation strategy that also considers the 
question of labour heterogeneity between family and hired labour has not been 
carried out to date. 
Another study related to the empirical work of this thesis is Hamal (1992) which 
presents the results of a profit function estimation for Nepalese agriculture, using 
aggregate national data for the 1961 to 1987 period. While Hamal's main significant 
finding is that total factor productivity growth in Nepalese agriculture, calculated 
from a growth accounting framework, has been negative during this period,21 he 
also carried out a detailed empirical estimation of a translog cost function. He 
specified four main inputs: land, homogenous labour, bullock power and chemical 
fertilizers. He computes the Allen partial elasticity of substitution between these 
inputs for various time sub -periods. All of the estimated AES are positive - implying 
all pairs of inputs are q- substitutes. The key estimate of the AES between land and 
labour is equal to one in all the specific time periods of his estimates; and most of 
the other AES are also very close to one, indicating an underlying Cobb -Douglas 
primal technology. 
20 In Cooke's estimation results the coefficient on the human wage rate variable will of course be 
affected by the presence of the shadow price variables for the environmental goods. These shadow 
prices are just the valuation of the time taken to collect these goods, using the market wage rate to 
value an unit of time. So there is likely to be a strong correlation between these price variables. A 
separate labour demand equation without the other shadow wage variables was not reported. With 
respect to her main hypothesis, Cooke finds that labour input in farm cultivation is unaffected by the 
time taken to collect environment goods as reflected in her shadow prices for environmental goods. 
2' This result is consistent with the fact that large tracts of forested land, particularly in the tarai 
region, have been brought under cultivation without a commensurate increase in farm output. 
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2.3 Summary 
While there is a large and growing literature on the estimation of farm household 
models for developing country settings, the specific issue of labour heterogeneity 
between family an hired labour has not been addressed in an integrated farm 
household model framework. There are a few studies that have looked at labour 
heterogeneity purely from a production function perspective. Production function 
estimates reveal a low degree of substitution between family and hired labour as well 
as different marginal effects in output; but the results are mixed and affected by the 
tendency to use limited functional form specifications. The specific sources of 
heterogeneity are not clearly specified. 
Attempts to estimate a non -recursive model with many different types of labour 
category lead to puzzling results with very large discrepancies in the marginal 
product of the different labour categories. Specifications based on an aggregate 
labour composite, allowing for heterogeneity between the different components, are 
likely to do better 
On the labour supply component, the approach most commonly used in the past 
(based on assigning the market wage rates of all farm households) produces mixed 
results. While more elaborate approaches to modeling the self -employment of family 
labour in peasant farming have been developed, these have not directly related the 
shadow wage rate applicable for family labour to the nature of the heterogeneity 
between family and hired labour. Nor do they take account of the fact that shadow 
wage rates should vary according to the labour hiring status of the farm household. 
Alternative strategies of estimating labour heterogeneity and labour supply in a 
consistent manner have not been satisfactorily addressed in previous studies in 
general and much less so in the context of Nepalese agriculture. In the case of Nepal, 
even ignoring the labour heterogeneity issue, there has been a very limited focus on 
the empirical modeling of the decision -making framework of rural farm households. 
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CHAPTER III 
A FARM -HOUSEHOLD MODELWITH HETEROGENEOUS LABOR INPUTS 
3.1. Introduction 
This Chapter presents the analytical structure of a farm household model allowing 
for family and hired labour to be either heterogeneous or homogeneous inputs in 
production. The model structure allows for different types of heterogeneity, and 
homogeneity of the labour inputs occurs as a special case of the general model. The 
focus is not on the specific source of this heterogeneity, but the manner in which it 
affects the analytical structure of the basic farm household model. A key objective of 
this Chapter is to show under what conditions the recursive property of farm 
household models is maintained, even with heterogeneous labour inputs; and to 
derive the implications of this structure for estimating the labour supply component 
of the model. 
Section 3.2 presents a model where family and hired labour are treated as completely 
separate inputs, which is the most general form of labour heterogeneity. The next 
section discusses the various difficulties in specifying and in estimating a farm 
household model of this general form. Section 3.4 presents an alternative model with 
a nested production structure where in the first stage family and hired labour are 
combined to create an aggregate or composite labour unit which then enters into the 
farm production function in the second stage. Section 3.5 derives the labour supply 
implications of the nested production structure with heterogeneous labour. One 
important advantage of a farm household model structure with a nested aggregate 
labour input is that the "shadow wage rate" for family labour can be related to the 
observed market wage rate for hired labour, when both family and hired labour are 
simultaneously used on the family farm. Such a relationship helps in identifying the 
correct effective wage rate to be used in the estimation of labour supply functions for 
family labour even when it is applied solely to the family farm. 
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The structure of the farm household model presented in this Chapter is focussed on 
the treatment of family and hired labour as heterogeneous inputs. Many other 
important and analytically interesting issues that can be incorporated into farm 
household models (i.e., home goods production, marketable surplus of farm 
production) are not incorporated into the models presented in this Chapter.' It also 
adopts the convention of treating a multi -person farm household as a single decision 
making unit which maximizes household level utility, ignoring decision making 
based on individual utility maximization and bargaining among the household 
members.' 
3.2. Analytical Structure of a Model with Heterogeneous Labour 
Let U represent an aggregate household utility function defined over a composite 
consumption good C and leisure .C. Let T be the total labour time endowment of 
the household that has three components: own -farm labour use (F), market wage 
employment (M) and leisure (E ). The inputs in the farm production process are 
land area cultivated (A), family labour (F) and hired labour (H); and the two types of 
labour are initially treated as distinct inputs. For simplicity assume there is a single 
(or composite) farm output, and other variable inputs in the production process are 
ignored because they have little bearing on the treatment of the heterogeneity 
between family and hired labour inputs'. The farm household also has non -labour 
endowment income of E. 
This approach also ignores the Beckerian tradition of treating household production of consumption 
goods based on inputs of purchased goods and family labour time. Becker's (1965) new household 
economics is a separate development that is mainly applied to developed country settings. 
2 See Chiappori (1988, 1997) for household models with individual bargaining. 
3 The main analytical relevance of explicitly modeling other variable inputs is that the presence of 
other variable inputs may affect the marginal product of the two types of labour in different ways. If 
the ratio of the marginal product of family labour to that of hired labour is sensitive to the level of 
other inputs, the production function is not separable in the two labour inputs (Chambers, 1986: 43). 
This means the two labour inputs cannot be consistently aggregated into a composite labour input. In 
a particular setting whether family and hired labour are separable inputs is an empirical question; and 
this is addressed in Chapter VI. Note this use of the term "separable" as a property of the production 
function is different from the "separable" (recursive) property of farm household models. 
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Let p represent the price of farm output and p, (normalized to 1) the price of the 
composite consumption good. Let wh be the wage rate at which labour can be hired 
in and w the net wage rate which family labour receives when it is supplied in the 
hired labour market. (It is common to fmd wh > w because it is likely there will be 
some costs associated with working away from one's home; but no restrictions on 
these wage rates are imposed a priori). For simplicity assume that the net wage rate 
received for all off -farm work is uniform - i.e. w applies to all alternative sources of 
employment for family labour outside of its own -farm cultivation, whether it be 
agricultural work on big farms or non -agricultural work within or outside the rural 
areas. It is assumed that labour markets clear and households do not face binding 
quantity constraints on either their labour demand or labour supply. The normal 
seasonal fluctuation in agricultural wages is also ignored (although the analytical 
framework of the model with a uniform wage will be valid in each of the specific 
time periods during which the seasonal wage is assumed fixed). 
The household's maximization problem can then be set up as follows : 
(3.1) max U(C, .C) 
subject to 
(3.2) C=pQ +wM-whH+E 
(3.3) Q = f(F, H, A) 
(3.4) T =L'+F+M 
(3.5) F> 0; M >0; H>0 
The constraints 3.2 to 3.4 deal, respectively, with the household cash income 
constraint for the purchase of the consumption good (C), the farm production 
technology constraint, and the household total time endowment constraint. The Iast 
restriction (3.5) imposes non -negativity constraints on the labour categories, 
allowing households the option to set M, F and H to zero. 
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It is analytically convenient to combine the three budget constraints represented by 
Eq. 3.2 to 3.4 into a single constraint referred to as the "full income" constraint. This 
will be of the form4 
(3.2n) C + w_e = {pQ -wF - w''1-11 + wT + E 
= II +wT +E 
where II represents the (short run) profits from farm production derived by 
deducting the cost of family and hired labour from gross output, with family labour 
valued at the market wage rate w. The total net returns to the farm household from 
its own farm production is broken down into two components: II, which measures 
the net profit or returns from the ownership of the farm land, and wF, which 
represents the wage labour income from own -account work on the family farm. 
The LHS of Eq. 3.2n represents the total expenditures of the household on 
consumption of goods and leisure. The RHS represents the full income of the farm 
household that has three components: farm profits (II), the value of the total time 
endowment of the household (wT) evaluated at the wage rate it receives when 
working off the farm, and the non -labour endowment income, E. 
To solve the household maximization problem specified above, substitute the 
constraint (3.4) directly into the utility function to set up the following Lagrangian: 
(3.6) Max £ = U[C, (T -F -M)] + 
[ pQ(F,H,A) - w''H + wM + E - C ] + !AIM + 1,i2H + 1.13F 
where µ1, µ, and µ3 are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with 
the non -negativity constraints on M, H and F which satisfy the 
following complementary slackness conditions : 
µ1 *M =0 = => µ1 =0 if M >0 (3.7a) 
(3.7b) 
(3.7c) 
µ2*H = 0 
µ3*F=0 
==> µ2=0 if H>0 
--> µ3=0 if F>0 
4 Equation 3.2n is derived by adding w to both sides of Eq. 3.2 and substituting out for on the 
left hand side using Eq. 3.4. 
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The choice variables for the household are C, M, F, H for which the first order 
conditions, respectively, are' 





aF ) +P3 
(p -w'') +,u2=0 
aH 
From (3.8) and (3.9) it follows 
U (3.12) E + /-11 
Uc 2 
The left -hand side of Eq. 3.12 represents the marginal rate of indifferent substitution 
of leisure for consumption (MRSE c) in the household's utility function. It measures 
the household's subjective valuation of leisure foregone in terms of the consumption 
numeraire when the household supplies an extra unit of labour. 
Let L represent the total labour supply of the farm- household (L= F + M = T -E ). 
Since 
(3.13) Ue UL 
Uc UC 
where UL is the marginal dis- utility of labour, the left hand side of Eq. 3.12 
measures the subjective value placed on a marginal unit of household labour. Sen 
(1966) refers to this as the "the real cost of family labour" whereas Nakajima 
(1986) calls it the "marginal (subjective) valuation of family labour ". 
From (3.8) and (3.10) it follows 
U e aQ 
U c 
p 
a F + 2 
(3.14) P3 
Following conventional notation Ue = a U/ a C and U.p = a U/ a . 
Equation 3.11 can be re- written as: 
(3.11a) 0Q >> /17 
OH 
The farm household equilibrium with respect to labour supply and labour demand 









These three Equations above represent the household labour supply and labour 
demand equilibrium for all possible combinations of the three labour categories (M, 
F and H). From Eq. 3.11a it is clear that if any hired labour is used (i.e. when H > 
0, implying 112 = O ), the value of the marginal product of hired labour is set equal to 
the wage rate paid out (w''). And if no hired labour is used, it must be true that the 
value of the marginal product of the first unit of hired labour is less than wl' (since 
both 2 and µ2 are non -negative). 
Similarly, from Eq. 3.14 if no family labour supply is used for own farm cultivation 
(F = 0, implying µ3 > 0) then the household's valuation of its leisure must be no 
less than the marginal product for the first unit of family labour applied to the farm. 
For the household that supplies some of its labour on own -farm cultivation and some 




This is the standard first order condition which specifies that when family labour has 
two different uses - working on the family farm (F) and working in the off -farm 
labour market (M), the returns to labour in both activities are equalized at the 
margin. Hence family labour is applied in own farm production until the point where 
the value of marginal product is equated to the market wage rate for off -farm work. 
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For the optimal family labour supply not to involve any market work (ie, for when 
M = 0), the equilibrium condition is: 
UE_w *_paQ 
Uc OF 
where w *= w + 111' 
(3.16) 
and w* >w, since X, >Oand µi >0 ifM =O. 
The w* represents a "shadow -wage rate" that applies to the subjective equilibrium 
of the labour -leisure choice faced by the farm household that only works on its own 
farm (Nakajima 1986). If a farm household does not supply any family labour to the 
off -farm labour market at a net wage of w, then the marginal returns to applying 
family labour to own farm cultivation must be no less than the market wage rate w.6 
When M, F and H are all positive, such that all of the µ 's are zero, the household 
equilibrium is characterized by the conventional optimality conditions. These equate 
the marginal products of the two types of labour inputs to their respective wage 
rates, and also the real cost of family labour to the market wage rate. These 
optimality conditions are given by Eq. 3.15 and Eq. 3.11a with vi2 = O. 
Diagrammatic illustrations 
The above equilibrium conditions for the allocation of family labour are illustrated 
in Figure 3.1 for the case where some family labour is applied on the farm and also 
is hired out (F > 0, M > 0). Figure 3.2 illustrates the case where all of the family 
labour supply is devoted to own farm cultivation (M = 0). 
In Panel A of Figure 3.1 the vertical axis measures the money value of consumption 
(C), say in Rupees, while the horizontal axis measures family labour/ leisure time, 
say in days. Since OT represents the total time endowment of family labour, the 
6 This result holds under the assumption there are no quantity constraints on the days of labour 
supplied and no fixed costs to working on the off -farm labour market. 
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distance to the right from point O measures family labour work days while the 
distance to the left from point T measures leisure days. The bold lines I, and I, 
represent the farm -household's indifference curves between consumption and leisure. 
These indifference curves as drawn have the conventional property of being down- 
ward sloping and convex from below, given that in the {C, -C} space the origin is 
represented by point T.' The upward sloping curved line OGQ represents the farm 
production curve as family labour increases, measured in terms of the consumption 
good. Since pc is normalized to one, OGQ represents the value of farm production as 
family labour input is varied, holding all other inputs (including hired labour) fixed. 
The farm- household equilibrium in Panel A is represented by the points of tangency 
of the line DGK with the farm production curve at the point G and with the 
indifference curve at the point J. The line DGK has the slope w, which is the off - 
farm market wage rate for family labour. The tangency at point G represents the 
optimal family labour applied to own farm cultivation in the amount of F, while the 
tangency at point J represents the total labour supply of the farm household, which 
includes F and the amount M of work in the off -farm labour market at wage w. 
Panel B in Figure 3.1 gives an equivalent representation of the labour- leisure 
equilibrium depicted in Panel A. The vertical axis of Panel B is in monetary units 
while the horizontal axis is labour days worked as in Panel A. The connection 
Along the indifference curves I, and I2 as leisure increases the slope of the indifference curve is 
falling, indicating a decreasing marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure as 
more leisure is taken. More formally sufficient conditions to ensure that indifference curves are 
downward sloping in the {C, ..C2 }space and convex to the origin are 
(N3.7.1) au c> 0 au U_e> 0 
ac a.e 
a(u luc ) a(u luc) (N3.7.2) ->0; -<0 
ac a 
The implications of these restrictions are fully drawn out in Nakajima (1986:11 -14). Although 
Nakajima works directly with a utility function specified in terms of C and L (labour work days) 
instead of C and J (leisure days) as in the above, the restrictions above are exactly equivalent to the 
restrictions 2.2, 2.11 and 2.12 imposed by Nakajima to obtain well behaved indifference curves 
which slope upwards in the {C, L} space and which are convex from below. 
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between Panel A and Panel B is that a measurement represented by a slope in Panel 
A becomes a vertical distance in Panel B. Hence, the YY curve in Panel B is the 
value of the marginal product of family labour which traces out the slope of the 
OGQ curve from Panel A at the equivalent level of family labour input.' Similarly, 
the VV curve measures the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and 
consumption (UE /U, ) which is the (positive) value of the slope of the indifference 
curve between leisure and consumption) at different levels of family labour work- 
days. As drawn in Panel B of Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the VV curve is upward sloping in 
its entire range.' This need not be the case always and the VV curve can have flat 
sections at low levels of labour supply.10 
In Panel B the solution relating to the optimal use of family labour in own farm 
cultivation is given by point G' - the equality of the market wage rate and the 
marginal value product of family labour (corresponding to the first equality in Eq. 
3.15). The solution with respect to the optimal total labour supply of the farm 
household is given by point J' - the equality of the wage rate and the marginal rate of 
substitution of leisure for consumption which represents the marginal subjective 
valuation of family labour. (Point J' corresponds to the second equality in Eq. 3.15). 
$ The YY curve is downwards sloping in its entire range under the assumption of a regular 
production function with declining marginal productivity of labour (and of all other) inputs. 
9 The VV curve sloping upward in its entire range implies that the MRS,ec is continuously 
increasing as work days (L) increases or leisure (C) decreases. Following Nakajima (1986:26) the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for VV to be upward sloping are : 
(N3.9.1) Z = E > 0: and óZ aQ óZ 
t; c ôC aF S-C 
These conditions are satisfied under the restrictions on the utility function specified by N3.7.1 and 
N3.7.2 of Footnote 3 above in this Chapter (assuming that the marginal product of family labour -- 
a Q/ ó F -- is always non -negative). 
10 It is quite feasible that VV be horizontal at low levels of labour and consumption. For instance if 
one postulates a minimum subsistence consumption level Co, and since low levels of labour input will 
lead to low levels of C (ignoring non -labour income), the MRSLC may remain unchanged until the 
labour days worked is sufficient to attain the Co level of consumption. Graphically this means the 
indifference curves [I and [2 when transferred to the region below C° would be upward sloping 
straight parallel lines with a constant slope in the {C, L} space. Consequently in Panel B, there 
would a section of the VV curve being horizontal at low levels of labour input. See Nakajima (1986 
pp. 19 -20). Horizontal sections of the VV curve are of analytical interest since it gives rise to 
"surplus labour" in the sense defined by Sen (1966). 
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Panel B in Figure 3.1 also clearly iIIustrates the separable property of the farm 
household equilibrium when labour is supplied on the off -farm hired labour market 
(M > 0). The optimal allocation of family labour for own farm cultivation 
represented by point G' is completely independent of the household's preferences 
with respect to leisure and consumption. Such preferences, which affect the shape of 
the indifference curves and hence the position and slope of the VV curve, determine 
only the total labour supply equilibrium position of E'. The VV curve has no effect 
on the position of D' which is determined solely by the exogenously given wage rate 
and the parameters of the farm production function which underlie the YY curve. 
The equilibrium conditions for the labour allocation of the farm household when all 
family labour supply is devoted to the own farm (M = 0) is illustrated in Figure. 3.2. 
In Panel A the optimum allocation is given by the point G where the indifference 
curve I is tangent to the value of farm production curve OGQ. The total labour 
supply of the farm household is OU days and all of it is supplied to the own -farm. At 
G the slope of the line of tangency, DN denoted as w *, is higher than the slope of the 
wage line DK, given by w. When family labour is allocated to own farm cultivation 
only, the returns to own farm cultivation must be greater than the returns to working 
in the off -farm labour market at the going wage rate (as indicated by the first order 
condition of Eq. 3.16 with µ, >0). The value of w* can be interpreted as "shadow" 
wage rate at which a hypothetical market for family labour is in equilibrium. A 
market wage rate of w* would equate the demand for family labour in own farm 
cultivation to the supply of family labour offered at w *. The equilibrium points G 
(and G' in Panel B) involve the farm household's subjective valuation of its labour 
which is determined jointly by production technology and preferences and is 
independent of the observed market wage rate, w. 
The farm household model with M = 0 is no longer separable into a producer and 
consumer equilibrium. The optimal input of labour on the family farm (which 
consists solely of family labour) is now affected by the household's labour -leisure 
preferences. Alternatively, the profit maximizing behaviour of a firm cannot be 
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Figure 3.2: Farm Household Equilibrium with No Family Labour Hired 
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3.3 Aggregation of Labour Inputs and Separability of the Production Function 
The farm household model presented in Section 3.2 above, with family and hired 
labour as completely distinct production inputs, is general enough to capture the 
various dimensions of any heterogeneity between them. As distinct inputs in the 
production function, no a priori restrictions are placed on how the marginal products 
of the two labour inputs are determined, nor on the elasticity of substitution between 
family and hired labour. Nevertheless, there are several theoretical as well as 
practical difficulties in treating family and hired labour as completely distinct inputs. 
These problems are further compounded when the family and hired labour can each 
be further dis- aggregated into several other meaningful sub -categories -e.g., male 
and female, or adult and child within each category. While each of these labour sub- 
categories may not be perfectly homogeneous with all others, it is reasonable to 
expect many of them to be very close substitutes for one another. 
The wide diversity of labour sub -categories actually employed in peasant farming 
does not in itself mean each sub -category has a special role or a specific effect on 
production that cannot be matched by other sub -categories. Farm families will tend 
to use whatever family resources are available for work, especially with regard to 
child labour (White 1994). This does not imply that child labour performs a special 
role that cannot be done as effectively by other adult family members. 
Moreover, labour allocation in traditional agriculture reflects a wide variety of social 
and cultural norms which often give rise to specialized patterns of the division of 
labour among different labour categories, particularly by gender (K. Bardhan 1993). 
For instance, in a given setting one specific farm operation may be done only by a 
particular labour category (e.g., weeding work done only by female labour while 
ploughing may be done only by males). Even if such an extreme division of labour 
occurs widely it is difficult to make the claim that any one sub -category of the many 
types labour inputs observed is an essential input." 
" An essential input must be used in order to have positive levels of output. If F(x1, x,, ...,x) = 0 
whenever x; = 0, then x; is an essential input (Chambers 1988; 9). 
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In specific village settings, while there may be general conventions about the sexual 
division of labour and other labour categories, there often are sufficient exceptions to 
the rule to belie any claims for the sui generis nature of specific labour categories. 
The main analytical problem with specifying a farm household model with many 
different labour categories is that the marginal product schedule for a specific type of 
labour (such as the YY curve in Fig. 3.1) can only be defined if the levels of the 
other labour inputs are taken as given. In an n input production function, while the 
marginal product of a particular input is affected by the levels of all n inputs, the 
relationship is specifically sensitive to the levels of other inputs which are very close 
substitutes (or very strong complements). With several different labour categories 
which are close substitutes for each other and none of which is by itself an essential 
input, there is a wide variety of ways of generating the same level of an aggregate or 
composite labour input. The marginal product schedule for any one labour input 
category will depend not only on the substitution possibilities between that particular 
labour input and all other remaining labour categories, but also on the substitution 
possibilities among each of the remaining labour categories.12 
While it is technically feasible to draw a marginal product schedule for any one 
labour category, holding the levels of all other labour and non -labour inputs fixed, it 
is difficult to provide an economic explanation for why the other labour inputs are 
held constant at any particular level when there is a high degree of substitution 
among several labour categories. The marginal product schedule for family labour 
holding hired labour fixed at, say, 10 units will be very different from the one that 
holds hired labour fixed at 200 units. In order to make sense of the marginal product 
schedule for family labour around a specific equilibrium position it will be necessary 
to explain what is the optimal level of hired labour that goes with that particular 
equilibrium allocation of family labour. When family and hired labour are close 
substitutes for each other the relative distribution of the total labour inputs between 
12 In a n input production function with k labour categories, there are k *(k -1) /2 distinct partial 
elasticities of substitution among the labour inputs themselves. When only a few of these distinct 
partial elasticities are high, it becomes difficult to derive a marginal product schedule based on only 
one specific labour category without aggregating in some way all the other remaining categories. 
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family and hired labour may not be properly defined. Many different combinations 
of family and hired labour allocations could satisfy a given optimal level of total 
labour input.13 
A related problem is that with many distinct labour inputs, it is often difficult to 
rationalize the observed division of labour among various labour categories with the 
optimal conditions of the equality of the ratio of the marginal products with the ratio 
of the wage rates. The wage rates for different types of labour are often specified in 
fixed proportions. For instance, the female adult wage rate may be 80% of the male 
adult wage rate in a wide variety of settings where it would be difficult to justify that 
the underlying productivity differences between male and female labour should 
remain at a constant 80% wherever this fixed wage gap is observed. In such a 
setting, a farm household model that had male and female labour as separate inputs 
would have difficulties in relating the observed division of labour by gender to the 
optimality conditions of the equality of the ratio of marginal products to the ratio of 
the wage rates. With a fixed wage gap and close substitutability, one would expect 
such models to predict a much higher incidence of complete specialization - using 
only male or only female labour - than what occurs in reality. 
There also are practical difficulties in empirical estimation of production functions 
with many categories of labour as distinct inputs. The parameter space expands 
rapidly with many different labour categories as distinct inputs, especially when 
using flexible functional forms. There are special econometric problems when many 
observations in a data set may have zero usage of some specific Iabour categories. 
Chapter VI will show that the production function parameter estimates differ 
substantially between specifications that use distinct labour input categories and an 
aggregate composite category, even when using flexible functional forms. 
" In the conventional farm household model where family and hired labour are treated as 
homogeneous inputs, the model determines only the total labour demand and labour supply, Any 
combination of family and hired labour on the demand side and any matching combination of own 
farm work and off -farm work on the labour supply side can satisfy these aggregate levels. Such 
indeterminacy of the individual components of F, H and M arise as the degree of substitution 
between family and hired labour increases when family and hired labour are treated as distinct inputs. 
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It is meaningful then to seek to combine all the different labour sub -categories into 
an aggregate or effective labour input, while still allowing for heterogeneity between 
different labour categories. However, it is possible to create a consistent labour 
aggregate only under special separability properties of the underlying production 
function (Berndt and Christensen 1974). Separability of the various labour -input 
categories from other non -labour inputs in the production function implies that the 
marginal products of all the labour input categories are affected in a uniform manner 
by the levels of the non- labour inputs. 
Formally, in a n -input production function given by 
(3.17) y =f(xxz,...,x") 
if the subset of labour input categories is indicated by the inputs x5 to xk, the 
production function is "separable" in the labour sub -categories if the production 
function can be written in an equivalent form as 
(3.18) y 
where the g(.) function itself is quasi- concave and strictly monotonic.' 
The g(.) function in itself has all the properties of a regular production function. It 
can be interpreted as a micro production function in which the output is the 
aggregate labour variable and the inputs are the different categories of labour. 
Separability implies that the marginal rates of substitution between pairs of factors 
in the separated group are independent of the levels of factors outside that group.15 
Whether family and hired labour are separable from other inputs in a particular 
setting is a question that can be empirically verified with farm level data. If, in a 
given setting, the separability of the labour inputs can be established, then all the 
1l Goldman and Uzawa (1964). 
15 The formal representations of the separable property of a production function are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter VI. Note that "separable" as a property of the production function is different from 
the "separable" (recursive) property of farm household models. To avoid confusion henceforth, the 
term "recursive" will be used to refer to the property of farm household models while the term 
"separable" will refer only to the property of production functions. 
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different categories of the labour inputs can be aggregated. This leads to some 
simplifications in the structure of the farm household model structure presented in 
Section 3.2 above, and consequently the separability property greatly facilitates the 
subsequent empirical estimation even in the presence of labour heterogeneity. 
The main theoretical implication of the separability of the labour inputs is that the 
ratios of the marginal product of family and hired Iabour (or alternatively, the 
marginal rate of substitution between family and hired labour) depend only on the 
levels of the labour inputs. Hence, optimal decisions about the allocation of family 
and hired labour can be made independently of the choices about other non -labour 
inputs. This gives rise to a sequential decision making (Chambers 1988:45). With 
separability the optimal levels of the labour inputs are chosen only with respect to 
the relative price ratios (wage rates) of the different labour categories. Hence there is 
now a clear relationship between the shadow wage applicable to family labour and 
the market wage rate for hired labour on farms that use both family and hired labour. 
This relationship is derived in the next section. 
3.4 A Farm Household Model with a Heterogeneous Labour Composite 
Assuming a separable structure of the labour inputs in the farm production function, 
the farm- household's maximization problem can then be set up in an identical 
manner to Equation 3.1 to 3.5 with the production function constraint (Eq. 3.3) 
written in the separable format as 
(3.3a) Q = f (g(F, H), A) 
where Le = g(F, H) defines an aggregate composite index of total labour input, 
which can be treated as units of effective labour created out of the observed levels of 
family and hired labour applied in farm production. 
The choice variables for the household utility maximization problem are the same as 
in Section 3.2; and hence the first order conditions are identical to Equations 3.8 to 
3.11. With the two types of labour inputs being separable in the production 
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function, an additional property of the farm household equilibrium is that the ratios 
of the marginal products of family and hired labour is a function solely of the levels 
of family and hired labour inputs. That is, 
(3.19) aQ / H aH ag / a - h(F, H) 
aQ / aF ag / OF 
At the optimal values of family and hired labour input (indicated as F* and H *), let 
this ratio of the marginal products be given by 0 *. That is 
(3.20) h (F*, H*) = 0* 
This additional condition derived from the separability of the labour inputs provides 
a way to relate the wage rates for the two types of labour, using the first order 
condition that the marginal product of hired labour will be set equal to wh, the hired 
labour wage rate. 
From the first order conditions for the farm household equilibrium, using Eq. 3.12 






- ' ; where ,u = 0 if M > 0; 
From Eq. 3.11a, one gets 
(3.22) aQ wh P2 
aH ' 
u,=OifF>0. 
where fc2 = 0 if H > 0 . 
hence, the ratio of the marginal products can be expressed as 
(3.23) aQlaH = 
aQ / aF 
wh F2 
.í 9* - h(F*, H*) 
w u, u, 
2 2 
keeping in mind the various complementarity slackness conditions on .i1 µ2 and µ3. 
Equation 3.23 is the basic optimality condition that must be satisfied for all possible 
labour allocations involving various combinations of F, M and H. Equation 3.23 is 
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particularly useful in the case when family labour does not work at all on the off - 
farm market at wage w (i.e. when M = 0) because in such situations the shadow 
wage rate for family labour can still be recovered from the observed levels of w".16 
Consider first the case of a big farm household that must rely on hired labour to 
some extent (i.e. where t2 = 0 because H > 0). For simplicity assume initially that 
0* = 1 at the particular allocations of F and H that are observed. Then the shadow 








Since one unit of family labour substitutes at the margin for one unit of hired labour 
which costs w", the relevant shadow price for family labour must also be w" as long 
as hired labour is employed on the farm and w'' > w. In this situation family labour 
is never supplied on the off -farm market employment at wage w when it could be 
used to replace a unit of hired labour which costs w ". 
If instead w > w", then it would lead to complete specialization of the farm 
household labour allocation: all of its labour supply will be on market employment 
at wage w, and all of the labour input on the family farm will be hired labour paid a 
wage w" per unit. Only in the case where w = w'' would it be optimal for the big 
farm household to supply labour to the off farm labour market employment as well 
as on its own farm. This is readily evident from Eq. 3.23 since for both F and M to 
be positive requires µ, = u2= 0; hence if 0 * =1 it must be that w = wh. 
1s The separability of the labour inputs in the production function is not a necessary condition to 
relate the shadow wage rate of family labour to the wage rate for hired labour. However without the 
separability property the ratio of the ratio of the marginal products of family and hired labour are 
functions of the level of other non -labour inputs as well; so this relationship will be less tractable. 
Under non -separability of the production function given by Eq. 3.3, 0* = h'(F *, G *, A *) where 
A is the land input. Although the shadow wage rate for family labour (w *) can be related to NO and 
0 *, the value of w* will vary among farmers who hire in labour at the same wage rate but whose 
farm size differ. When the production function is separable, 0* will be independent of A and other 
non -labour inputs. Hence w* can be related directly to w6 and the levels of F and H only. 
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The farm household labour demand and labour supply equilibrium with w" > w 
(implying M = 0) and 0* =1 is illustrated in Figure 3.3 below. As in Fig. 3.1 and 3.2, 
the VV curve plots the rising real cost of family labour which is the utility cost of 
leisure foregone represented by UE /Uc . The YY curve is the marginal product of 
aggregate labour drawn under the assumption that family and hired labour are 
homogeneous inputs (0 = 1, everywhere). Since at the margin hired labour is used, 
the aggregate labour demand equilibrium is represented by the point P where the 
marginal product of the last unit of aggregate labour equals the hired wage rate. Ld 
measures the total labour days utilized on the farm which under the assumption 
that 0 = 1 everywhere is simply the sum of F and H in natural units. In the presence 
of hired labour which is perfectly substitutable with family labour, the family labour 
supply equilibrium is represented by point E where U, /U0 equals w'`, and not the 
point E0 where UE /U, equals w. 
When w < wh and 0 =1, the market wage (w) that family labour could earn when 
working off farm is irrelevant to the labour supply equilibrium of the big farm 
household that is hiring in labour at the higher wage rate, w''. For every extra unit 
of family labour applied between Eo and E, the real cost of labour is below w`' while 
the gain in consumption is w' - the value of the wage payment for hired labour that 
is foregone when family labour displaces hired labour on a one to one basis. Hence 
the farm household attains a higher level of utility at Point E that at point Eo (as long 
as the point E is feasible, with total work- days less than or equal to the total time 
endowment, T). 
Figure 3.3: Labour Supply and Demand Equilibrium for a Big Farm Household 
w 
V 4- H 
Y 
O Fo F Ld Labour days 
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In the case of a small farm household the relevant family labour supply choice is 
about the allocation of total time worked into the own farm labour input (F) 
component and the off -farm market employment (M) component at wage w. Here 
also, all the relevant scenarios can be derived from Eq. 3.23. Again, when O = 1 
everywhere, if w > w° one would observe complete specialization in the labour 
allocation of the small farm household also. All of its labour supply will be on 
market employment at wage w, and all of the labour input on the family farm will be 
hired labour paid a wage wh per unit. Eq. 3.21 is satisfied with µ3 =0 and no and N2 
non -negative. If w < w" then hired labour will not be used and family labour is 
allocated to the family farm till the marginal product of family labour is equated to 
the market wage rate. The remaining work days are devoted to market wage 
employment. In either case the wage rate which applies to the determination of the 
household labour supply equilibrium is the market wage rate. The optimality 
condition derived from Eq. 3.23 in this situation is exactly equivalent to the 
equilibrium conditions given by Eq.3.15 derived in Section 3.2 where family and 
hired labour are treated as completely distinct inputs. 
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The more general case when 0 is different from one give rises to a wide variety of 
alternative household labour supply and demand equilibria where the effective or 
shadow wage rate for family labour will again depend on the hired labour market 
exposure of the farm household. 
3.5 Labour Supply Implications of Heterogeneity 
There are three different possible scenarios for the labour supply and demand 
equilibrium of the farm household when 0 is allowed to differ from one. These are 
summarized below. The main analytical point to note is that inherent differences in 
the productivity of family and hired labour are in essence equivalent to a wage gap 
between hired and family labour (Benjamin 1992). In the presence of labour 
heterogeneity, if at a particular labour allocation one unit of family labour would 
substitute for 1/0 units of hired labour, the implicit price the farm household would 
place on one unit of family labour would be w'' /0, if hired labour was also being used 
by the household. 
Case(i) : if w > wh/B* 
All farm households are completely specialized in their labour allocation. 
All days of family labour supply (Ls) are devoted to wage employment in the 
local labour market (at wage w); and all labour input (Ld) on the family farm 
consists of hired labour only (paid a wage w''). 
In this scenario it is not meaningful to distinguish small farm households 
(who are net sellers of labour) or big farm households (who are net buyers of 
labour). The optimal labour supply and demand conditions for all 
households, irrespective of their total labour demand needs, are identical and 
are given by 
(3.25) 
(3.26) 
U_e /tic = w LS = M ; (F=0) 
Ld H 
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These optimal conditions are independent of whether e is less than, equal to 
or greater than one. When w > w'' /0, irrespective of the value of 0, it pays 
the farm household to specialize by offering all of its desired labour supply 
on the off -farm labour market, while hiring in all its labour demand 
requirements. 
In this scenario, in spite of the presence of labour heterogeneity (0 # 1), the 
consumption/labour supply component of the farm household's decisions are 
independent from the production side choices for all households. The 
effective wage rate which determines the farm household's optimal 
labour /leisure choice is the market wage rate, w; and the farm household 
model is recursive. 
Case(ii) : if w = wh /8* 
When the differences in the wage rates for family and hired labour exactly 
offset the difference in marginal productivity, the equilibrium conditions are 
given by: 
(3.27) w h =p aQ 
-p aH 
w>> 
aQ /1_5c (3.28) UE = w = 6)* 
-p 
OF 
When any observed efficiency difference between family and hired labour is 
exactly mirrored in the difference in the market wage rates available to hired 
and family labour, the family and hired labour inputs become perfect 
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substitutes (in the neighborhood where w = w'' /O *). This sub -case reduces to 
the conventional farm household model where family and hired labour are 
treated as homogenous inputs with a common market wage rate. The only 
adjustment is in the units of measurement - i.e. whether total labour is 
measured in units of family days or hired labour days with 0* being the 
conversion factor for the quantities and the wage rates. 
In this scenario, as in the case of homogeneous labour inputs, the farm 
household model cannot be solved for specific levels of F, H or M. What is 
determined is total labour demand in effective units (F + 0 *H); but its 
composition between F and H is indeterminate. Similarly on the 
consumption/leisure component of the model, only total labour supply days 
(F + M) is determined; its allocation between F and M is arbitrary. In this 
situation altering the mix between F and H and between F and M, while 
keeping total labour supply and demand fixed has no effect on farm profits 
or wage income, and hence no effect on the household utility level. 
Case(iii) : if w < wh/®* 
In this scenario the analytical structure of the farm household differs 
according to the net position of the household in the hired labour market. 
Three distinct farm household types can be distinguished. For each type the 
effective wage rate that determines the labour supply equilibrium will differ. 
(a) the small farm household whose total labour supply will consist of work 
on the family farm (F) supplemented by off -farm market wage employment 
(M) at wage w. The effective wage rate for this household is the market 
wage rate, w, and its equilibrium position is characterized by 




These conditions are exactly equivalent to the equilibrium conditions for a 
household with M > 0 given by Eq.3.15 in Section 3.2 where family and 
hired labour are treated as completely distinct inputs. From Eq. 3.29, this 
sub -model is also recursive. 
No hired labour is used because the total family labour supply exceeds the 
total labour demand and the wage cost of family labour is lower than that of 
an equivalent unit of hired labour. It will be more profitable for the farm 
household to use family labour valued at wage w than hired labour at an 
effective wage of wh /0. 
(b) the autarchic household which neither sells any family labour on the 





= w * SQ = (pF,) 
w 
n 
where w < w * <_ 
9* 
The effective wage rate, w *, faced by this household is indeterminate within 
the bounds specified above." Since w* is partly a function of the marginal 
product of family labour which depends on production technology, the model 
for the autarchic farm household is not recursive. 
These bounds on w* are slightly wider when e* > 1. If hired labour has a higher marginal product 
the farm household can be autarchic only if there are no net gains from transferring one unit of 
family labour from own farm work to market work, while replacing the unit of family labour with 
hired labour for farm cultivation. This leaves unchanged the total labour supply of the farm - 
household, hence the net gains can be determined by the change in consumption which is given by 
(N3.17a) (w- p) ±(paQ -Wh) 
A farm household can remain autarchic only if the above expression is non -positive. Noting that 
w* = p 
Q 
and p Q = 9* p Q , the required condition necessary for an autarchic state to be 
0F óH aF 
optimal reduces to 
(N3.17b) 
fi 
<w*< W -w 
0* -1 
wh -w w'' 
Tt can be readily shown that > if, as assumed, 0* > 1 and w < wh /0. 
B * -1 0 * 
when 6* > 1. 
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(c) the big farm household which must supplement its family labour days 
with hired labour in order to meet the total demand for labour in its farm 
cultivation. Given that w < wh /0, the big farm household never supplies any 
labour to the market at wage w since that same unit of labour when applied 
to the family farm earns a return of wh /0 when family labour can substitute 
for 1/0 units of hired labour. 
The optimum labour input allocations will satisfy 
(3.32) w' =p 
Q OH
(3.33) ôQ ; F > 0; M = 0 UE /Uc =w * =pBF 
Wh 
where w <_ w * = since by assumption 
0 
(3.34) Wh ôQlaH = 0* 
w* ,7Q/óF,FH 
Consequently, for a household which uses hired in labour the shadow wage 
rate w* which determines its own labour supply equilibrium is not 
"subjective" any more as it was in the model with family and hired labour as 
distinct inputs.18 With separability this wage rate can be related directly to the 
wage rate for hired labour with the adjustment for the difference in the 
marginal productivity, if any, of the two types of labour at that particular 
equilibrium. Hence, w* = wh /0 *. 
8 From Eq. 3.16 w *= w + when family labour is modeled as distinct input and all family 
labour is supplied on the family farm. Since µ, and X are Lagrange multipliers that vary with the 
constraints of the model, the effective wage rate w* is subjective and cannot be identified from the 
observed market wage rate w. 
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The farm household sub -model for the big farm household that hires in 
labour is not generally recursive since the effective wage rate for family 
labour, w5/0, is not exogenously given to the household. It will depend on the 
allocation of F and H which affects 0 *. However, if within the relevant range 
of labour allocations for a particular household, 0* happens to be constant 
then the sub -model for the big farm household is recursive. In this case the 
household equilibrium will be identical to the case of a household facing an 
exogenously given market wage rate of Wh for hired labour and a market 
wage rate wh/0* for family labour. 
Diagrammatic íllustratíon for Case (iii) when w < wh/0* 
The labour supply and demand equilibrium for these three types of households are 
illustrated in Figure 3.4 for a specific scenario where 0 *< 1 and w < wh < wh/0 . 
The marginal product of family labour is denoted by the YF schedule while the 
marginal product of hired labour is denoted by the YH schedule. As drawn YH is 
always below YF indicating that at any given labour allocation of F and H, adding 
one more unit of F leads to a higher increase in output than adding an extra unit of 
H. This implies 6 < 1 in the entire range of total labour demand. 
In each panel the point Iabeled E denotes the appropriate labour supply equilibrium. 
Hence, in estimating the labour supply component of the farm household it is 
important that the wage rate variable to be used in the regression analyses conforms 
to the wage rate relevant for point E. This wage rate varies for the three different 
household types19 as indicated in Panels (a), (b) and (c) of Figure 3.4. The effective 
wage rate for family labour is higher than the market wage rate in the autarchic and 
big farm households. 
19 Fig 3.4 is drawn with w < wh. This is not a necessary condition for the three different household 
types to be defined. The necessary condition is w < wh/O. When 6 < t, this condition can be satisfied 
even if w > wh. 
66 
Panel (a) shows that the differences in the productivity of family and hired labour 
have no effect in neighborhood of the labour supply equilibrium of the small farm 
household. At the margin it faces a given wage rate which determines the total 
amount of its labour supply. The Point E in Panel (a) is unaffected by the value of 
O. The only relevance of productivity differences in Panel (a) is that with O < 1 and 
w <wh /O, the small farm household does not simultaneously use hired labour as well 
as supply its own labour in market work. 
In Panel (b) the farm household is autarchic: it neither buys any hired labour nor 
does it sell any of its family labour on the market. Total household labour supply 
exactly matches the total demand for labour in farm production (the amount OF). 
The household acts as if it were facing an effective wage rate w* which equates the 
demand and supply of family labour. This household does not sell any of its family 
labour on the market because the returns to labour on own farm cultivation are 
higher than the market wage rate. On the other hand, given the family labour input of 
OF, the marginal product of an extra unit of hired labour is less than the hired labour 
wage rate w" . 
As drawn in Panel (b) the autarchic equilibrium is created by the fact that 0 <1. The 
wage gap between w and w" by itself is not sufficient to create an optimal autarchic 
equilibrium since w* > w" as drawn. If O -1 and the marginal productivity of both 
family and hired labour were to be represented by the YF schedule, it would not be 
optimal for this household to be autarchic' In that case family labour supply to 
own farm cultivation would only be OF° (instead of OF) and a few extra units of 
labour would be hired in (upto the point of intersection of the YF schedule and the 
w" wage line). 
Finally in Panel (c), the effective wage rate applied to family labour at point E is 
directly affected by the value of O. The fact that O < 1 has two separate effects on 
the optimal labour supply and demand choices of the big farm household: 
20 With 0 =1 an autarchic equilibrium could still be optimal if the intersection of the YF and V 
schedules was such that w < w* < w" . 
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(i) the first effect is that total labour demand is reduced (from OLd to OLd). 
Without any differences in the productivity of the two types of labour, the 
YH schedule would coincide with the YF schedule and the optimal total 
labour demand would be the point of intersection of the labour marginal 
productivity schedule with the wh wage line (which gives total labour 
demand of OLdo 
(ii) the second effect is a higher labour supply response for family labour 
because it leads to a higher effective wage rate for family labour. Family 
labour supply is OF with 9 < 1 as compared to OF° with 8 = 1. 
The combined effect of a lower total labour demand and a higher proportion of it 
coming from family sources means that the demand for hired labour is considerably 
reduced on big farms because of the efficiency differences. The amount of hired 
labour used on the big farm household illustrated in Panel (c) is the distance between 
F and Ld (indicated as H). If family and hired labour were homogeneous inputs the 
demand for hired labour on this big farm would be equal to the distance between F° 
and Ld instead. 
As discussed in Chapter II, one of the key "stylized facts" about agricultural 
production in developing countries is that small farms are cultivated more 
intensively with higher levels of variable inputs used per hectare than bigger farms. 
This often leads to the celebrated observation of an inverse relationship between 
farm size and output per hectare. The relatively greater application of inputs on 
smaller farms is most pronounced in the case of labour. Per hectare labour input on 
small farms is consistently higher than on bigger farms over a large range of farm 
sizes; and this result holds whether or not average yields on small farms are higher 
(Berry and Cline, 1979 ). A traditional explanation for the higher labour intensity on 
small farms has focussed on factor market imperfections (Sen 1966, 1975). By 
comparing Panels (a) and (c) of Figure 3.4, it is clear that efficiency differences 
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between family and hired labour can be a source of the inverse relationship even if 
rural labour markets are functioning well and the market wage rates are set in a 
competitive manner 
The equilibrium of the three types of farm households illustrated in Fig. 3.4 for the 
Case (iii) scenario of w < wh/0 suggests that efficiency differences in the 
productivity of family and hired labour are analytically equivalent to a lower market 
wage rates for family labour than for hired labour. The three types of household in 
Figure 3.4 would still be identified even if 0 =1 as long as w < wh, but the 
equilibrium would be at a different position in Panels (b) and (c). Only the small 
farm household (Panel a) that supplies labour to the market wage rate w is 
unaffected by the O parameter.21 
Such an equivalence between an observed market wage gap for family and hired 
labour and inherent productivity differences suggests that the labour supply 
component of the farm household model will not be able to distinguish between 
these alternative explanations for the higher effective wage rate for family labour in 
autarchic and big farm households. If there is any labour heterogeneity which 
results in efficiency differences between family and hired labour (9 * #1), it must 
be detected directly from the production function estimations. If in addition a wage 
gap is observed between w and wh, this is additional information that must be taken 
into account in deriving the effective wage rates to describe the labour supply 
equilibrium positions. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter presented the analytical framework for a farm household model 
allowing for family and hired labour to be heterogeneous inputs. A farm household 
model based on a general form of labour heterogeneity that allows for family and 
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hired labour (as well as other relevant labour categories) to be completely distinct 
inputs is analytically unappealing and empirically difficult to estimate. A particular 
problem in treating family labour as a distinct input is that the wage rate for 
determining the labour /leisure equilibrium choice of the household is unidentified 
when family labour is devoted solely to own farm cultivation. 
An alternative approach to modeling labour heterogeneity issue with a composite 
effective labour input is more appealing. With such a specification, the effective 
wage rates for family labour can be related directly to the observed market wage 
rates at which non -family labour can be hired in. The aggregation of various labour 
inputs, however, requires that the labour inputs be separable from the other inputs in 
the production function. If this condition is met the ratio of the marginal products of 
family and hired labour become independent of the levels of the other non -labour 
inputs. Consequently, the first order conditions for the optimal use of hired labour 
can be used to derive the effective wage rates for family labour as well. This 
framework is general enough to accommodate wage gaps that arise when the hiring 
in wage rate and hiring out wage rates for family labour differ. 
The separability of the labour inputs in the production function in essence makes 
family labour equivalent to a traded input even when family labour is supplied only 
to own farm production work. Such an equivalence is obtained by comparing the 
marginal product of family labour with that of the traded input (hired labour). This 
relationship can be used to derive the effective wage rate for family labour on large 
farms which also employ hired labour. This considerably simplifies the estimation of 
the labour supply component of the farm household model for households engaged 
in own farm work only. 
The predictions made by a model of the farm household with heterogeneous labour 
inputs are testable. When w > wh /0, it should lead to complete specialization in the 
21 This ignores potential general equilibrium effects whereby the demand for hired labour is affected 
by the O parameter, and hence has an effect on the equilibrium market wage rate at which a small 
farm household can work off -farm. 
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labour supply and demand of all farm households. This situation, however, is rarely 
observed in practice. In the more likely scenario of w < w'' /A, it gives rise to three 
distinct types of farm households: the small farm household that does not employ 
any hired labour, but sells surplus family labour on the market, an autarchic 
household which neither buys nor sells any labour, and a big farm household where 
all of family labour is devoted to own farm cultivation, supplemented by hired 
labour. The effective wage rate which identifies the labour /leisure equilibrium for all 
three household types can be identified, and an estimation strategy devised based on 




This Chapter develops the econometric strategy for both detecting and incorporating 
potential labour heterogeneity in the production and labour supply component of the 
farm household model. The model estimation results, based on household data from 
the tarai region of Nepal, are presented in Chapters VI and VII. In this Chapter 
Section 4.1 reviews the general estimation issues involved and briefly discusses 
alternative strategies. Section 4.2 outlines the sequential estimation strategy 
proposed by Jacoby (1993) for estimating non -recursive farm household models. 
Section 4.3 presents an adaptation of this methodology to the estimation of a farm 
household model with labour heterogeneity that is consistent with the structure 
developed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 of Chapter III. Section 4.4 contains a brief 
discussion of the required adjustments to the variance- covariance matrix in a 
sequential estimation strategy. 
4.1 Estimation Issues 
The conventional approach to the empirical estimation of farm household models 
treats family and hired labour as homogenous inputs valued at a common wage rate. 
As a consequence a two step estimation procedure is feasible. In the first step, the 
production side of the model is estimated through either a production function 
(Barnum and Squire 1979), a profit function (Lau, Lin and Yotopoulos 1987), or a 
cost function (Binswagner 1974). These are specified for a given level of commodity 
dis- aggregation for outputs and inputs. The labour input variable is in terms of total 
labour: its composition between family and hired labour need not be addressed. This 
first step results in a set of output supply and input demand equations that are 
functions of input and output prices, and of farm characteristics, including fixed 
inputs. 
In the second step, a consumer demand system is estimated to represent the farm 
household's preferences. This second component can be modeled either as a 
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complete dis- aggregated demand system (such as the Linear Expenditure or Log 
Linear Expenditure system) that specifies leisure as one of the consumption goods 
(Kuroda and Yotopoulos 1980). An alternative approach is to specify directly a 
reduced form labour supply equation (Rosenzweig 1980) which can be made 
consistent with a demand system with leisure and an aggregate consumption good. 
Irrespective of the approach and specific functional forms chosen for production and 
consumption components of the model, the distinctive feature of the conventional 
estimation strategy is that the consumption/labour supply choices are estimated 
independently of the production side of the model, relying on the recursive property 
of the standard farm household model. The only connection between the production 
and consumption side in the conventional estimation of the recursive model is that 
the consumption choices are conditioned on the level of "full income" of the 
household, which includes the value of farm profits at the production optimum.' On 
the consumption side, the commodity demands and labour supply are functions 
solely of commodity prices, including labour wage rates, household full income, and 
possibly some household and individual characteristics which affect preferences. 
Hence the full consumer demand system or the labour supply equation alone can be 
estimated in an independent fashion based solely on exogenous variables and the 
farm profit variable which can be computed from the observed production side 
choices (Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986c1: 20). 
On the other hand, when family and hired labour must be treated as heterogeneous 
inputs, in the general case the recursive structure of production and consumption 
choices breaks down.2 Econometric estimation of fully non -separable models is 
analytically cumbersome as well as very time -intensive to implement. Joint 
The full income of the farm household includes the imputed short run farm profits which represents 
the pure returns to the land input. (See Equation 3.2n in Section 3.2 of Chapter III). The method of 
imputing the value of farm profits already reflects the labour supply choices of the farm household, 
and hence the consumer demand side estimation is conditional on this specific level of full income. 
The recursive structure of the farm household model may break down for other reasons as well - 
such as if home produced consumer goods are imperfect substitutes for market purchased consumer 
goods or if the household assigns different levels of dis- utility to work days applied to own farm 
cultivation and work days on the off -farm labour market. Lopez (1984) is an example of a non- 
recursive model based on varying preferences between work on the family farm and off -farm work. 
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estimation of farm production, input demands as well as consumer demand 
equations may not even be feasible at times. It may be impossible to solve for the 
reduced forms of these equations analytically (Singh, Squire and Strauss 1986c1: 
22). Given that a non -separable farm household model would be highly non - linear in 
the parameters it may not be feasible to identify the structural parameters of interest 
even when it is possible to solve for their reduced forms (Jacoby 1993). A joint - 
systems estimation relying on full information methods will be very cumbersome, 
especially as the level of commodity dis- aggregation increases. Moreover the data 
requirements for the joint estimation approach are enormous. Data is required for all 
endogenous variables in the system (in addition to the set of properly exogenous 
variables) while in a recursive model estimation can be done with limited data sets 
which cover only specific components of the model. 
While non -recursive models are difficult to implement empirically, there are costs to 
assuming a recursive estimation strategy when the underlying model is genuinely 
non -recursive. The inter -dependence of the production and consumption choices of 
farm household models affects empirical estimation based on an assumed recursive 
structure in two ways.' The usual parameters estimated in output supply, factor 
demand and consumer demand systems that incorrectly assume a recursive structure 
are statistically inconsistent. Secondly, these parameters by themselves are unable to 
identify the full effect of the comparative statics of the truly non -recursive model 
because the latter model will have additional terms that have not been estimated.' 
The total error resulting from the combination of the inconsistent estimates and the 
missing terms in the comparative static derivations will be difficult to gauge. 
The subsequent discussion in this paragraph closely follows Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986c2: 48). 
'For instance, in deriving the comparative statics of a change in the price of farm output on 
household leisure demand, in the recursive model with a fixed wage rate for family labour the output 
price change has only an income effect because it changes the level of farm profits. But in a non- 
recursive model with a subjectively determined shadow wage rate for family labour, the change in 
the output price has an additional effect on leisure demand. The household -specific shadow price for 
family labour that equates family labour supply and demand will also change in response to the 
change in the output price. The latter term - the marginal effect on the shadow wage for family 
labour due to a change in the output price will not have been estimated in a recursive model structure. 
See Strauss (1986) in Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986) for the comparative statics of a farm 
household model involving shadow or virtual prices. 
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Previous studies have not adequately looked into the question of how large the errors 
are in implementing a recursive estimation strategy when the true underlying model 
is non -recursive. Lopez (1984) - which is also summarized in Lopez (1986) - is the 
only example where estimation results of a full information method based joint 
estimation strategy have been compared with the results from assuming the 
conventional recursive farm household model structure. His results show significant 
difference in the values of the parameters of the farm household model when using a 
recursive versus a non- recursive estimation strategy. For instance, the estimates of 
the own wage elasticity of family labour supply changes from 0.19 in a recursive 
estimation strategy to 0.04 in a non -recursive strategy. Unfortunately, Lopez does 
not report standard errors for each set of estimates so one cannot test whether the 
differences in the estimated value are statistically significant or not. A second and 
more important issue which was not addressed is whether the differences in these 
two estimates are also of economic significance -i.e., are they different enough to 
lead to very different results on specific applications of the model, especially on 
implied policy prescriptions. Again, there is little empirical evidence on how 
substantially significant such model errors can be. 
4.2 The Two Step Estimation Strategy for a Non -Recursive Model 
The possibility that such errors could be significant - statistically and economically - 
but not always large enough to warrant a full -scale joint estimation has led to the 
development of alternative estimation strategies. The objective has been to develop 
estimation procedures that are valid for a non -recursive model specification but 
which retain the tractability of the step -wise estimation of the production and 
consumption/labour supply components of the conventional farm household model. 
One such approach has been proposed and applied by Jacoby (1993). Jacoby's 
approach is a general methodology for estimating a structural labour supply equation 
for workers who are self -employed. It is analogous to the treatment of labour supply 
in the presence of progressive income taxes that was pioneered by Hall (1973) and 
which involves "linearizing" an underlying non- Iinear budget constraint. This 
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approach is widely used in the labour supply estimation in developed country 
settings,5 but Jacoby's application to a farm- household setting is novel. 
In the context of farm- households whose members are purely self -employed (M = 0 
in the terminology of Chapter III), the household budget constraint for consumption 
is given by the net farm output which is an increasing function of family labour days 
applied to farm production. Consequently, the household faces a concave budget 
constraint in the form of a well behaved agricultural production function with 
diminishing marginal product of family labour. The methodology proposed by 
Jacoby is to "linearize" the budget constraint at the household's optimum point. The 
objective is to convert the farm -household labour /leisure choice with a concave 
budget constraint into an equivalent standard consumer problem where the farm 
household acts as if it were facing a linear budget constraint with a fixed wage rate 
for its labour but which leads to the same optimal labour supply position. This 
"linearization process" is illustrated Figure 4. 1. 
For the simple farm household model presented in Chapter III where labour and land 
are the only production inputs, from Eq. 3.2, the household's budget constraint for 
consumption is given by 
(4.1) C=(pQ -w''H)+wM+E 
The three components of the budget constraint represented above are the net returns 
from own farm cultivation (pQ - whH), wage income when family labour works on 
the off -farm labour market (wM), and non -labour endowment income (E) which is 
exogenously given. The full range of such a budget constraint for the farm 
household is diagrammatically represented by the solid bold line OBPQ in Figure 
4.1. 
The OBPQ line has three segments to match the three components of the 
household's budget constraint in Eq. 4.1. The vertical segment OB measures the 
Burtless and Hausman (1978) and Blomquist (1983) are early examples. 
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level of consumption that can be funded solely from the household's non -labour 
endowment income. The distance OB measures the value of the variable E in 
Equation. 4.1 above. The curved segment BGP represents net income from farm 
production.' It includes the returns to the ownership of the land as well as to family 
labour applied to own farm production. As drawn, BGP is a part of the farm 
production function for increasing levels of family labour application (holding all 
other inputs constant) which is represented in its entirety by BGQ. Hence, the slope 
of BGP is the marginal product of family labour which is decreasing as more family 
labour is allocated to farm production. The final linear segment PK represents labour 
income from off -farm market work. The slope of PK is the exogenously given 
market wage rate, w. 
Given the household budget constraint line OBPQ and household preferences over 
leisure and consumption denoted by the indifference curves I, and Iz (and assuming 
that at least some family labour is devoted to on -farm production),' two equilibrium 
positions are possible. The tangency of the indifference curves can either be with the 
curved section BP of the budget constraint or on a linear section such as PK. 
The scenario that is drawn in Figure 4.1 is of a farm household equilibrium on the 
curved section BP of the budget constraint. Given household preferences, the 
production technology and the market wage rate (w), the household finds it optimal 
to supply all its labour to own farm production and not engage in any off -farm work. 
This optimal labour allocation is denoted by the point G. At this equilibrium the 
subjective valuation of family labour (U., /U, ) is set equal to the marginal product 
of family labour. The latter is given by w *, the slope of the farm production function 
at G. Hence the optimal allocation of family labour denoted by the point G is 
6 Since the price of the consumption good pc was normalized to one, the value of farm output can be 
incorporated directly into the household's consumption budget constraint without distinguishing real 
and nominal consumption quantities. 
This avoids comer solutions involving complete non -participation of family labour in productive 
activity. The labour force participation decision can be modeled in alternative ways, for instance, 
with a probit model. 
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supported by a "shadow wage rate ", w *, that is necessarily greater than or equal to 
the market wage rate, w. 8 
The process of "linearizing" the household budget constraint at the optimal point G 
is also illustrated in Figure 4.1. If the concave budget constraint OBPQ that the farm 
household actually faced would have been replaced by an artificial linear budget 
constraint represented by the dashed bold line DGN in Figure 4.1, the farm 
household equilibrium remains unchanged at point G. This artificial linear budget 
constraint DGN is uniquely defined by two parameters: (i) the slope w *; and (ii) the 
intercept OD. The intercept OD represents the consumption level that could be 
attained, based on the fictitious linear budget constraint line DN, if all available 
family labour time was devoted to leisure. 
Hence, if the budget constraint of this particular farm household was re- formulated 
in a linear form, uniquely defined by the slope w* and intercept OD, the equilibrium 
point G would represent the optimum solution of the standard consumption- leisure 
choice problem faced by a household that was not involved in its own farm 
production. G represents the labour supply equilibrium of a household with a fixed 
labour endowment T and an exogenously given non -labour endowment income 
(equal to the amount OD), where the household faces an exogenously given market 
wage rate of w *, which it takes as given for all levels of its labour supply. 
That is, the point G is also the solution to the problem 
(4.2) max U (C, 
subject to 
(4.3) C = w *(T - -C') + E* 
for which the first order condition 
(4.4a) U, /Uo = w* 
a Figure 4.1 is identical to Panel A in Figure 3.1 of Chapter III, except for the extension of the 
vertical axis to include the BO segment of the budget constraint. Point G in Figure 4.1 is identical 
with point G in Figure 3.1(A). 
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Figure 4.1: Linearized Budget Constraint for a Farm Household Equilibrium 
o Labour U U, _ Leisure T 
is identical to the first order condition for the labour supply component of the farm 
household's utility maximization problem (the first equality in Eq. 3.16 ) where9 
(4.4b) *=w 4- 11 
is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the farm -household utility maximization problem 
given in Chapter III by Eq. 3.6, and µ, is the complementary slackness parameter associated with the 
non -negativity of off -farm labour supply ( the M variable) as specified in Eq. 3.7a. 
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This re- formulation of the consumer problem with a linearized budget constraint in 
essence takes the farm out of farm -household's decision -making locus. The farm 
household becomes equivalent to the standard consumer household with a given 
non -labour endowment income (OD) and a labour time endowment (T) which can be 
sold at a fixed market wage rate, w *. This is the conventional household of labour 
economics textbooks (Killingsworth 1983) for which an internal equilibrium 
solution can be derived in a much more straightforward manner because there is no 
linkage to a farm production component.16 
The solution to this simpler problem, where the household maximizes its utility 
subject to the "linearized" budget constraint then yields a standard Marshallian 
demand for leisure equation which will be of the form 
(4.5) P = (w*,E*,S,(3) 
where w* is as defined above and E* represents the non -labour 
income equivalent to OD. S is a vector of household and individual 
characteristics that may affect preferences for consumption and 
leisure independently of w* and E *; and 3 is the labour supply 
parameter set to be estimated. 
The structural labour supply function is of the same form as Eq. 4.5 since 
(4.6) Ls = T - .0 = T - 6 (w *, E *, S, 3) = e (w *, E *, S, 13,T ) 
where Ls is the total labour supply of the household," and T is 
conventionally treated as an exogenously given constant. 
10 The only difference between the textbook version of a labour household equilibrium and the farm 
household equilibrium with a linearized budget constraint is in the interpretation of the full income of 
the household. In the former the full income is completely determined by E and w *T and does not 
reflect any household choices. In the latter the full income of the farm household is conditioned on 
the observed demand for leisure, and conversely the optimal leisure /labour choices are also 
conditioned on the production choices determining the level of farm profits (Jacoby 1993:906). 
L, includes all components of the household labour supply including other productive activities 
such as home processing and cottage industry activities. At the optimum, the marginal returns to all 
productive activities should be set equal to each other. It is not required that the shadow wage rate be 
defined only in terms of the marginal product of family labour in farm production. The marginal 
returns to other household production processes could be used as well, although it would normally be 
more difficult to estimate the production function for these other activities. 
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The two variables (w* and E *), needed to identify the linearized budget constraint 
and hence to allow the estimation of Eq. 4.6, can be derived directly from a prior 
estimate of a farm production function. As noted before, w* is just the marginal 
product of family labour in farm production at the optimum production point. E* is 
the level of an assumed endowment income which includes the level of farm profits 
at the production optimum. This level of farm profits is calculated by deducting all 
labour cost and other variable costs from the gross value of farm production. The 
labour costs for family labour are based on the assumption that family labour is paid 
a fixed wage rate of w* for each unit of family labour applied to the farm. That is, 
(4.7) E* = lt *(w *) + E 
where n* _ "shadow" farm profits -the maximized value of profits 
at the equilibrium point G using a shadow wage rate, w* 
= max {pQ(F,H,A) -whH - w *F} 
F, H 
(4.8a) = { p Q(F *, H *, A) - wh H* } - w* F* 
(4.8b) = Y *N - w* F* 
(Y *N represents the maximized total returns to farm cultivation net of 
all purchased inputs, but including the implicit return to family labour 
applied to own farm work; and F* and H* are the optimum levels of 
family and hired labour input). 
Since E* depends only on variables that are either exogenous or depend only on w *, 
the only variable needed to linearize the farm household's budget constraint is w *. 
In summary, the application of the "shadow wage" method for estimating a labour 
supply equation for farm households engaged only in self -employment consists of 
three steps: 
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(i) estimate a whole -farm agricultural production function in which family 
labour is recognized as a distinct input 
(ii) using the estimated parameters of the production function, derive the 
marginal product for family labour for each sample household. Using this 
estimated value of the marginal product as the effective wage rate (w *) for 
family labour, derive the shadow farm profits at the optimum production 
point. Then compute the total non -labour endowment income variable E* as 
the sum of shadow farm profits and the normal non -labour endowment 
income E. 
(iii) estimate a standard labour supply function of the form of Equation 4.6 
by regressing total household labour supply on w *, E* and S, assuming the 
household treated these shadow wages and shadow endowment income as 
being exogenously given to the household for all levels of its labour supply.12 
The labour supply equation in (iii) can be estimated independently or as part 
of a joint demand system with the other consumption goods of the model." 
This methodology of linearizing the concave budget constraint of the farm 
household works just as well for households participating in the off -farm labour 
market. When M > 0 the consumption equilibrium position occurs along a linear 
section of the household budget constraint (such as PK illustrated in Figure 4.1). In 
this case the household allocates its family labour to own -farm production up to the 
point where the marginal return from farm production is equal to the off -farm wage 
12 In Figure 4.1 the full range of the non -linear budget constraint OBPK for a farm household which 
does not supply any labour on the off -farm market can be represented by a single linear budget 
constraint at the optimum point. This is in contrast to the linearization process in the presence of 
progressive income taxes which results in several piece -wise linear budget constraints. The analytical 
method to solve for the equilibrium labour supply position and the econometric procedures for 
estimating labour supply functions with piece -wise linear budget constraints is considerably more 
complex (Moffitt 1986) than in the case of the farm household model outlined above. 
l' This depends on whether leisure is assumed to be separable from other goods in the utility function 
(Deaton and Muelbauer 1980). Alderman and Salm (1993) is an example of a joint estimation of 
leisure and commodity demands using an AIDS specification. 
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rate (w). Since the wage rate is exogenously given, the equilibrium occurs in an 
already linear section of the budget constraint. It is still necessary, however, to 
"linearize" the entire budget constraint along the equilibrium point. This is required 
in order to reformulate the farm- household utility maximization problem as the 
simpler utility maximization problem of a consumer household with a fixed non- 
labour income level and a given labour time endowment. 
The linearization is done is the same way as in the case illustrated in Figure 4.1. It is 
necessary to identify the slope and intercept of a linear budget constraint which 
would give the same consumer equilibrium as the concave budget constraint OBPQ 
when the equilibrium occurs in a linear section such as PK. The slope of the 
linearized budget constraint will be the off -farm market wage rate w (the same slope 
as PK). The intercept, which gives the imputed non -labour endowment income (E' ), 
will be computed just as in Equation 4.7 with w* replaced by w. When M > 0, the 
value of family labour in deriving farm profits is based on the opportunity cost of 
family labour on the off -farm labour market. In this case the marginal product of 
family labour does not have to be separately estimated to carry out the linearization 
of the budget constraint. All that is required is to derive the intercept term which 
represents the value of consumption that can be met from non -labour endowment 
income, including the imputed value of farm profits derived from deducting the cost 
of family labour valued at the market wage rate for family labour.'` 
A The linearized budget constraint when family labour is also supplied on the off farm labour market 
can also be illustrated with reference to Figure 4.1 itself. In this case the production equilibrium will 
be given by the tangency of a wage line with slope w with the production function surface BGQ. To 
derive this point of tangency within Figure 4.1 simply shift upwards the wage line DK till it is 
tangent to the BGQ line. Let this line of tangency with slope w be represented by D'K' where OD' is 
the intercept on the consumption axis. Let P' be the point where D'K' is tangent to BGQ. P' must be 
to the right of the point G as drawn in Figure 4.1 because the tangency line ON at point G has a 
higher slope by assumption. D'K' represents the linearized budget constraint for the farm household 
which works on the off -farm labour market. Its consumption equilibrium will be represented by the 
tangency of the D'K' line with the highest level indifference curve. This point will be further to the 
left than P' because by assumption the total labour supply of the household exceeds the family labour 
applied to own farm cultivation when M > O. 
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4.3 A Two Step Estimation Strategy with Heterogeneous Labour 
The two -step estimation strategy discussed in the previous section is general enough 
to carry over to the specific framework of a farm household model with 
heterogeneous labour inputs. We make two adjustments to the specific procedures 
used by Jacoby (1993). First, we use the farm production function estimation to 
embed a test for the heterogeneity of family and hired labour, using alternative 
representations of the nature of the efficiency differences between family and hired 
labour. Second, the specification of the labour supply equation is not based on the 
estimated marginal product of family labour but on the equivalent effective wage 
rates for family labour that can be derived in a theoretically consistent manner using 
the parameters that describe the extent of labour heterogeneity. As described in 
Chapter III (Section 3.5) the effective wage rates for family labour are based on the 
observed market wage rates for family and hired labour and on the ratio of the 
marginal products of the two types of labour (A *), depending on the net labour 
market position of each household. 
We do not model family labour as a separate input distinct from hired labour but use 
a nested production structure where aggregate labour is a composite function of 
family and hired labour. The separable labour composite, if supported by the data, 
still allows for a general form of labour heterogeneity but it considerably simplifies 
the analytical solution and estimation of the farm household model. In this case the 
shadow wage rates for family labour in the labour supply equation need not be set to 
the estimated marginal products of family labour. We can make use of the additional 
first order conditions that relate the marginal product of family labour to the market 
wage rate for hired labour on large farms that utilize both family and hired labour. 
This makes it feasible to derive the correct effective wage rates (w or wk adjusted by 
0 *) for family labour depending on the labour market exposure of the particular farm 
household, as specified in Section 3.5 of Chapter III. 
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In the first step we estimate the production structure implicit in Equations 3.3(a) of 
Section 3.4 in Chapter III where family and hired labour form a separable but 
possibly heterogeneous composite:15 
(4.9) Q = f( g(F, H, O), V, a) + u 
where A is land area cultivated 
g(.) determines a composite of effective labour in efficiency 
units, given inputs of family (F) and hired labour(H) 
V represents other production inputs 
O is the parameter set of the g (.) function which determines 
the nature and extent of labour heterogeneity 
a is the parameter set of production function f (.) with 
aggregate labour and other inputs 
u is the random error term. 
The test for labour heterogeneity consists of specifying alternative functional 
specifications for the g(.) function and testing whether the parametric restrictions 
which lead to a specification of labour homogeneity are supported by the data. We 
test several functional forms for the g(.) function which creates an aggregate labour 
composite from observed levels of family and hired labour, allowing for differences 
in marginal productivity as well as for a constant or varying AES between family 
and hired labour. 
Labour heterogeneity has two related dimensions: 
(i) Are family and hired labour perfect substitutes in the production 
function in the sense that the Allen partial elasticity of substitution 
(AES) between family and hired labour is infinitely large? 
(ii) Are the marginal products per unit of labour time of these two types 
of labour equal to each other, everything else held constant? 
15 There is a prior step involved in which it is necessary to test whether F and H can indeed be 
represented in a separable composite given by the g (.) function. These tests for separability are 
described and carried out in Chapter VI. 
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Dimension (i) above is a test for whether the g() function is linear. Dimension (ii) is 
a test for whether the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between family and hired 
labour is always equal to one. 
As discussed in Chapter III, when F and H can be aggregated in a separable 
composite given by the g (.) function, the relative efficiency of hired and family 
labour is determined solely by the parameter set O of the g (.) function. At the 
optimal labour allocation let the ratio of the marginal productivity of hired labour vis 
a vis family labour be represented by 0 *. 
With separability, 
aQ1aH aglaH (4.10) h(F*, H*, O) = 6)* 
aQlaF aglaF 
Consequently, the value of 0* estimated from the production function can be used to 
derive the effective wage rates and the shadow profits required for the estimation of 
the labour supply component of the model in the second step. Instead of defining the 
shadow wage rate for family labour, w *, in terms of the estimates of the marginal 
product of family labour from the production function, Equation 4.6 can be re- 
specified in terms of the observed market wage rates, w and wh and 0* as follows:16 
(4.11) Ls = Q ( w*(0*), n*(0*) + E, S, 13, T) + e 
where w *(0) = w if M > 0 (small farm) 
= wh/0* ifH >OandM =0 (big farm) 
= w` if H = M = 0 (autarchic farm) 
where w < wv < w`' /0* for 0 < 1 
7(0 ) = Y *N - wF if M > 0 (small farm) 
= Y *N - (wh /0 *) F if H > 0 and M = 0 (big farm) 
= Y *N if H = M = 0 (autarchic farm) 
16 Assuming w < wh /O *. Otherwise all family labour is supplied on the off -farm wage market by all 
households. See the discussion in Section 3.5 of Chapter III. 
87 
where Y *N is the optimized value of net farm income including 
returns to family labour (Refer to Eq. 4.8c). 
S = a vector of household and individual level characteristics 
which affect preferences between leisure and consumption 
e = error term. 
The advantage in the estimation structure of Equations 4.9 and 4.11 is that it avoids 
direct use of the estimated marginal product of family labour in the labour supply 
equations." Predicted values of the marginal product of family labour at the 
household level is likely to show an extreme level of variation which may not be 
consistent with the variation in the unobservable underlying subjective evaluation of 
family labour, UdUc . Unless certain restrictive functional forms are used, the 
estimated marginal product of family labour could he negative in a large percentage 
of the sample households from which the production function is estimated. In 
Jacoby's own exercise when the production function was estimated as a fully 
specified translog equation, nearly 20% of the sample households produce a negative 
marginal product for female family labour.18 
Another problem with using marginal products of labour in the labour supply 
equation to derive both the shadow wage and the shadow farm profits is that it 
increases the likelihood that errors of the production function and labour supply 
equations (u and e) will be correlated. Such correlations increase the complexity of 
the two -step estimation procedure and the adjustments in the standard errors in the 
second step which must be made in order to draw correct statistical inferences. (This 
adjustment process is discussed in Section 4.4 below). While the potential 
" In the specification of Eq. 4.11 an estimate of the marginal product of family labour is required 
only to exactly identify the effective wage rate of the autarchic household since in equilibrium w` 
will equal the marginal product of family labour. The alternative specification based on the observed 
market wage rates w and w'' and the 0' value, however, can still be used to define a fairly narrow 
range over which the effective shadow wage rate must lie even in the case of the autarchic household. 
Jacoby addresses this problem by dropping specific interaction terms involving female family 
labour that have a negative coefficient in the fully specified translog equation with some loss of 
generality in the flexible functional form. (Jacoby 1993: 913 footnote 14). 
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endogeneity of the marginal product based measures of w* and E* in Eq. 4.11 could 
be addressed by using instruments for the shadow wage rate and shadow farm 
profits, the choice of instruments that are not only uncorrelated with e but also 
uncorrelated with u are likely to be limited. 
The two step sequential estimation strategy proposed above - where some of the 
regressors used in the labour supply equation are derived from parameters estimated 
in the production function equation - is an example of what Pagan (1984) refers to 
as a two step procedure for estimating models with a "generated regressor ". In these 
models the main interest is in obtaining consistent estimates of the parameters in the 
second stage regression when it contains variables that, while directly unobservable, 
are estimable from the parameters of an auxiliary equation estimated in the first 
step.19 Our interests, however, are somewhat different from the usual model with 
generated regressors. The auxiliary equation of the production function does not 
serve only to generate the unobservable variables for the labour supply regressions 
but also to detect the presence and nature of the heterogeneity between family and 
hired labour as reflected in the O parameter set. 
An alternative strategy to the two -step procedure would be to estimate the first 
(auxiliary) and second step models via some joint method, such as full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) as in Liederuran (1980). In reference to Eq. 4.9 and 
4.11, FIML estimation would imply that the O parameter vector reflecting the 
heterogeneity between family and hired labour would be estimated jointly from the 
production function and the labour supply equations. Our tests for labour 
heterogeneity would likely be more robust if the estimates of the O parameter set 
were derived from a joint estimation of the production and the labour supply 
function. In addition there would be the usual efficiency gains if the error terms in 
the two equations were to be correlated. A joint estimation strategy for Eq. 4.9 and 
19 In econometric applications models in which generated regressors occur are widely used. Some 
example are models of (rational) expectations where the variable reflecting the anticipated value or 
expected value is generated as the predictors from another equation representing the expectations 
process (Barro 1977; Topel 1982); and spatial models of labour market equilibrium which include as 
a regressor the predicted probabilities for unemployment (Abowd and Ashenfelter 1981). 
89 
Eq. 4.11, however, is equivalent to joint estimation of the production and 
consumption components of the underlying farm household model, As noted in 
Section 4.1, such a joint estimation strategy for farm household models is 
computationally complex; and, depending on the nature of the heterogeneity implied 
by the Co parameter set, it may not always be feasible to solve analytically for the 
reduced form equations. If so, one cannot take advantage of economic theory in 
imposing or testing for parametric restrictions in the estimated equations.20 
Another reason why FIML is not used in this study is the structure of the data. The 
farm production function is estimated at the level of a household while the labour 
supply regressions are done with individual household member data. With such a 
data structure it is awkward to hypothesize the joint distribution for the error 
structure in the first and second step regressions. While the labour supply 
regressions could also be estimated at the household level by averaging over 
individual members, it is a better option to work with the individual level data since 
individual characteristics can be important in determining of labour supply 
behaviour in addition to shared household level characteristics. 
While opting for the sequential estimation procedure in which the O parameter set is 
derived form the production function equation only, we carry out sensitivity analyses 
to show that the production function based results on labour heterogeneity are robust 
to many alternative assumptions and specifications of the production function 
(Chapter VI). Secondly, while the labour supply equations do not directly contribute 
to the estimates of O, they can be used to provide independent corroboration of the 
nature of labour heterogeneity detected in the production function estimation. This is 
accomplished through appropriate model selection diagnostic tests for comparing 
alternative model specifications (in Chapter VII) that allow for a common effective 
wage (which is consistent with family and hired Iabour being homogeneous inputs) 
and varying effective wages conditional on the estimated Cl (which is consistent with 
labour heterogeneity). 
20 Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986c: 21), 
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4.4 Error Correction for the Two Step Estimator 
The basic strategy of the two step procedure is to replace the unobserved regressors 
in the second step with their estimated or predicted values from the auxiliary or first 
step regression. These values are then treated as if they were known a priori for the 
purpose of estimation and inference in the second step model. That the two -step 
procedures yield consistent estimates of the second step parameters under fairly 
general conditions is well documented as is the fact that the second step standard 
errors and related test statistics reported in the normal regression output are normally 
incorrect (Pagan 1986, Murphy and Topel 1985). But the need to correct the 
standard errors in the second step is commonly ignored. 
The standard errors in the second step require an upward adjustment in order to 
account for the fact that the generated regressors are measured with sampling error 
which is related to the precision of the parameter estimates in the first step. In an 
illustrative example reported in Murphy and TopeI (1985: 372), the proportional 
adjustment in the estimated standard errors is largest for the generated regressors. 
The required adjustments are somewhat smaller for variables that appear in both the 
first and second step equations, and negligible for the non -generated exogenous 
regressors in the second stage which do not also appear in the first step equation. 
In the specific framework of the estimated model for this study the key parameters 
of interest in the second step labour supply equations are the wage and income 
elasticities of labour supply. Since the wage and (non -labour endowment) income 
variables are the generated regressors in Eq. 4.11, for which the required adjustments 
in the standard errors of the relevant parameters are likely to be the Iargest, it will be 
important to make the necessary adjustments. 
The procedure adopted for adjusting the second step standard errors follows that 
suggested by Murphy and Topel (1985). These adjustments are relatively 
straightforward when the second stage equation is linear as in Equation 4.11 and 
when it is further assumed that the random errors of the first step and second step 
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equations are un- correlated?` This latter simplifying assumption is also made in the 
estimation work of Jacoby (1993). 
The general structure of a two step estimation procedure can be written as: 
(4.12) q=x,a + u 
(4.13) y= x2,0+ f(a,x,)y + e 
where a is a vector of unknown parameters estimated in the first step, based on a 
vector x, of exogenous variables which determine q. And y is the variable of interest 
in the second step regression and y is influenced both by an exogenous set of 
variables, x2, and another set of variables which are actually unobservable but which 
can be generated with the help of the a parameters (and the x, variables) of the first 
step equation. These unobservable variables are given by f(a ,x,). The set x, and x, 
could, of course, overlap and f(.) need not be related in any way to the function 
which determines q from x,. The only restriction imposed on f(.) is that it be twice 
continuously differentiable for each a in x,. Hence f(.) could be non - linear in a . 
It is assumed that the first step regression yields an estimator â of a which is 
consistent and asymptotically normal with covariance matrix V (6). Let V (â) be a 
consistent estimate of V( â) which is obtained from the first step regression. In the 
second step y is regressed on x2 and the estimated values f(ä , x,) and what is 
required is the correct asymptotic distribution of ((3, y) for tests of statistical 
significance and other inference based on a least squares regression of Eq. 4.13. 
Let r be the number of elements in the â vector and n the number of observations 
for the second stage regression. Denote by X2 be the n xp matrix of observations on 
x2 and Iet B be the n x m matrix of generated regressors f(â, x1). Denote the full 
observation matrix of the second step equation as Z = (X2, B). The covariance matrix 
for (ß, y) when Eq. 4.13 is estimated by ordinary least squares is given by: 
21 Under these conditions the standard error adjustments can be made on the basis of the normal 
regression output of most econometric packages. When the errors are correlated the adjustments are 
more complicated. See Newey (1984) for details. 
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(4.13) Ea = s2 (Z7) "' 
where s2 is the sample estimate of the variance of e. 
The correct asymptotic covariance matrix for (ß, y), adjusted for the fact that â is 
estimated with error, is given by22 
(4.14) E = Ea + (Z'Z)"' z'B* V ( â ) B*'Z(Z'Z)-I. 
(4.15) 
where B* is computed from the derivative matrix of f(.) with 
respect to a such that the typical element b *,i of B* is given by 23 
f 
= 
e k(axli) b* ij ik 
k=t al 
The form of Eq. 4.14 indicates the error correction procedure for the second step 
equation exceeds the commonly reported covariance matrix Eo by a positive definite 
matrix (given by the second term in Equation 4.14). As a result the standard errors 
based on the unadjusted E, in a naïve two step procedure are always under -stated. It 
is also clear that the size of the adjustment in the standard errors of ((3, y) depend 
crucially on two factors: V (â ) which is the precision of the first step parameter 
estimates, and the correlation between the explanatory variables Z and the derivative 
matrix B *. To the extent that this correlation is high, or the first step sampling error 
significant, the error adjustment will be important (Murphy and Topel 1985:375). 
4.5 Summary 
The estimation methodology for this study follows a two step procedure adapted 
from the method proposed by Jacoby (1993) for estimating non -recursive farm 
household models. In the first step, an aggregate farm production function 
22 Murphy and Topel (1985: 374 -375). 
23 In Equation 4.15 the index i represents the observation number (from 1 to n), the index j ranges 
over the number of elements in the a parameter set (from 1 to r); and k indexes the number of 
generated regressors in Eq. 4.12 given by f(.), which by assumption is 1 to m. Hence the matrix B* 
isnxr while Bisnxm. 
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containing a separable labour nest is estimated, enabling the heterogeneity between 
family and hired labour to be tested. Several alternative specifications that allow for 
imperfect substitution between family and hired labour and varying marginal 
products are estimated. In the second step a structural labour supply equation is 
estimated with a specification that is consistent with the type of labour heterogeneity 
found in the production function estimation. This typically means that the effective 
wage and non -labour income variables used in the labour supply regression will be 
derived from parameters estimated in the production function. 
Jacoby's approach was to base these "generated regressors" in the labour supply 
equation on the marginal product of family labour estimated from the production 
function. In Chapter III we showed that the marginal product for family labour at the 
optimum labour allocation could be directly related to the observed market wage 
rates for family and hired labour, when the heterogeneity between family and hired 
labour is explicitly modeled within a separable labour nest in the production 
function. Depending on the net labour market position of specific households, it is 
possible to derive the effective wage rate that determines their labour supply 
equilibrium from the observed market wage rates and the parameters that reflect the 
labour heterogeneity. This provides an alternative specification of the labour supply 
equation that has several advantages over the specification based on directly using 
the estimates of the marginal product of family labour. 
An alternative estimation strategy based on full information methods to estimate the 
production and labour supply equations jointly would have allowed for the nature of 
the labour heterogeneity to be simultaneously determined from the production and 
labour supply behaviour of the farm households. The complexities of such joint 
estimation, however, are formidable. The method adopted for this study is the 
simpler but widely used alternative of sequential estimation which gives consistent 
estimates under quite general conditions, requiring only a straightforward adjustment 
to the standard errors of the second step estimates. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE SETTING AND THE DATA 
This Chapter contains three sections. Section 5.1 contains a cursory description of 
the tarai (southern lowland) region of Nepal that provides the data used in the farm - 
household model estimation work of this thesis. It also briefly explains why the 
question of heterogeneity between family and hired labour in Nepalese agriculture is 
particularly relevant in the context of the tarai region. Section 5.2 describes the 
survey design and main features of the household survey and the structure of the 
data collected. The Iast section (5.3) provides additional information on the 
definitions adopted for the main variables used in the production function and labour 
supply regressions, and further details of how they were computed from the data 
recorded in the household survey. 
5.1 The Setting 
Nepal has three distinct ecological regions that lie on a north to south axis 
throughout the whole country. They are the northern most mountainous region, the 
middle hill region and the southern lowland (tarai) region. The material conditions 
for agricultural production are very different in these three regions. These 
differences derive mainly from climatic factors related to variations in altitude, but 
over the years such differences in physical conditions have led to very distinct 
regional agrarian structures and the social relations of production. 
The empirical component of this thesis is based on household level survey data from 
the tarai region of Nepal only. The data are drawn from a large nationally 
representative household budget survey carried out by Nepal Rastra Bank (the 
central bank of Nepal) which is referred to as the Multi- purpose Household Budget 
Survey (MPHBS). Although the MPHBS collected household data from a 
representative sample for each of the three ecological regions of Nepal, this 
complete data set is not utilized in the present study. The estimation of the farm 
household model is limited to the data from the tarai sample because the question of 
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heterogeneity between family and hired labour in Nepalese agriculture is best 
addressed in the context of that region 
The MPHBS sample of households from the northern hill and mountain districts of 
Nepal has been excluded from this study because of the very limited use of hired 
labour in those regions. The average farm size in these northern regions is only about 
0.7 hectares per operated holding (HMG /CBS 1993). Farm production is mainly 
subsistence oriented. There is only a limited form of economic differentiation among 
farm households in this region. Almost all households are owner -cultivators. 
The agrarian structure in the southern plain (tarai) region of Nepal more closely 
follows the classical structure of a few large landlords dependent primarily on hired 
labour, a middle group of owner- cultivators and a large group of landless households 
who supply the hired labour on the larger farms. Although average farm size in the 
tarai region is still small (about 1.2 hectares), a wider socio- economic differentiation 
of the rural households exists. A significant percentage of the land is cultivated in 
operated holdings in excess of 10 hectares; while on the other extreme a significant 
proportion of the population consists of landless households who work as hired 
labourers on the big farms. 
The National Sample Census of Agriculture for Nepal gives data on the size 
distribution of land holdings based on operated area and not on owned area. Hence 
there are few completely landless households enumerated in the census since those 
who do not own any land will usually rent in small operated areas. On the basis of 
the operated size of farm holdings from the 1991/92 Census', more than 10% of the 
tarai region households operate less than 0.1 hectares of land. Another 8% operate 
between 0.1 and 0.2 hectares. On the other hand, while holdings greater than 10 
hectares comprise only 0.5% of the total holdings (households), but they account for 
about 7% of the total operated land. 
The information on the size distribution of Iand holdings in this section is compiled from the 
1991/92 Nepal Agricultural Census volumes (HMG/N, CBS 1993, Table 3). 
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The rural labour markets in the tarai region are quite active. In peak periods there is 
considerable in- migration of agricultural labourers from India as well (Wallace, 
1989). Because of better regional transportation infrastructure, local villagers also 
have easier access to off farm wage employment opportunities in other villages and 
nearby urban centres. Rural households in the tarai region of Nepal are less likely to 
be quantitatively constrained on either the labour demand or labour supply side than 
farm households in the northern hill /mountain regions. 
A distinctive feature of hill region farming is that households arrange reciprocal 
labour exchange arrangements among household groups of equal status. The 
incentive structures for exchange labour will differ from that for hired as well as 
own family labour. This is another reason why this study is focussed on the tarai 
region only, where exchange labour arrangements are very rare. 
Nepal's tarai region is an extension of the Indo- Gangetic plains of northern India. 
Within Nepal the tarai comprises a narrow strip of land along the southern border at 
relatively low altitudes in comparison to the hilly north. Tarai region crop 
production is undertaken on level land, consisting of alluvial soil, which can be 
irrigated with the monsoonal flow of the region's rivers. Farms in the northern areas 
consist mainly of terraced hillsides that are difficult to irrigate. 
The tarai region has about half of the population of Nepal and two- thirds of the 
cultivated land. The main summer crop is paddy, sometime grown in two rotations 
where irrigation is available. Wheat, pulses and oilseeds are the main winter crops. 
Maize and millet are the common rotation in upland plots (pakho) not suitable for 
paddy cultivation. 
Agricultural production technology in the tarai region of Nepal is very backward. 
Average paddy yields are only about 2 metric tons per hectare and have been 
declining (HMG/N, MOF 1996) as more and more marginal land is brought under 
cultivation. Human labour is the main farm input, typically accounting for more than 
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50% of the total cost of farm cultivation.' There is a significant east -west sub - 
regional variation within the tarai belt of Nepal. The monsoon rainfall decreases as 
one travels west and hence so does population density. 
The sub -regional economies of the tarai region are more closely integrated with the 
Indian border markets than with each other (Wallace 1989). Hence one observes 
considerable variation in output and input prices within the tarai region of Nepal. 
This variation extends to market wage rates for agricultural labour. This variation in 
the sample data makes it feasible to estimate the Iabour supply regressions with 
cross -sectional data from within the tarai region only. 
5.2. The Data Set 
(a) Source 
The Multi- purpose Household Budget Survey (MPHBS), was conducted in a phase - 
wise manner in 1984 and 1985 and it collected household level data with reference 
to the 1984/1985 annual cropping cycle. This survey is the most extensive of the 
periodic but irregular household budget surveys conducted by Nepal Rastra Bank 
(henceforth, Rastra Bank), designed principally to compile information for the 
preparation of consumer price indices. The MPHBS, however, had a more ambitious 
objective of improving the Nepalese database on the regional patterns of 
employment, income distribution and consumption because regular surveys of this 
nature are not conducted by other government agencies in Nepal. 
The full sample size for this survey was 4022 households, of which the rural 
component consisted of 3660 households, drawn from a stratified sample of 22 
districts (out of a total of 75 in Nepal). The data used for this thesis consists of a 
subset of the rural sample from the southern tarai region of Nepal. The full tarai 
region sample in the MPHBS was 1571 households from seven sample districts. The 
actual estimation work reported in Chapters VI and VII is based on a smaller sub -set 
2 See HMG/N, Ministry of Agriculture, Costs of Production for Major Crops in Nepal 1985/86. The 
data from this publication is contemporaneous with the MPHBS sample data. 
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of the tarai region sample, consisting of 1007 households. This is the complete 
household sample from five out of the seven tarai districts of the MPHBS. 
The reason for the further reduction of the tarai sample size is that not all 
components of the MPHBS data used in this research was made available from 
Rastra Bank in computerized form. Because of the vast amount of data collected and 
the extensive work required for processing and data cleaning, some parts of the 
MPHBS questionnaire were not computer processed at Rastra Bank.' Unfortunately, 
one component of the survey left out of the Rastra Bank data tapes was the extensive 
data collected on the farm management module of the survey with the details of the 
crop -specific farm outputs and production inputs. 
The data processing of the farm management component of the MPHBS was 
organized by the author of this thesis in 1992 at the Institute for Integrated 
Development Studies (IIDS), Kathmandu, from the original survey questionnaires. 
At IIDS it was not feasible to process the complete farm management component 
from all of the 3660 rural household questionnaires. An arbitrary choice was made to 
process the full household sample from only 13 of the 23 sample districts, based on 
regional representativeness. Although the additional data processing at IIDS was 
initially done for other purposes than the research work undertaken in this thesis, the 
coverage of the tarai sample used for this thesis is close to two- thirds for households 
(1007 out of a possible total of 1571 sample households), and even higher in the case 
of sample districts (5 out of 7).4 
The production function estimates reported in Chapter VI are based primarily on the 
farm management data sub -set of the MPHBS that was processed at IIDS. This 
component of the survey has been linked with the computerized data files obtained 
3 The data processing and analyses of the MPHBS by Nepal Rastra Bank was considerably delayed in 
any case. The survey report was issued only in 1989 (Nepal Rastra Bank, 1989); and public access to 
the data set was provided only after the survey report was published. 
The five districts are Morang, Mahottari, Rupandehi , Banke and Kailali. Each of these districts 
represents one the five regional development zones of Nepal, moving from east to west, respectively. 
The other two tarai districts in the MPHBS sample were Sarlahi and Bara. 
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from Rastra Bank on other parts of the survey to prepare a full integrated data base 
of the 1007 sample households for the labour supply regressions of Chapter VII.' 
In spite of the long period since the data were collected, the MPHBS remains one 
of the most detailed household level survey data collected for Nepal.' It was well 
designed and implemented, and the data collection was carefully monitored. 
Information was collected over several rounds. One of its special features was to 
collect data on many non -monetized transactions (e.g., income received in kind as 
gifts and transfers, or as a part of wages) which are important sources of income in 
poor developing countries but are often overlooked in household surveys.' hi spite of 
its richness, the data from the MPHBS has been rarely used for subsequent research 
work on Nepal. This neglect provided part of the motivation to base the estimation 
work of this thesis on the MPBHS data. 
(b) Sample design 
The sample design of the MPHBS was based on a four -step selection procedure. In 
the first step 22 sample districts were chosen based on random sampling from a 
regional stratification of all the districts of Nepal.' Within each sample district the 
subsequent steps followed in selecting the sample of rural households consisted of: 
In hindsight even the limited coverage of the MPHBS sample attempted in the IIDS data processing 
proved overly ambitious. The computerized data processing, cleaning and, most importantly, the 
linking of the farm component module with the data set received from Rastra Bank proved more 
difficult than anticipated. These problems considerably delayed the research work carried out for this 
thesis. 
6 A Poverty Assessment report on Nepal was prepared by the World Bank based on the MPHBS 
data set (World Bank 1991) and the Bank has remarked favourably on the quality of the data in this 
survey. Subsequently, the World Bank itself conducted a Living Standards Measurement Survey 
(LSMS) of Nepal in 1996 but access to the LSMS survey data was provided too late to be used in the 
estimation work of this thesis. In any case, the farm management component of the LSMS is not as 
detailed as the MPHBS. 
The data on non -monetized transactions and other own- household accounts proved useful in 
deriving the non -labour endowment income, especially for the poorer households, which is required 
for the labour supply regressions. 
The procedures followed in this step are not relevant for the purpose of this study which is based on 
an ad hoc sub -sample of the tarai districts selected for the MPHBS. The details about the regional 
stratification of the sample districts and selection procedure for the MPHBS are given in NRB (1988) 
Chapter 2. 
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(ii) a random selection of sample village panchayats 
(iii) a random selection of 2 out of 3 clusters9 from each sample 
panchayat 
(iv) a stratified sample of households from each cluster derived from five 
strata based on the size of the land holding by the household. 
The panchayats selected in step (ii) correspond to the main administrative units 
within a district.10 The panchayat boundaries in Nepal are drawn to include about 
1,000 to 1,200 households, and so they do not usually coincide with a single village. 
Nonetheless, the geographical area covered within a panchayat boundary tends to be 
homogenous, particularly in the tarai region which has a much higher population 
density than the northern hill regions of Nepal. Hence, for convenience of language, 
in the subsequent text of this Chapter and elsewhere in the thesis, the term "village" 
is used interchangeably with village panchayat. 
In the last step of the sample design there was a complete enumeration of all 
households within the selected clusters. These households were then classified into 
five sampling strata (categories) based on the size of the operated land of the farm 
household. Operated land consists of owner -cultivated land and land rented in. The 
first four strata were defined to be households with operated farm sizes designated as 
marginal, small, medium or large farm holdings." A fifth stratum consisted of 
landless households. Within each stratum a five percent random sample was drawn, 
with an upward adjustment in the sampling ratio where necessary to ensure that at 
least two households were selected from each stratum. 
9 Each village panchayat is sub -divided further into 9 wards. In the MPHBS sample design each 
selected panchayat was broken down into 3 clusters, each consisting of 3 adjoining wards. 
10 The village panchayats in Nepal have been renamed as village development committee areas after 
the political changes of 1991 but the boundaries have remained the same. 
" The farm size strata were defined in terms of the area of total land operated by a household. 
Operated land includes self -cultivation of owned land as well as land rented in. So the distribution of 
operated land will differ somewhat from and tend to be more equal than the distribution of land 
ownership. The size strata limits were as follows: marginal farm holdings up to 1.02 hectares, small 
holdings up to 2.73 hectares, medium holdings up to 5.44 hectares, and large farm holdings above 
5.44 hectares. Households with only a homestead that may have included a kitchen garden were 
classified as landless. 
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The important implication of this sample design is that within each sample village 
panchayat the material conditions of farm production, the cropping pattern and wage 
rates and prices will tend to be fairly uniform. But these will vary considerably 
across panchayat and districts, especially since the five district sub -sample has been 
selected from the entire range of the east -west regional variation in Nepal. Within a 
village (and consequently within ward clusters) the main basis for the variation in 
the household level data will be with respect to income and assets holdings based on 
the amount of land cultivated. Hence the MPHBS data is a broadly representative 
sample from different socio- economic strata within a village. Such a variation 
proves useful in the labour supply estimation work to identify the income effects 
across households that face more or less equal wage rates. 
The final sample of 1007 tarai region households used in the empirical part of this 
thesis does not constitute a completely random sample for the tarai region of Nepal. 
The sample of households within districts is the complete set selected for the 
MPHBS, and hence can be treated as random (subject to the stratified clustered 
sample design described above). But the random sample properties of the overall 
tarai sample of the MPHBS do not carry over to the data subset drawn from only 5 
of the 7 tarai districts of the MPBHS. In the regression estimations of this thesis no 
specific attempt is made to deal with this problem by modifying the weights given to 
the households to reflect the ad hoc selection of the 5 districts. The focus of this 
study in not on estimating tarai region aggregates or household means. The 
estimation work assigns equal weight to each household. To the extent that the full 
sample of 1007 household is used, the equal weight procedure is justified since the 
sample size within districts in the MPHBS was chosen to be proportional to the 
district population.' 
The distribution of the actual sample of households used in this thesis, classified by 
sample district and land size strata, is given in Appendix Table 5A.1. 
2 At the fmal stage of the stratified sample design of the MPBBS there is also a more or less equal 
representation of households from the five land size strata (NRB1988: 29). This property is 
maintained in the five district sub -sample since the entire sample within a district is used. 
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(c) Data structure: farm management 
The farm management module of the MPBHS collected detailed data on all output 
and input use on the farm over a multi -round twelve month survey period. The farm 
household's own -account production activities were classified into agricultural and 
non - agricultural enterprises. The main sub -categories identified under agricultural 
enterprises were crop production, animal husbandry, horticulture and fishery. Crop 
production is the dominant farm activity. For the full tarai region sample of the 
MPHBS the crop production component constitutes more than 81% of total 
agricultural enterprise income; and the latter (own account agricultural enterprise 
income) itself accounts for about 65% of total income for the average tarai region 
rural household." 
The MPHBS collected very detailed output and input data on crop production at the 
level of individual crops. In particular the labour input in specific crops was 
classified into nine categories based on three types of workers (adult male, adult 
female and child) and three sources (family, hired and exchange labour). Detailed 
information was collected on the actual wage payments and meal expenses related to 
hired and exchange labour so that an average wage payment for each type of 
labourer can be computed for each household reporting use of hired and exchange 
labour on a crop -wise basis. Data on other production inputs such as bullock days 
and seeds are also distinguished by source - whether hired (or purchased) or from the 
household's own resources. In almost all categories the information is collected in 
both quantity and value terms with the main exception being chemical fertilizer.' 
" NRB (1988:230) Table 2A. Other sources of household income are income from wages and 
salaries, rental income, non -agricultural enterprise income (i.e. household trade and cottage industry 
activities) and gifts and remittances. Within the MPHBS definitions of own account agricultural 
enterprise income, apart from crop production which accounts for 81.2% of this sub -total, the minor 
components are animal husbandry (16.1 %), horticulture (1.4 %) poultry (1 %) and fisheries (0.2 %) 
14 The absence of quantity data on chemical fertilizers is not a serious shortcoming in the estimation 
of the production function. Fertilizer distribution in Nepal occurs through a single para- statal agency 
which charges a fixed price throughout Nepal. So the value data is a good proxy for quantity if one 
ignores differences in the nutrient content of different fertilizers. 
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The farm management data set is organized into a winter and summer cropping 
cycle /rotation. This structure can be used to derive average wage rates paid for hired 
labour for crop production in each of the two cropping cycles to get a measure of 
seasonal variation in the wage rate. 
Although the farm management survey data, as with the rest of the MPHBS data, 
was collected through recall based interview methods, several steps were taken to 
ensure reliability and accuracy of the farm management data. For instance, the data 
on crop output was cross -tabulated with a table on the disposition of farm output 
(market sales, home consumption, remaining stocks) to produce a household balance 
by crop. Similarly, the information on family labour input in crop production was 
cross -checked with the labour supply component of the survey questionnaire to 
maintain consistency. 
Detailed data were also collected on the size and type of land operated by each 
sample household. The farm -level land holding data is also distinguished by land 
tenure forms: owner cultivated, leased out and leased in either as fixed rent or share 
cropping arrangements. The main distinction in agricultural land in the tarai region 
is between wet land (khet) suitable for growing paddy and sloping upland (pakho) 
that does not retain water for paddy cultivation. Within each category a further 
distinction is made between irrigated and un- irrigated land. This makes it relatively 
easy to control for the differences in the quality of the land input. The cropping 
pattern between khet and pakho land tends to he very different. Hence defining the 
land input to take account of the heterogeneity between pakho and khet land is one 
way to account for differences in the crop composition across farm households. 
While this information gives a good indication of the quality of the land input 
available to each farm household, the area planted to each crop, unfortunately, is not 
broken down into these specific land types. The crop -level land input is recorded as 
a single value for the total area harvested. 
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(d) Data structure: Family labour supply 
The family labour supply component of the MPBHS data is also very detailed. A 
complete enumeration of all household members with details on individual 
characteristics (age, marital status, education level, etc.) was prepared in the first 
survey round. Members of the household who are part of the extended farm family 
are clearly distinguished from temporary residents and farm servants. The usual 
occupation for each household member is noted on the basis of a very detailed three 
digit coding structure, and this information is used to determine whether a particular 
person is economically active or not. For each economically active person (aged 10 
or above) data on the seasonal employment pattern was collected through multi - 
round interviews. These data were then aggregated into total days of productive 
work in each month of the survey year. The main categories of employment 
distinguished for the number of days worked in each month are: work on own family 
farm, work on the hired labour market and work as an exchange labourer. 
A major shortcoming of the labour supply data set is the lack of information on the 
wage rate received by each individual when working in the hired labour market. 15 
Nor does the data distinguish the place and type of employment - i.e., whether it is 
agricultural labour or non -agricultural employment, and whether it is within the 
sample village or outside. This deficiency means the wage rates for individual 
family members who report working on the off -farm labour market must be imputed 
from some other part of the MPHBS data set. 
5.3 Main Variable Definitions 
(a) Production function 
The production function estimations reported in Chapter VI are based only on the 
crop production component of the farm management data which is the dominant part 
15 There are data on monthly income from off -farm wage labour at the household Ievel. While this 
could be used to derive an average earning per off -farm work day at the household level, this 
computation is likely to be affected by major reporting errors. Another problem is that this 
information cannot be used to derive wage rates for male and female workers separately. 
105 
of farm production in the tarai region. The other components of agricultural 
production identified in the MPHBS - animal husbandry, horticulture and fisheries - 
are ignored. These other activities are ignored because they are minor components of 
farm production,1ó and because detailed input data are not always available for these 
other components in the MPHBS. Finally, there is very little use of hired labour in 
these ancillary activities and so they are not relevant to an estimation framework 
where the main objective is to test for the heterogeneity between hired and family 
labour. 
Although the MPHBS contains data on crop -specific farm inputs and output, the 
test for labour heterogeneity is embedded in an aggregate production function for all 
crop output mainly because the important information on land quality is not 
available at the level of individual crops. The differences in the efficiency of family 
and hired labour may also lead households to choose alternative cropping patterns 
based on the labour requirements of different crops. One particular manifestation of 
the labour efficiency related production choices made by households may be more 
intensive multiple cropping. Such responses will not be fully captured in 
comparisons of labour productivity in single crop production functions. Further, 
since the family labour supply data are also at the aggregate level (i.e. not 
distinguished by crop specific work days) it makes sense to derive the effective 
wage rate for family labour in terms of an average comparison of the productivity of 
family and hired labour, rather than crop -specific comparisons which may vary 
considerably among crops. 
On the other hand, working with aggregate farm output does create potential bias in 
the estimation results when the crop composition and output prices are not uniform 
across different households and regions (Bardhan, 1973). The price variation 
problem can be accounted for by measuring the farm output as a composite quantity 
1S As noted in footnote 13 on page 102, the role of horticulture, poultry and fisheries components in 
total agricultural enterprise income is negligible for the average tarai region rural household. While 
animal husbandry, which on average accounts for 16% of total agricultural enterprise income, is an 
important ancillary activity to crop production, there is almost no use of hired labour for this 
component. Also, it is difficult to correctly impute what annual animal husbandry production and 
income is when sales and slaughter of farm animals also represent a depletion of capital stock. 
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variable rather than simply as the market value of total output. The quantity index 
for aggregate crop output is computed by deflating the total value of farm output by 
a village -specific aggregate price index. The village specific price indices are 
derived as a Tomquist (log- linear) price index of individual crop prices, using the 
value share of different crops grown in that particular village. 
From Eq. 4.9 in Chapter IV, the specification of the production function with a 
separable nest for labour inputs is of the form: 
(5.1) Q = f(g(F,H2O),V,a) + u 
where Q is aggregate composite output as derived above. 
On the input side, in addition to the land (A) and composite labour input g(.), two 
other main input variables were created from the MPHBS survey data (to represent 
the set V). They are bullock -pair work days (B) and material inputs (M). 
The material input variable simply lumps together several diverse production inputs 
identified in the MPBHS data in value terms. M is the sum of the value of seeds, 
chemical fertilizers, insecticides, irrigation charges, and operating cost and rental 
charges for farm machinery. The bulk of M consists of the value of seeds and 
fertilizers since only a small percentage of farms reported machinery use or 
payment of fees for irrigation water. M is converted into real units by deflating the 
nominal sum by the village -specific crop price index. The use of such a deflator is 
justified since the major component of M is the value of seeds. 
Apart from the components of M, all of the other major inputs are already reported 
in quantity levels in the MPBHS data. The main computations required for defining 
these variables are aggregation procedures over sub -categories. 
As noted above, for the labour inputs, the MPHBS reports work days on the family 
farm by male adult, female adult and child labour under each of three sources of 
labour: family, hired and exchange. The input of child labour is not broken down 
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further by gender. Fortunately, the overall level of child labour reported as inputs in 
crop production is minimal in the MPHBS farm management data in the selected 
tarai districts.' Hence the child labour category is completely ignored in creating 
the sub -aggregates of total family and hired labour. The level of exchange labour in 
the tarai region is also minimal. Where it occurs it has been treated as hired labour.'$ 
The adult male and female work days in each category are added together after 
imply adjusting the female work days into equivalent male labour days based on the 
observed male female wage rate in a particular village. That is, total family labour 
days (F) is measured in terms of adult male equivalent units and is computed as 
F = Fm + (w,/wm) Ff where the f and m subscripts signify male and female sub- 
categories. A similar procedure is used for aggregating hired labour. 
This specification treats male and female labour as perfect substitutes, adjusted for a 
constant productivity difference represented by (w,/w,,,) -- the observed ratio of the 
female to the male wage rates in a sample village. This is admittedly a crude manner 
of handling any heterogeneity between male and female labour (within both the 
hired and family labour sub -aggregates). It is, however, theoretically justifiable to 
the extent that differences in competitively set market wage rates will reflect 
differences in labour productivity at the margin. 
Alternative treatment of the potential heterogeneity of male and female labour was 
attempted by distinguishing four different labour inputs in the labour aggregator g(.) 
function. Using such a structure with the flexible functional specifications of the 
production function proved intractable. Instead of persisting with an awkward four 
" The MPHBS Report indicates that child labour is concentrated more on what it classifies as 
household subsistence activities - collecting drinking water and fuewood, home processing of food 
crop, etc. (NRB 1988:141 Table I). 
e Labour exchange arrangements can be viewed as hired labour contracts where payment is received 
in kind terms of the other participants' labour input. Of course, the incentive structure and costs of 
monitoring the effort of exchange labour differ from that of purely casual hired labour. In some 
specific situations the exchange labour arrangements may be based on close -knit groups or extended 
family /clan identities and hence be more similar to family labour. Since exchange labour work days 
in the MPHBS data for the tarai region are so limited, its classification ultimately is not important. 
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input g(.) function this study has opted for the alternative approach of carrying out 
detailed sensitivity analyses to show that any observed heterogeneity between family 
and hired Iabour is independent of the specific values of the (w,/wm) ratio used to 
convert female labour work days to equivalent male work days. 
The bullock work -days variable is also distinguished by family source and hired 
source. Our derivation of the total bullock input variable (B) is simply the sum of 
hired bullock days and family bullock days. Potential heterogeneity in input of 
bullock power from family and hired sources is not of interest in this study. 
The land input variable however required some detailed computations. From the 
MPHBS farm management data it is possible to compute several alternative 
indicators of the land input. Since the dependant variable is aggregate farm output, 
the main distinction is between net sown area - a measure of the physical size of the 
land area that is cultivated by the farm household - and gross harvested area which 
takes into account of the actual cropping cycle whereby more than one crop may be 
planted on a particular plot in the reference period. In empirical applications 
production function specifications have used both types of the land input variable. 
Where data are available, gross cultivated area seems a more appropriate measure of 
the annual flow of services received from the physical land endowment of the farm 
(Carter 1984). 
The problem with defining the land input in terms of the gross cultivated area with 
the MPBHS data set is that the information about land quality (paddy land or 
upland, irrigated or unirrigated) is available only at the level of the physical land 
endowment and not in terms of the land area allocated to specific crops. Several 
alternative ways of bringing in the land quality variables were tried. In the 
production function specifications using ordinary least squares estimation, additional 
land quality variables can be introduced in a ratio format - such as the ratio of 
irrigated land to total physical land or the ratio of paddy land in total land - by 
assuming that these ratios carry over to the gross cultivated area as well. 
Alternatively, in the specifications based on non -linear estimation, an aggregate 
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quality adjusted land input can be computed directly from the physical land type 
data, and the index of cropping intensity in the same way as the aggregate labour 
input is constructed as a composite of family and hired labour. 
(b) Labour supply function 
From Eq. 4.11 the labour supply regressions are of the form 
(5.2) L, = e (w *(0*), E *(0 *), S) + e 
= e (w *(0), t(0 *) + E , S) + e 
where L, is a measure of the total labour supply in all productive activities. 
The labour time of family farm household members has four general uses: 
(i) unpaid work on own farm cultivation, including time devoted to subsidiary 
productive activities such as livestock rearing, home processing of farm 
output for sale; etc. 
(ii) work as a hired labourer in other households' farming activities 
(in) off -farm non -agricultural hired labour work (such as in construction work) 
(iv) household subsistence activities, such as home processing for own 
consumption, time spent on collecting firewood and water, etc. 
The definition of labour supply adopted (based on the definition followed in the 
coding of the MPHBS data) includes items (i) to (iii) only. 19 In the setting of the 
tarai region of Nepal there is very little off -farm non -agricultural work available for 
individuals who continue to reside on their farm. The bulk of the labour days of 
work reported in the MPBHS sample therefore consists of items (i) and (ii). 
The labour supply regressions are run at the level of individual family members of 
the farm household in order to allow for the effects of variation in individual 
9 When data exists on activities included in (iv), this category can be treated as much a part of 
labour supply as the unpaid farm work under (i). Under optimal labour allocation conditions, the 
marginal returns to labour in all activities are equalized. Jacoby (1993) specifies his labour supply 
variable to include category (iv) activities. 
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characteristics such as age and educational levels. The sample of individuals is 
limited to immediate family members residing in the household who can be 
identified through their relationships to the household head. 
The dependant variable is the number of days of productive work reported by each 
economically active family member. For each economically active family member 
the data on the number of days worked is available on a month to month basis. The 
monthly data can be aggregated into two six -monthly sub -totals to correspond to the 
two phases of the survey data collection in the farm management module. This 
procedure helps to establish a link between the labour supply work days (in six 
monthly sub -totals), and data on the average wage rates paid by farm households 
that report hiring in labour in the summer and winter cropping cycles. In this way the 
seasonal labour supply behaviour of a particular individual can be modeled since 
there will be differences in the average wage rates reported in the two cropping 
cycles. It is at best a gross simplification to assume that the operation of the rural 
labour markets in the study areas gives rise to two distinct seasonal wage rates, each 
of which is constant over an arbitrary six month survey cycle. Nonetheless, this 
method of aggregating the monthly labour supply data offers a crude way of 
accounting for some seasonal wage variation to compensate for the missing data on 
the actual seasonal wage rates received by individual household members. 
As noted above, the main definitional treatment regarding the wage rate variable is 
the imputed equivalence of the off -farm wage rate for family labour and the wage 
rate at which labour is hired in by the sample households in a particular village. In 
effect, the assumption w = Wh is forced since w is not directly reported in the 
MPHBS data set.2° Although such an imputation for the off -farm wage rate for 
family labour could be a source of unspecified bias in the estimates of parameters of 
20 Actually what is required is Wilk where the i indexes an individual in farm household j for the 
month k . The wage rates received by individual family members who report working off -farm in the 
hired labour market may vary according to their skill and nature of the specific tasks performed, even 
in a particular local abour market. Unfortunately this information is not recorded in the MPHBS data 
nor can proxies for it be computed from other parts of the survey questionnaire. 
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the labour supply function, such errors seem unlikely to be serious in the specific 
setting of the Nepal tarai. There are several reasons for this presumption. 
Given the fragmented nature of rural labour markets in Nepal, the primary place for 
off -own -farm employment of family labour will be as hired labourers in the larger 
farms in their own or nearby villages. Hence it is expected that w = w'' on average 
for a sample of farm- households from a particular village with limited non- 
agricultural employment prospects 21 In a similar setting to the Nepal tarai, Bardhan 
and Rudra (1981) report a very limited locus of off -farm employment in agricultural 
operations for wage labourers in West Bengal. If the local village economies were 
completely closed, and crop production was the only economic activity undertaken, 
there would be an exact equivalence between the average wage reported as paid out 
and the average wage rate reported as received, even in the presence of seasonal 
variations in the local village wage rates. In reality local village economies are not 
completely closed, and there are other wage labour activities apart form crop 
production. But the effects these have in creating a major wage gap between the 
wages paid out and wages received by households in a particular village is still likely 
to be small. 
Secondly, the analytical results in Section 3.5 of Chapter III indicate that w is the 
correct wage rate to use in the labour supply regression for farm household members 
only if w > w'Ye consistently in the sample data.22 But in such situations there would 
be complete specialization in labour allocation: family labour would be completely 
supplied on the off -farm market at wage w, and farm cultivation would be done 
completely by hired labour paid a wage w''. Since one rarely observes such a pattern 
of specialization, it is more usual to find w < wh /A. When the latter condition holds 
the effective wage rate to be used in the labour supply equation is defined in terms of 
Z' This will be particularly true for female family members whose off -farm mobility is even more 
restricted. The wages female labourers receive will be the wages other households in the village pay 
to female farm workers in that village. 
22 8 is the ratio of the marginal product of hired labour and family labour at the optimum labour 
allocation for crop production. Refer to the discussion in Section 3.5 of Chapter III. 
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wh/0 for the subset of households who hire in some labour for their farm 
cultivation. In such cases the off -farm market wage rate, w, need not be known. The 
verification of whether w <w170 can be obtained on the basis of the observed labour 
allocation pattern alone. The individuals who receive a high off -farm wage rate 
would not be specializing in farm production work, and hence can be detected 
through the usual occupation codes reported in the MPHBS. 
To minimize the discrepancy related to varying wage rates due to differences in the 
type of work performed, irrespective of the relationship between w and wh /9, the 
labour supply regression in Chapter VII will be limited to individuals who report 
their main occupation to be farm operators or agricultural labourers. For instance, 
the reported wage rate for hired labour in crop production would not apply to the 
labour leisure equilibrium of a household member who may do some work on the 
family farm but whose main occupation was as a shop keeper or a village carpenter. 
In these other principal occupations, the marginal returns to labour are likely to be 
very different from the average wage paid to hired labour in crop production. But the 
variations in individual level wages are unlikely to be important in village settings 
for individuals who report farm cultivation or agricultural labour as their main 
occupation, when farming is carried in under traditional cultivation techniques with 
little mechanization. The main difference will be between male and female adult 
wage rates which is recorded in the MPHBS data. Finally, the usual distinction 
between gross and net wages in settings such as the Nepal tarai is not likely to be 
important. The fixed costs to finding work on the local market will be minimal and 
there are no income tax wedges to consider. 
It is concluded from the above that the imputation w = wh, which is forced by the 
data structure in the absence of direct observations of w, is defensible in the 
proposed estimation set up and in the setting of the Nepal tarai. Hence, in the labour 
supply regression results of Chapter VII, wh becomes the effective wage for any 
family member reporting work days in the hired labour category for a particular 
cropping cycle. For individuals in autarchic households, or in big farm households 
that hired in labour, the effective wage rates will be based on wh with the appropriate 
adjustment for O if labour heterogeneity is indicated. 
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The second main variable that needs to be created for the labour supply regressions 
is the measure of household non -labour income, including the imputed value of farm 
profits. From Eq. 4.7, the household -level nominal non -labour income (NLY), 
corresponding to the linearized budget constraint, is defined as follows: 
(5.3) NLY = E* = n *(w *) + E 
= Y *N - w* F* + E 
YN - w *F + E 
where rt* is the maximized value of farm profits using a shadow wage rate, 
w *, to value family labour inputs, and E is true non -labour endowment 
income. 
The specific derivation of NLY used in the labour supply regressions is the 
approximation based on YN given by the third line of Eq. 5.3. YN represents the 
actual (not the optimized) value of the total returns to farm cultivation net of all 
purchased inputs, but including the implicit return to family labour applied to own 
farm work. The approximation for household level farm profit based on YN is used 
because YN is observed while Y *N has to be computed from the first -order conditions 
for a specific functional form.23 
Since YN and E can be computed from the income categories reported in MPHBS, 
F is directly reported in the farm management module, and w* is derived in the 
manner described in Section 3.5, the NLY variable based on observed data is easily 
computed. The optimized value of NLY would in addition be based on the estimated 
parameters of the production function from which the optimum levels of F and H, as 
well as other variable inputs, have to be computed. For methodological reasons - 
23 It may appear that the observed Y5 will consistently under -estimate the optimal Y *N since the 
latter is an extremum value and therefore YN on average would equal Y55 only if all households 
achieved their profit maximizing optimum input levels. However, in the presence of an additive error 
term in the production function, as specified in Eq. 5.1, there will be random errors in farm output, 
conditional on the actual input levels applied. Hence the observed YN can be greater or less than the 
optimal Y *N (which is computed without considering the error term). Therefore YN can on average be 
a consistent approximation for Y *N without resorting to the extreme assumption that all farm 
households achieve their profit maximizing input levels. 
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relating to the two step estimation strategy - it is desirable that the labour supply 
regressions be independent of all of the other estimated parameters of the production 
function, except for the unobservable w* variable (which would reflect the extent of 
labour heterogeneity between family and hired labour). Such a procedure can 
provide an independent verification of the labour heterogeneity results of the 
production function (and partially compensate for the fact that the production 
function and labour supply regressions are not jointly estimated to derive 0).24 
The main income categories included in the E variable are household income from 
gifts and remittances, land rental payments and rent from other farm assets such as 
bullocks and farm machinery. In order to avoid having HNY become zero for most 
landless households (for whom YN = 0 by definition) the adopted definition of E 
also includes the imputed rental value of the family residence which is also reported 
as income for every household in the MPHBS data. 25 
5.4 Summary 
This Chapter presented a brief overview of the setting of the Nepal tarai and the 
MPHBS data which is used in the estimation of the farm household model in. 
Chapters VI and VII. Although the MPHBS data from other regions of Nepal was 
also available, the empirical work in this thesis is limited to the tarai region sample 
because of the limited usage of hired labour in other regions. The clustered sample 
design of the MPBBS give rises to significant variation in the independent 
variables, such as wage rates, to permit estimation of the farm household model 
with cross -sectional data from the tarai region only. 
24 Chapter VII provides further details on how the labour supply regressions can be used to choose 
between alternative model specifications that support labour heterogeneity or homogeneity, 
independently of the production function estimation results. 
25 The E income categories are derived from Section 3.1 of the MPHBS survey questionnaire Form 
Ga for the cash income components and section 5 of Form Ga for the income in kind categories 
which are received as gifts. 
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This Chapter also discussed in some detail the procedures and definitions followed 
in computing the main variables required for the regression analyses of the 
production and labour supply functions. The main features were that that the 
production function is specified at the level of aggregate farm output mainly because 
data on land quality are not available at the individual crop level. The labour supply 
equations are specified for individual family members and limited to specific 
agricultural occupations. Individual level wage rates are not reported in the MPHBS 
data. Instead the village level wage rates for hired labour derived from the farm 
management component of the survey are used as proxies for the off -farm wage rate 
for family labour. It is argued that in the setting of the Nepal tarai region there will 
be a close relationship between the wage rate reported as paid out by households 
hiring in labour in a specific village, and the wage rates received by individuals from 
that same village who report working on the hired labour market. 
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Appendix Table 5A.1 




Sample Districts by Region: 
Eastern Central Western 
(Morang) (Mahottari) (Rupandehi) 










BIG 19 27 27 12 18 103 
MEDIUM 26 31 31 16 19 123 
SMALL 79 42 44 33 29 227 
MARGINAL 82 107 57 23 12 281 
ALL cultivators 206 207 159 84 78 734 
LANDLESS 96 95 29 21 32 273 
TOTAL 302 302 188 105 110 1007 
Note: The actual sample of households used in the regression analyses in Chapters VI and VII differ 
slightly from the above due to additional adjustments explained in each specific chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PRODUCTION FUNCTION ESTIMATION RESULTS AND TESTS FOR 
HETEROGENEITY BETWEEN FAMILY AND HIRED LABOUR 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents the results of a production function based estimation 
procedure to test for heterogeneity between family and hired labour inputs in crop 
production in the tarai region of Nepal. The production function regression results 
also serve as the first step of the sequential estimation strategy outlined in Chapter 
IV for estimating a farm household model that allows for labour heterogeneity. The 
parameters of the production function that describe the specific nature of the labour 
heterogeneity will be used to generate the unobservable variables for the labour 
supply regressions in the second step (Chapter VII). Unlike the standard two -step 
model with "generated regressors" (where the first step is carried out only to derive 
the unobservable variables for the second step estimation), the estimated production 
function parameters presented in this Chapter are of independent interest. These 
parameters describe the production component of the farm household model, 
irrespective of the nature of the heterogeneity detected. They are used to derive the 
appropriate set of factor demand elasticities and the elasticities of input substitution 
that reflect the production side decision making of the farm household. 
The test for labour heterogeneity is embedded in a production function structure that 
uses alternative ways of aggregating family and hired labour into a composite labour 
input. Consistent aggregation of family and hired labour, however, pre- supposes that 
the underlying production function is separable in the labour inputs (Berndt and 
Christensen 1974). Therefore it is necessary first to test for the separability of the 
two labour inputs in the aggregate farm production function. If the labour inputs are 
indeed separable, it allows a direct way of testing for labour heterogeneity together 
with the estimation of the complete set of parameters of the production function. In 
addition, as discussed in Chapter III, the separable input structure is advantageous 
for generating the unobservable shadow wage rates for family labour needed in the 
second step labour supply equations. 
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The statistical inference in this chapter is based on the primal estimation of a farm - 
level production function. The problem with direct estimation of a production 
function when the variable inputs could be endogenous is well known (Griliches 
1984). A conventional resolution of this problem is to interpret the production 
function relationship in the light of the Zellner, Kmenta and Dreze (1966) 
framework of expected profit maximization by the farm- households, which makes 
the error term independent of the inputs. We adopt such a framework because the 
alternative of using a dual estimating procedure (based on a cost or profit function) 
is not feasible in this context because the shadow wage rate for family labour under a 
general form of labour heterogeneity is unobservable. 
The empirical results presented in this Chapter are based on two different sub -sets of 
the MPBHS sample for the five tarai region districts. One data set consists only of 
those households that utilize both family and hired labour in crop production 
(Sample I). The second data set consists of all farm households that report any use of 
family labour (Sample II). Sample I is obviously a sub -set of Sample II. These two 
data sets are described in Section 6.2, together with a summary table of the main 
variables of interest for the production function regressions. 
The empirical results based on Sample I are given in Section 6.3, using a translog 
specification for an aggregate production function with family and hired labour as 
two distinct inputs. The main results are on the tests for the separability of family 
and hired labour. The values of the various elasticities of substitution derived from 
the estimated parameters are also reported for this specification. After establishing 
that the production function is indeed separable in these two types of labour, in 
Section 6.4 alternative functional forms for aggregating the two labour categories 
into a single composite input are tested. These tests are based on the data from 
Sample II that also includes households where no hired labour is used. Section 6.5 
presents the full estimation results for the preferred labour aggregation functional 
form. Section 6.6 tests for the robustness of the labour heterogeneity result through 
See also the spirited defence of the primal approach to production function estimation offered in 
Mundlak (1996). He argues that estimating dual specifications with prices assumed exogenous at the 
firm level does not utilize all the available information and the loss in efficiency can be sizeable. 
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sensitivity analyses. The full set of the elasticities of substitution and factor demand 
elasticities based on the preferred composite labour function, estimated over Sample 
II, are derived and discussed in Section 6.7. The last section provides a summary. 
6.2 Data Summary 
General issues related to the structure of the MPBHS data and variable definitions 
adopted in this study were discussed in Chapter V. The main point relevant to this 
Chapter was the decision to specify an aggregate production function and to add up 
male and female labour inputs assuming perfect substitutability with unequal 
productivity.2 This section gives further information about the actual sample of 
households used for the production function estimates in the different parts of 
Chapter VI that follow, and a summary description of the main variables of interest. 
The coverage of the farm management component of the MPHBS data set is limited 
to households that operate some land for crop production. Ignoring the purely 
landless households in the sample of the 5 selected tarai districts, farm management 
data is available for 734 cultivator households. (Appendix Table 5A.1 in Chapter V 
gives the distribution of these households by the operated land size strata). 
As noted in Chapter V, the farm management data set was processed independently 
of the rest of the MPHBS. Sample household identification codes were used to link 
the farm management data set with the data tapes received from Nepal Rastra Bank 
for the other parts of the survey. Due to coding errors a few households in the farm 
management data set could not be linked in this manner, and they have been 
discarded from this data set. In addition, the farm management records for several 
other households had to be discarded due to missing data or because the conversion 
factors for the local units of measurements recorded in the farm management 
a The dependant variable in the aggregate production function is a real index of composite crop 
output created by deflating the nominal value by a village- specific producer price index. The sub- 
totals for family and hired labour add up the male and female labour days, after converting female 
work -days into equivalent male days, using the observed female to male wage ratio. For instance, 
total hired labour days = hired male days + wr . hired female days, where wr is the ratio of the 
wage rate of the female to male hired labour wage rate reported for a particular sample village. The 
total family labour input is computed similarly, using the wr observed for hired labour wage rates. 
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questionnaire were not noted in the MPHBS codebook. The actual usable sample 
size for the farm management data created at IIDS, after data cleaning and verifying 
household identification codes, was 713 households. 
For the estimation work of this thesis, a final adjustment to the sample was made by 
discarding those households whose recorded land holding was less than 0.1 hectares 
or those households which did not report any use of own -family labour as inputs in 
crop production.' These adjustments give a final sample of 679 households, which 
is Sample II - the data set used in the main empirical work of Sections 6.4 to 6.7. ° 
For the tests of separability of family and hired labour reported in Section 6.3, the 
sample is limited to those households that utilize both family and hired labour. In 
order to test for separability it is necessary to restrict the sample to cases where both 
types of labour inputs are used. The number of sample households where both 
family and hired labour are used is 279. This constitutes Sample I, and it is 
obviously a subset of the 679 households in Sample II. 
A summary description for the main variables used in the production function 
regressions in these two data subsets are given in Tables 6.1a and 6.1b. As is to be 
expected, Sample I, which is limited to households which use both family and hired 
labour in crop production, contains a higher share of big farm households. The 
average operated farm size in Sample I is 4.11 hectares compared to 2.67 hectares in 
Sample II. In Sample I, 54% of the households are from the medium and large farm 
size strata (as defined in the MPHBS sample design) while the corresponding 
The first of these adjustments in effect re- classifies marginal farm households with an operated land 
size of less than 0.1 hectares as landless households. The MPHBS strata limits are arbitrary since 
there is no clear line distinguishing a completely landless household and an almost landless one. It is 
appropriate to exclude from the production function estimation those households with very small 
plots of land that could be just extensions of the homestead plot. Similarly, the farm households that 
do not report any family labour input in crop production are also unusual. Since some of the 
composite labour functions used in Section 6.4 rely on a ratio format of the two types of labour, and 
since most households use some family labour, the cases without any family labour input are 
dropped from the sample. This ensures that the ratio of hired to family labour is defined for all 
included cases. The same sample is used for all other functional specification in order to have a 
consistent comparison of the results. The adjustments to the sample size due to these two arbitrary 
cut -offs are minor. Only 34 additional households are excluded from Sample II for these reasons. 
Sample selection bias that may be created by these adjustments are ignored Nonlinear methods of 
estimation, coupled with the two step error correction, already complicate the estimation process. 
121 
proportion in Sample II is only 33 %.5 These percentages, however, show that a 
substantial proportion of the bigger farm households is completely reliant on family 
labour. On the other hand, almost half of the households reporting hiring labour for 
crop production come from the small and marginal farm size categories. Because 
family size and labour supply behaviour of individual family members differ, neither 
the incidence of hired labour use nor the ratio of hired labour in total labour input are 
related to operated farm size in a simple proportional manner. 
Another important difference between Sample I and II is the variation in the gender 
composition within the family and hired labour categories. The average number of 
work -days of family labour is substantially larger in Sample I because of the larger 
farm size endowments, but the extra application of family labour is biased towards 
male family members. The average work -days of female family labour is almost the 
same in Sample I and II. Hiring a relatively higher percentage of female hired 
Iabourers makes up for the lesser application of female family labour on bigger 
farms. Hence the estimation results on labour heterogeneity based on Sample I can 
be subject to a more severe confounding influence of differences in the gender 
composition of the family and hired labour work days.' 
The average wage rates for male and female hired labour are also slightly lower in 
Sample I than in Sample II. Although these are un- weighted average wage rates that 
do not fully reflect the clustered sample design of the MPHBS, it is reasonable that a 
lower wage rate be associated with a sample where there is a higher incidence of 
hired labour use. In terms of the ratio of the female to male wage rates, the two 
samples are very similar. This ratio (wr) ranges from 0.64 to 1, with a mean of about 
0.85 in both samples, implying that female hired labour is, on average, 15% less 
productive than male workers (assuming perfect substitutability). 
5 The data on the proportion of households in the big farm category reported in Table 6.1 is based on 
re- classifying the large and medium farm size strata of the MPBHS sample design as big farms. 
Similarly, the smaller other two strata have also been collapsed into a single small farm category for 
the estimation work of this Chapter and Chapter VII. 
6 The share of female labour in total labour input (from both family and hired sources) is almost the 
same in Sample I and Sample II - about one third. The respective proportions in the family and hired 
categories are different. In Sample I about 28% of total family labour is female work -days but the 
corresponding proportion is 39% for hired labour. In Sample II the differences in gender composition 
are smaller - about 34% of family labour is female and about 39% of hired labour is female. 
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Table 6.1a: Farm Management Data Summary for Sample I* 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
(N = 279) 
Min. Max. 
Composite farm output (kg,) 8112 7037 194 50986 
Composite output price (Rs. /Kg.) 2.79 0.39 2.42 4.64 
Labour input variables: 
Exchange Labour work days - female 0.5 3.5 0 44 
Exchange Labour work days - male 1.0 5.1 0 50 
Exchange Labour days - total 1.5 8.0 0 94 
Family Labour work days - female 92.7 116.2 25 858 
Family Labour work days - male 233.5 208.4 32 1530 
*Total Family labour work days - female 93.2 116.3 25 858 
*Total Family Labour work days - male 234.7 208.2 32 1530 
Hired Labour work days - female 119.0 156.9 8 960 
Hired Labour work days - male 184.5 228.0 13 1295 
Percentage of households using hired labour 100 
% of households using female hired labour 88 
% of households using male hired labour 92 
Share of hired labour in total labour input 0.42 
Total Female labour work days (all sources) 212.3 187.7 37 994 
Total Male labour work days (all sources) 419.0 339.2 52 2345 
Total Labour input (both genders) -unadjusted 631.3 485.5 95 2988 
Total Labour input (both genders) - adjusted ** 589.6 456.2 83 2846 
Share of labour in value of production 0.28 0.09 0.07 0.63 
Nominal female hired labour wage rate (Rs. /day) 8.94 1.32 6 15 
Nominal male hired labour wage rate ( " ) 9.61 1.79 6.43 15 
Ratio of female to male wage rate (wr) 0.86 0.07 0.64 1 
Land input variables: (in hectares) 
Total farm cultivated area 4.11 4.08 0.1 37.4 
Irrigated paddy land area 1.9 2.55 0 17.0 
Unirrigated paddy land area 1.73 2.46 0 13.6 
Total upland farm area 0.48 2.23 0 32.6 
Gross Area harvested 6.1 5.15 0.17 37.5 
Cropping Intensity Ratio 1.59 0.44 0.64 3.02 
Total bullock input days 123.5 110.2 16 980 
Total real material inputs (Rs.) 572.0 565.9 82 3436 
Proportion of households in Big Farm category 0.54 0.5 0 1 
Years of Schooling of Household Head 1.97 2.02 0 8 
Distribution of Households 
by labour market exposure: 
percentage that are autarchic 0 
percentage with off -farm labour supply 8 
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Table 6.1b: Farm Management Data Summary for Sample II* 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
(N = 679) 
Min. Max. 
Composite farm output (kg,) 5278 5738 104 50986 
Composite output price (Rs. /Kg.) 2.83 0.42 2.42 4.64 
Labour input variables: 
Exchange Labour work days - female 1.0 6.2 0 92 
Exchange Labour work days - male 1.5 7.6 0 121 
Exchange Labour days - total 2.5 13.1 0 213 
Family Labour work days - female 89.9 97.7 8 858 
Family Labour work days - male 185.1 172.7 11 1530 
*Total Family labour work days - female 90.9 98.1 8 858 
*Total Family Labour work days - male 186.6 172.8 11 1530 
Hired Labour work days - female 52.9 120.0 0 960 
Hired Labour work days - male 82.6 176.9 0 1295 
Percentage of households using hired labour 44 
% of households using female hired labour 41 
% of households using male hired labour 43 
Share of hired labour in total labour input 0.2 
Total Female labour work days (all sources) 143.8 151.6 8 994 
Total Male labour work days (all sources) 269.1 278.7 11 2345 
Total Labour input (both genders) -unadjusted 412.9 402.8 21 2988 
Total Labour input (both genders) - adjusted ** 380.7 378.0 19 2846 
Share of labour in value of production 0.29 0.1 0.07 0.82 
Nominal female hired labour wage rate (Rs. /day) 9.21 1.28 6 15 
Nominal male hired labour wage rate ( ") 9.86 1.86 6 16.5 
Ratio of female to male wage rate (wr) 0.85 0.07 0.64 1 
Land input variables: (in hectares) 
Total farm cultivated area 2.67 3.21 0.1 37.4 
Irrigated paddy land area 1.27 2.05 0 17.0 
Unirrigated paddy land area 1.05 1.85 0 13.6 
Total upland farm area 0.35 1.54 0 32.6 
Gross Area harvested 4.11 4.31 0.1 37.5 
Cropping Intensity Ratio 1.64 0.43 0.86 3.05 
Total bullock input days 83.0 87.6 6 980 
Total real material inputs (Rs.) 347.1 445.2 40 3436 
Proportion of households in Big Farm category 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Years of Schooling of Household Head 1.33 1.75 0 8 
Distribution of Households 
by labour market exposure: 
percentage that are autarchic 23 
percentage with off-farm labour supply 33 
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6.3 Estimation and Inference for Households Using Family and Hired labour 
6.3.1 Input separability 
For a production process utilizing n inputs, separability of inputs X, and Xz from the 
other inputs implies that the marginal rates of substitution between X, and XZ are 
independent of the levels of the other n -2 factors. That is, in the production 
function given by Eq. 6.1 
(6.1) Q = f (Xl, Xz, X) 
inputs X; and Xi are separable from Xk if 
(a f(x)/axi 
(6.2) a f(x) 
/ a x; 
- 
a Xk 
a f(x) / a x; 
since - the marginal rate of substitution between input i and j. 
a f(x)la xi 
Two alternative equivalent representations of (6.2) are 
and 
(6.3) a In (0 f(x)/ax; ) O In f(x)/ax ) 
alnxk ln xk 
i.e., the elasticity of the marginal product of x; with respect to xk is equal to 
the elasticity of the marginal product of x, with xk (Chambers 1989: 43); 
(6.4) na - ßjk 
where 6;k is the Allen partial elasticity of substitution (AES) between input i and k, 
and similarly ajk is the AES between input/ and k (Berndt and Christensen 1973a). 
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The intuitive meaning of separability implied by conditions (6.3) and (6.4) is more 
clearly demonstrated by considering what happens to the isoquant in i , j space 
when the level of input k is changed. If the slope of the isoquant is not affected by 
the level of xk, then inputs i and j are separable from input k. This situation is shown 
in Figure 6.1(a). Changes in the application of input k lead to a parallel shift in the 
isoquants in i , j space. If there is a rotation in the isoquant when levels of input k 
are changed, as in Figure 6.1(b), then clearly the marginal rate of substitution 
between inputs i and j are affected by the levels of input k. Hence x; and x, are not 
separable from xk 
Figure 6.1 Input Separability: Diagrammatic Representation 
x; 
Panel (a) Panel (b) 
For the subset of the farm households that utilize some of both family and hired 
labour for on -farm crop production, the separability of family and hired labour from 
the other inputs can be tested through parametric restrictions on the production 
function estimated with family and hired labour as separate inputs. The translog 
functional form is used for this purpose as an approximation to the true underlying 
production function. It allows for a flexible characterization of the relationship 
between family and hired labour. 
The translog equation to be estimated is: 
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(6.5) lnQ=ao a 1nX;+1/2 lnX;lnXj+ BkZk 
i=1 
where family labour is indexed as input I (X1), hired labour as input 2 (X2), both 
measured in days; X, is gross harvested area, X, bullock days and X5 material 
inputs. The elements of Z are additional explanatory variables that are not interacted 
with the elements of X. These include variables which control for the quality of land, 
such as the ratio of irrigated land and the ratio of paddy land in total holding size, 
and other variables such as the educational level of the household head. These are 
not inter -acted with the five main inputs to keep the number of estimated parameters 
manageable. Several dummy variables are also included in Z. The main ones are the 
dummies for the sample village clusters and a dummy for farm size.' 
For the translog production function given by Eq. 6.5, with family labour specified 
as X, and hired labour as X2, following Denny and Fuss (1979), the conditions for 
various types of separability of the two types of labour from the other three inputs 
(X3, X, and X5) are given by the following restrictions on the parameters:8 
weak separability (WS): 
(6.6) a, l a, = a13 
partial strong separability (PSS): 
(6.7) 
= a14 / a24 = a15 / a25 
a13 - a23 - a14 - a24 - a15 - a25 - 
complete strong separability (CSS) (i.e. Cobb -Douglas functional form): 
(6.8) a = 0 for all i,j ( i = 1 to 5 ; j = 1 to 5) 
The four land size strata of the MPHBS are collapsed into a single farm size dummy variable, re- 
classifying the large and medium farm size strata of the MPBHS as big farms and the small and 
marginal holdings as small farms. Consequently, the dividing line between small and big farms is 
2.73 hectares. Similarly, the 32 sample village clusters in the five districts were represented by 
dummy variables to capture underlying land quality differences through fixed effect intercepts. 
$ These parametric restrictions are based on the treatment of the translog flexible form as a second 
order approximation to an unknown arbitrary production function. Denny and Fuss (1977) call this 
an "approximate test " for separability. When the translog is interpreted as an exact production 
relationship the separability tests involve additional restrictions on the parameters, as in Berndt and 
Christensen (1973b). Denny and Fuss (1977:405) discuss the differences between the approximate 
and exact tests for separability and suggest the use of the former because the latter involves a joint 
test for separability and specific functional forms, and hence are unduly restrictive. 
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From the above restrictions it is clear that strong separability implies weak 
separability but not vice versa.' Finally, the complete strong separability restriction 
when imposed on a translog equation is not a restriction about separability alone 
only but also of a specific functional form.10 
6.3.2 Test for Separability of Family and Hired Labour 
The results of the statistical tests for the various forms of separability restriction are 
given in Table 6.2. These results are based on an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation of the translog production function of Eq. 6.5. Two different test 
procedures are followed. In Test A, Eq. 6.5 is estimated without any additional 
restrictions (apart from the conventional one of symmetry between a,i and ce ). The 
restrictions implied by the various types of separability outlined above are then 
tested in separate independent tests, using the Wald Chi -square test statistic based on 
the unrestricted parameters." 
Test B follows a nested testing sequence where the subsequent tests are based on 
imposing the prior null hypotheses that have not been rejected. At the first level is a 
test for constant returns to scale (CRTS) of the five -input translog (TL) production 
function specified in Eq. 6.5. This restriction is not rejected. At the second level, 
Eq. 6.5 is re- estimated by imposing the CRTS restrictions and the test for weak 
separability is based on the parameters of the CRTS restricted TL equation. If weak 
9 The restrictions of Equation 6.6 can be re -written as 
(6.6a) a1a23 -a2a13 ; a1a24 -a2a14 ; a1a2s -a2a1s 
which are always satisfied when Eq. (6.7) holds. Hence partial strong separability is a sufficient but 
not necessary condition for weak approximate separability 
10 Another term for complete strong separability is factor wise separability (Chambers 1988:46 -47). 
The weak and partial strong separability conditions are restrictions about the equality of the Allen 
elasticity of substitution between inputs in different partitions of the input list (Berndt and 
Christensen 1973a). The Cobb -Douglas form not only imposes equality of the AES between all input 
pairs but also restricts the value of this common AES to 1. 
" The Wald test statistic is used for the tests on separability even though the equations are estimated 
by OLS because the tests in some instances involve non -linear restrictions on the parameters. 
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separability (WS) is not rejected at the second level, Eq. 6.5 is re- estimated with 
both the CRTS and WS restrictions imposed; and then, at the third level, the 
restrictions for partial strong separability are tested. If this is also not rejected, Eq. 
6.5 is re- estimated with CRTS and PSS restrictions imposed, and a fourth level test 
for complete strong separability is implemented. The test sequence stops whenever a 
prior higher level null is rejected. 
For nested tests the appropriate significance level of a specific test at the second and 
further levels depend on the significance levels of all the prior hypotheses in the 
sequence which were not rejected. Let H'0 be the i th null hypothesis in a particular 
test sequence to be with a assigned significance level of 8; , conditional on the 
sequential non -rejection of the i -i prior hypotheses with assigned significance 
levels 8 62 ... S ;,. Then the appropriate significance level for testing H'0 is given 
by (Denny and Fuss 1977) 
(6.8) 1 - fJ(1 - 8s) 
=1 
which is 1 - (1 - S )' , if a common significance level (6) is 
assigned to each level. 
A significance level of 0.025 is chosen for each level in order to get reasonable 
significance levels in the second and third levels. The overall test significance level 
is 0.040 at the second level, 0.073 at the third and 0.096 at the fourth level. 
The test results reported in Table 6.2 are based on ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation with White's correction for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.12 
In the independent series of tests (Test A) only the WS null is not rejected. The other 
forms of more restrictive separability of hired and family labour are clearly rejected 
at the 5% significance level. The WS restriction (which has a Wald test statistic with 
a p -value of 0.45) is readily accepted by the data. The separate test for constant 
12 This is computed with the HETCOV option in the Shazam regression program for OLS. See 
Shazam (1992: 79). 
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Table 6.2 Testing for Separability of the Labour Inputs 
Test A: Independent separate tests based on Base Equation of Unrestricted Translog 
test 
number 








i. WS .05 2.51 (3) 0.473 No 
ii. PSS .05 17.01 (6) 0.009 Yes 
iii. CSS .05 80.17 (15) 0.000 Yes 
iv. CRTS .05 9.26 (6) 0.159 No 
Test B: Sequential tests based on nested prior restrictions 
Test 
level 
Test for Significance Levels Wald test 






1. CRTS .025 .025 9.26 (6) 0.159 No 
2. givenl, 
WS .025 0.05 0.35 (3) 0.950 No 
3a. given 2, 
PSS .025 0,073 9.58 (3) 0.002 Yes 
3b.# given 2, 
CSS .025 0.073 59.6 (7) 0.000 Yes 
*Note: The fourth level nested test sequence for CSS is not reached because PSS is rejected in the 
third step. Test level 3b is an alternative third level direct test for CSS based on the restrictions not 
rejected at levels 1 and 2 only (CATS and WS). 
CRTS = constant returns to scale 
PSS = partial strong separability 
WS = weak separability 
CSS = complete strong separability 
(equivalent to Cobb -Douglas) 
DF = degrees of freedom for the computed Wald Chi- square test statistic 
p -value = probability value of the computed Wald test statistic. 
If the p -value is larger than the significance level used for the test of the 
null hypothesis, the null is not rejected. 
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returns to scale, which is independent of the separability restrictions, also shows 
that the data does not reject the null of constant returns to scale." 
In Test B the test sequence begins with the CRTS restrictions since constant returns 
to scale is a desirable property to have in production function estimation." Since test 
number (iv) in the Test series A did not reject the null of CRTS, this condition is 
imposed at the first level in the Test series B. (Test A(iv) and B(1) are identical). 
After imposing CRTS, the second level B test is for WS using the CRTS restricted 
TL parameters. Again WS is not rejected. At the third level, the estimated TL 
equation imposes a priori both CRTS and WS, and the test is for the additional 
restrictions of PSS. The results in Table 6.2 show this restriction is barely rejected 
(test level 3a), at the nested significance level of 7.3 %. The nested testing sequence 
properly terminates at this level. For completeness, an alternative third level test is 
also reported for complete strong separability - the Cobb Douglas form - given prior 
restrictions of CRTS and WS. The Cobb Douglas functional form is strongly 
rejected, with a Wald test statistic of 62.8 with 7 degrees of freedom (test 3b). The 
result of the nested test sequence is that the most specific restriction accepted by the 
data are constant returns to scale and weak separability of family and hired labour. 15 
In summary, both Tests A and B show that the family and hired labour are only 
weakly separable from the other three main inputs (land, bullock days and material 
inputs). A more restrictive form of partial strong labour separability is rejected. 
Also, the most restrictive form - complete strong separability, which implies a Cobb - 
Douglas functional form - is strongly rejected. 
" The CRTS restrictions in Eq. 6.5 are imposed on the X variables only. The parametric restriction 
s s 5 
implied by CRTS in the translog equation are a; =1; I E a ; = 0 for each i = 1 to 5. 
14 The restricted estimates have a smaller variance -covariance matrix than the unrestricted estimates; 
so if the restrictions are accepted, it is desirable to use the restricted specification (Greene 1993: 205). 
15 The non -rejection of the null of weak separability of the two types of labour in Test B of Table 6.2 
is not conditional on the prior restriction of constant returns to scale. In Test A, WS is accepted even 
without imposing CRTS. In Test B if WS is imposed at the first level and CRTS tested in the second 
level, the same overall test result occurs. The only difference is in the levels of significance of the 
tests at individual levels. 
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6.3.3 Parameter estimates 
The full regression results for the CRTS and WS restricted translog production 
function for aggregate farm output with family and hired labour as separate inputs 
are given in Table 6.3.16 Three alternative sets of parameter estimates for the TL 
equation are presented. The specification in Model 1 imposes only the CRTS and 
WS restrictions discussed above. A potential problem with the parameter estimates 
of a translog equation, as with other flexible functional forms, is that the theoretical 
curvature conditions on the concavity of production functions could be violated 
(Diewert and Wales 1987). Since the parameter estimates will be used to derive the 
elasticities of substitution and factor demands which are meaningless if the 
estimated production function is not concave, it is necessary first to verify that the 
translog specification of Model 1 satisfies the concavity property at least at the mean 
of the sample data. Unfortunately it does not." Hence the CRTS -WS restricted 
specification of Model 1 is re- estimated again with additional restrictions imposed to 
satisfy local and global concavity conditions!' The results are reported in Table 6.4 
as Models 2 and 3 respectively. 
6 The Translog regression results reported in Table 6.3, as well as in all other subsequent tables in 
this chapter are incomplete results. The coefficients for other variables included in these regressions 
are not shown. The main set of such variables was the 31 intercept dummy variables for the sample 
villages (panchayat) . The combined set of these dummy variables in the regressions results are very 
significant, indicating unobserved regional heterogeneity. 
" Concavity of the TL function at specific positions can be tested by verifying the negative -semi- 
defmiteness of the Hessian matrix of second derivatives (Berndt and Christensen 1973b). 
18 Local concavity imposes concavity at a point of approximation of the TL function - such as the 
geometric mean of the sample data. Global concavity requires the function to be concave at every 
point and this often reduces the flexibility of the translog specification (Diewert and Wales 1987). 
The procedures for estimating the TL equation with global concavity restrictions follow the Cholesky 
decomposition approach of Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1981), and Ryan and Wales (1998) for local 
concavity. 
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Table 6.3 Translog Function Parameters with Family and Hired Labour as Independent Inputs 
Dependent Variable : Log composite farm output quantity 
Sample subset : Sample I (households using family and hired labour) 
Prior Restrictions : Constant returns to scale and weak labour separability 
Estimation Method : Non -Linear least squares 
(N =279) 
Modell Modelt Model 3 
additional restrictions: none local concavity global concavity 
Variable Coeffic. t- ratio Coeffic. t- ratio Coeffic. t- ratio 
Family lab. (F) al 0.223 7.28 0.227 8.10 0.043 2.95 
Hired Lab (H) a2 0.141 5.62 0.142 5.90 0.033 1.56 
Land (A) a3 0.447 6.49 0.430 7.30 0.765 15.50 
Bullocks (B) a4 0.104 3.76 0.104 3.73 0.092 3.45 
Material inputs (M) al 0.083 2.34 0.095 3.47 0.067 2.10 
Educ of Head 0.012 1,87 0.013 1.86 0.094 1.31 
Big Farm dummy 0.041 1.39 0.036 1.23 -0.020 0.65 
Second order coefficients (x 10) 
FxF c l ! 0.437 3.87 0.442 3.93 -0.0002 0.03 
HxH a22 0.581 6.45 0.590 6.81 -0.0069 0.08 
FxH (x12 -0.821 4.10 -0.838 3.80 0.001 0.08 
AxA a33 -3.578 2.39 -3.690 2.49 -0.081 0.11 
BxB a44 0.508 1.14 0.448 1.25 -0.016 0.11 
MxM a55 1.114 1.74 0.657 2.10 -0.053 0.13 
FxA a 13 1.387 3.08 1.420 3.15 0.004 0.05 
HxA a23 0.870 2.81 0.890 2.86 -0.024 0.02 
FxB a l4 -0.640 2.40 -0.659 2.55 -0.002 0.06 
HxB a24 -0.402 2.36 -0.410 2.50 0.011 0.12 
FxM al5 -0.364 1.45 -0.370 1,54 -0.003 0.06 
HxM a25 -0.229 1.47 -0.232 2.47 0.019 0.11 
AxB a34 1.188 1.65 1.030 1.52 0.036 0.11 
AxM a35 0.133 0.20 0.350 0.69 0.065 0.12 
BxM a45 -0.654 1.62 -0.400 1.67 -0.029 0.13 
R -Sq. between observed & predicted 0.955 0.955 0.944 
Residual sum of Squares 10.31 10.34 12.91 
Log Likelihood 64.26 63.78 32.85 
Test for Cobb -Douglas form 
Wald test statistic (with 7 DF) 59.60 (reject) 86.90 (reject) 0.19 don't reject 
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The parametric estimates of the CRTS -WS Translog equation, with local concavity 
imposed at the geometric mean, are similar to the unrestricted estimates (Model 1). 
The log likelihood value decreases very marginally from 63.78 to 63.69 with the 
imposition of local concavity; and there are only minor changes in the estimates of 
the parameters of the inter -action (second order) variables. Local concavity 
restrictions change the sign of only three of the fifteen second -order coefficients, and 
all three are for parameters (a15, a25, a35) which are not significantly different from 
zero in the unrestricted model. In both Models I and 2 the a1, parameter which 
represents the inter -action between family and hired labour is significantly negative. 
This indicates that increasing application of the other labour input reduces the 
marginal product of each type of labour input, everything else held constant. 
The global concavity restrictions (Model 3) however are too severe. They change the 
model fit and parameter estimates radically. The log likelihood value for Model 3 
decreases to 32.85. All of the second order coefficients (a;i) become insignificant, 
which reduces this model to a Cobb -Douglas specification. But even as a Cobb 
Douglas function the estimated elasticity parameters (a) are very unreasonable. 
They imply that the combined share of family and hired labour is less than eight 
percent of the value of output ( a1 + a2 = 0.076) while the share of Iand is more 
than three fourths (a3 = 0.765).19 The values of these share parameters are very 
reasonable in Models 1 and 2. The combined share of labour is about 37% and of 
land 43% while the share of bullock power and material inputs are around 10% each. 
Model 3 is a demonstration of the empirical problems likely to arise (as intimated in 
Chapter III) when family and hired labour are treated as distinct inputs, if there is a 
high degree of substitution between them. 
19 The data underlying the parameter estimates in Table 6.3 have been scaled at the geometric mean. 
Therefore the a; represent the input elasticity at the geometric mean and are estimates of the share of 
input i in the value of total output under competitive market conditions (Boisvert 1982). 
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6.3.4 Elasticities of substitution 
The elasticity of substitution between family and hired labour can be computed 
from the parameter estimates of the locally concave, CRTS and WS restricted TL in 
Table 6.3 (Model 2). In a multi- factor setting there are many definitions of the 
elasticity of substitution between any two factors. The Allen partial elasticity of 
substitution (AES) denotes whether two factors are p- substitutes or p- complements 
(where p stands for price). A positive (negative) AES; signifies that inputs i and j 
are p- substitutes (complements), implying that the demand for factor i increases 
(decreases) when the price of factor j increases, holding output constant.20 
In a general production function with n distinct inputs as in Eq. 6.1, the Allen 
partial elasticities are given by: 
(6.4a) 
Xkfk 
6ii = k_i Fí( 
X X F 
where fk is the partial derivative of f(.) with respect to input Xk, F is the 
determinant of the (n +1) x (n --l) bordered Hessian matrix and F11 is the 
cofactor associated with the element f; in the bordered Hessian (Chambers 
1988: 33). 
Equation (6.4a) shows that the computed values of the Allen partial elasticities of 
substitution depend in a complicated way on all of the estimated parameters of the 
production function which define the bordered Hessian matrix. 
The Hicksian elasticity of complementarity (HEC) between inputs i and j is defined 
only in terms of the first and second partial derivatives of the production function 
with respect to inputs i and j as:21 
20 Sato and Koizumi (1973). 
21 The Hicksian elasticity of complementarity (HEC) was introduced in Hicks (1970). It is the inverse 
of the Hicksian elasticity of substitution defined in the Theory of Wages (Hicks 1964). Sato and 
Koizumi (1973) have shown it is more appropriate to work with the HEC in a multi- factor setting 
since the HEC and AES represent the duality between the production and cost functions. In a two - 
factor setting, the AES and HEC are identical (Hicks 1970). 
(6.4b) HEC Qfi Í .fi 
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Following Hicks (1970), factors i and j are classified as q- complements or q- 
substitutes according to whether HEC;i is positive or negative (where q indicates 
quantity). Given non -negative marginal products, the sign of HEC;i follows the sign 
of fi - the cross partial derivative of the production function with respect to the 
relevant two inputs. f measures the effect on the marginal product of input i (f) due 
to an exogenous change in the quantity of input j. Output is not held constant in the 
computation of HEC (as it is in the derivation of the AES). In fact the HEC 
measures the degree to which two factors jointly contribute to a change in output 
(Sato and Koizumi, 1973). 
If HEC is positive, an increase in the quantity of factor j leads to an increase in the 
marginal product of input i, and so more of input i is also used, if input prices are 
held constant. In this case the increased use of input i and j jointly contribute to 
increase output. When HEC is negative, the increased usage of input j leads to a 
reduced demand for input i, and the combined effect on output depends on the 
relative magnitudes. 
The direct elasticity of substitution (DES) is a multi- factor generalization of Joan 
Robinson's original interpretation of the elasticity of substitution as a measure of 
the response of the optimal factor input ratio of two inputs to a change in their 
factor price ratio. 
(6.4c) DES _ aln(X; /X.) 
aln(1/I'D 
The DES is a short-run measure of the substitution between two inputs, holding 
output and all other inputs constant (Chambers 1988:33). It ranges between zero and 
plus infinity, and larger values signify easier substitution between the two inputs. 
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The values of these various elasticities of substitution between family and hired 
labour, computed from the parameter estimates of Model 2 in Table 6.3 at the 
geometric mean of the sample data, are as follows:22 
AES between F and H = 10.68 
HEC = -1.59 
DES = 4.62 
The positive value of AES indicates that family and hired labour are price - 
substitutes: as the price of one type of labour increases the quantity of the other type 
is increased along an isoquant. The estimated value of the AES is quite high, 
suggesting relative ease of substitution of one type of labour with another.23 The 
negative HEC between family and hired labour indicates that increased usage of one 
type of labour reduces the marginal product, and hence demand for, the other. This 
result, together with the positive AES, indicates that family and hired labour are 
clearly substitutes for each other in both the price and quantity sense. The computed 
value of the DES between family and hired labour, which is greater than 4.6, also 
indicates relative ease of substitution. In a similar computation of the DES between 
family and hired labour in Indonesia, the highest values of the DES (among 
different regions) was 1.68, with many being under 1 (Squires and Tabor 1994). 
The complete set of the Hicksian elasticities of complementarity for all five main 
production inputs at the geometric mean are reported in Table 6.4. The imposition of 
local concavity at the geometric means insures that the matrix of the HEC;; is 
negative semi- definite with all of the diagonal elements (own HEC's) being negative. 
22 These elasticities are computed by applying Equations 6.4 (a,b,c) to derive their specific form in 
terms of the estimated parameters of a translog production function. These derivations are fairly 
involved and hence not repeated here. The computation of the AES for a translog function are 
detailed in Berndt and Christensen (1973b), and the derivation of the HEC and DES for a translog 
function are given in Squires and Tabor (1994). 
23 Note that the calculation, of the AES from production function parameters involves inverting the 
bordered Hessian matrix of second order derivatives. Hence if any of the production function 
parameters have large standard errors, then the resulting estimates of the AES are imprecise, with 
standard errors that are not readily computable (Squires and Tabor 1994). 
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The imposition of weak separability of the two labour inputs (F and H) from the 
other three inputs also means that HECF,,= HECF , where k = L, B and M. 
Table 6.4 Hicksian Elasticities of Complementarity 
(with Family & Hired Labour as Separate Inputs) 
Family Lab. Hired Lab. Land Bullocks Materials 
Family Lab. -2.54 -1.59 2.46 -1.77 -0.7 
Hired Lab. -1.77 2.46 -1.77 -0.7 
Land -3.32 3.28 1.85 
Bullocks -4.46 -3.37 
Materials -2.26 
Source: Derived from the parameter estimates of Model 2 in Table 6.3. 
The cross -HEC's reported in Table 6.4 appear quite reasonable. Operated land area is 
a q- complement (positive HEC) for all other inputs. An increase in the land area 
increases the marginal product of all other inputs. Labour and bullock power are q- 
substitutes - increased application of labour reduces the marginal product of bullock 
power, which is a reasonable result. The least intuitive result is that labour and 
material inputs are q- substitutes. This would have been reasonable if material inputs 
included a lot of mechanized power inputs. But as noted in Chapter III, the main 
elements of M are the value of seed and fertilizers. 
6.3.5 Estimated Marginal Products 
The regression parameters of Model 2 (Table 6.3) can also be used to derive the 
marginal products of the main inputs. These are presented in Table 6.5, estimated at 
the geometric mean of the data in Sample I. There is a strong indication of labour 
heterogeneity in these results, which show a substantially higher marginal product of 
family labour per day (Rs.15.70), compared to the marginal product of hired labour 
(Rs.10.61). The estimated average marginal product of hired labour is close to the 
average wage rate for hired labour paid out by the sample households. The 
difference is not statistically significant at the 5% level, given the reported standard 
error on the estimated marginal product of hired labour. On the other hand, the ratio 
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of the marginal product of hired labour to family labour (0* in the notation of 
Chapter III) is 0.676. This estimate is significantly less than 1, even at the 1% level 
of significance.24 
The estimates of the marginal products for the other inputs are also very plausible. 
Note that the marginal product of land is expressed as per hectare of gross cultivated 
area. This is the return to an additional hectare of multiple cropping which is not the 
same as the return to increasing the operated land of the farm household by a 
hectare. The estimated marginal product for a bullock pair per day is higher than the 
marginal product of hired labour, which is consistent with the observed market wage 
rates for these two inputs. 
Table 6.5 Estimated Marginal Products of Inputs 
Inputs units Marginal Product 
Value tand. error 
Family Labour (F) Rs. per day 15.7 1.93 
Hired Labour (H) Rs. per day 10.61 1.8 
Land (A) Rs. per ha. 2371 325 
Bullocks (B) Rs. per day 19.1 5.12 




Average daily wage rate for male hired labour 9.61 
Ratio of the marginal product 
of hired labour to family labour 
0.676* 0.083 
* significantly less than 1 
Source: Marginal products computed at the geometric mean of the data using the regression 
parameters of Model 2 in Table 6.3 
6.3.6 Alternative Estimation with a homogeneous labour aggregate 
The TL equation with family and hired labour as separate inputs gives reasonable 
estimates for the production function parameters as well as the marginal products of 
24 The Wald statistic for the test that the ratio of marginal products is equal to one is 15.3, with 1 
degree of freedom. The p -value is 0.0001. 
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additional restrictions : 
Log real aggregate farm output 
: Sample I (households using family and hired labour) (N =279) 
: Constant returns to scale 




Variable Coefficient t- ratio 
Total labour (L) al 0.367 5.78 
Land (A) a3 0.449 6.26 
Bullocks (B) a4 0.105 3.87 
Mat. inputs (M) a5 0.079 2.75 
Educ 0.01 1.65 
Big Farm dummy 0.024 0.9 
Second order coefficients (x 10) 
LxL all -1.35 0.64 
A x A a33 -6.08 2.51 
B x B a44 0.37 0.95 
M x M a55 0.66 1.07 
LxA a13 3.95 1.97 
L x B a14 -1.83 2.13 
L x M a15 -0.77 1.00 
A x B a34 1.74 1.74 
A x M a35 0.38 0.497 
B x M a45 -0.27 0.73 
Adj. R- SQ. 0.955 
Residual sum of squares 10.22 
Log Likelihood 65.4 
Test for Cobb -Douglas form 
Wald test statistic (Chi- square with 6 DF) 12.27 reject 
Test for common production technology** 
F test statistic (with 48 and 581 DF) 1.36 don't reject 
- this is a test for common production function paramaters in the sample of farms that use 
both family and hired labour (Sample I) and farms that use only family labour. 
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the inputs, and the various elasticities of substitution. The reasonableness of these 
results, however, needs to be checked against alternative specification that may be 
preferred to the one that has F and H as distinct inputs. Table 6.6 presents the 
parameter estimates for a TL specification that assumes that family and hired labour 
are homogeneous inputs. In this specification (Model 4) there are only four main 
inputs which are inter -acted with each other: total labour (L, which is simply the 
sum of F and H), land, bullock days and material inputs. Constant returns to scale 
and local concavity are imposed as in Table 6.3. 
A comparison of the parameter estimates between Model 2 and Model 4 reveals only 
minor changes in the first order coefficients (the a, 's). The coefficient a, on total 
labour in Model 4 is almost an exact sum of the corresponding coefficients on family 
and hired labour in Model 2. But there are bigger changes in some of the second 
order coefficients (aj 's). The coefficient on the total labour quadratic terni (L x L) 
changes sign in Model 4 and there is a large change in the coefficient for (A x A). 
The effect of these changes in the estimated parameters on the underlying household 
behaviour can be illustrated by computing the values of the Hicksian elasticities of 
complementarity (HEC) for Model 4. These are reported in Table 6.7 (computed at 
the geometric mean of Sample I). Comparing the values of the HEC's in Table 6.7 
and Table 6.4 shows that the input relationships based on a model with aggregate 
homogeneous labour does differ considerably from the relationships based on 
treating family and hired labour as separate inputs. 
Table 6.7 Hicksian Elasticities of Complementarity 



















Source: Computed at the geometric mean of the data using the regression 
parameters of Model 4 in Table 6.6 
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Table 6.6 also reports on a test for common production function parameters in the 
sample of farms that use both family and hired labour (Sample I) and farms that use 
only family labour (Sample II). There are no a priori reasons to believe that the 
production technology available to households that use hired labour is different from 
households using only family labour. This proposition is tested with the 
homogeneous labour aggregate because with this specification the model can be 
estimated by ordinary least squares for which the F test for the stability of 
parameters in different samples is exact!' The total number of parameters estimated 
with the homogeneous labour aggregate is 47 (including 31 sample village cluster 
dummies). The computed F test statistic is less than the critical value at the 5% 
significance level. Hence, the null of a common production technology for all farm 
households , irrespective of whether they use hired labour or not, is not rejected. 
Returning to the parameter estimates relating to Sample I households only, Model 4 
in Table 6.6 and Model 2 in Table 6.3 are not nested within each other. Therefore the 
evidence on which specification is preferred is not straightforward. As an illustration 
it is interesting to note that the standard goodness of fit criteria for non -linear 
regressions, such as the log likelihood and the residual sum of squares, indicate that 
Model 4 with the homogeneous labour aggregate provides a better fit for the sample 
data. This is a surprising result given that Model 2 is a flexible functional form 
which provides for a general form of inter -relationship between family and hired 
labour. If family and hired labour were truly homogeneous inputs, Model 2 could 
have reflected such a relationship instead of the estimated wide divergence in the 
marginal products of the two labour inputs at the mean of the data. 
It appears that production functions that treat family and hired labour as distinct 
inputs could be mis- specified when in fact the two types of labour are very close 
substitutes. This was clearly evident in the Cobb -Douglas specification with family 
zs Tests for common production function parameters based on the nested production function 
structure with an effective labour nest, as specified in Section 6.4 to follow, are awkward to carry 
out. This is so not only because of the non -linear estimation procedures for which the F test is only 
approximate (Greene 1993:218); but also because the parameter set between samples using hired and 
family labour and those using only family labour will differ in the nested production function. 
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and hired labour as distinct inputs - the parameter estimates in Model 3 (Table 6.3) 
were nonsensical. Similar problems may carry over to more general functional forms 
as well, given that Model 4 with a homogeneous labour aggregate performs better 
than a flexible specification with family and hired labour as distinct inputs. The 
preferred alternative is to look at ways of aggregating the different labour inputs into 
a composite labour aggregate without imposing homogeneity. This is the issue 
explored in the next section of this Chapter. 
6.4 Testing for Alternative Aggregates of Family and Hired Labour 
The separability results of Section 6.3.2 imply that family and hired can be 
consistently aggregated into a single composite labour input. Specifying the 
production function with a composite labour input will also mean that the parameter 
estimates can be based on Sample II which also includes households that do not 
report any hired labour use for crop production. Such households constitute almost 
60% of the total available sample of 679 land cultivating farm households created 
from the MPBHS tarai sample. The production technology available to households 
that use hired labour is unlikely to be different from those using only family labour; 
and the F test reported in Table 6.6 did not reject this null hypothesis. It is then 
appropriate to estimate a common production technology for all households, 
specified on the basis of a composite labour input, irrespective of whether or not a 
particular household reports any use of hired labour. 
An alternative specification of the translog production function which still maintains 
family and hired labour as distinct inputs for the entire Sample II is inappropriate. In 
this case a large proportion of households would have zero inputs of hired labour. Ad 
hoc procedures of re- scaling the data by converting the zero values to one (or ten) so 
that logarithmic values can de defined, while commonly used, are inappropriate for 
this data set because of the high proportion of zero values for hired labour.26 
26 Adopting such a procedure leads to substantial downward bias in the linear coefficients of hired 
labour (a, in Table 6.3) and, hence in the implied ratio of marginal productivity of family and hired 
labour. See Appendix 6.1 for a fuller discussion, and in particular Appendix Table 6.13. 
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The customary approach to creating a composite out of two or more separable inputs 
is to create a value -share weighted linear or log- linear (Tornquist) index. For an 
underlying translog production process, a Tornquist composite of separable inputs 
would be an exact index (Diewert 1976). This procedure is not feasible here because 
zero values of hired labour are common and also because the relevant "price" of 
family labour is not observed. Indeed the main purpose of carrying out the 
the production function estimation is to decipher whether and how this (shadow) 
price of family labour differs from the observed market wage rate. 
Consequently, alternative functional forms are specified which create a composite 
quantity of family and hired labour that allows for zero values of hired labour. The 
composite labour input then becomes a single input in the aggregate production 
function. The specification for the composite labour aggregator function is nested 
into the translog production function of Eq. 6.5, which is now re- specified in terms 
of the four main inputs that are interacted: composite labour, land, bullocks and 
material inputs. The composite labour variables can he viewed as the total input of 
labour in effective units (as opposed to standard time inputs of days or hours) and 
can be termed as effective labour. 
6.4.1. Effective labour functions 
Five specific functional forms are chosen to create an effective labour (Le) input 
from the observed levels of family and hired labour - the g (.) function in the 
terminology of Chapter III. These allow for different possibilities of efficiency 
differences as well as for a constant or varying elasticity of substitution between 
family (F) and hired labour (H) in the "production" of effective labour. These 
functional forms, which are adapted from Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1983), are: 
6.5. Cl. Homogeneous labour: Le = F -H 
6.5. C2. Linear heterogeneous: Le = F + 9 *H 6 > o 
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6.5 C3. CES:" Le = [F -P+ 0 *H 
0 >0, p? -1 
6.5 C4. Generalized Linear (GL): Le = F + 0 *H + 2 *8 *(H *F) "Z 
0 >0 
6.5 C5. Ratio: Le= (F +H) *(F /(F +H))µ 
µl51 
Once input separability is established for a subset of inputs, there are two additional 
technical properties of the g (.) aggregator function that determine whether two 
different production inputs are homogeneous or heterogeneous: 
(i) whether g(.) has a linear form such that the input components are perfect 
substitutes for each other, implying an infinitely large AES 
(ii) whether the ratio of marginal products (the marginal rate of substitution 
between input pairs) is equal to one. 
The five functional forms specified above allow for different possibilities on points 
(i) and (ii) above. Forms C.1 and C.2 imply an infinite elasticity of substitution 
between F and H. The CES composite implies a constant elasticity of substitution. 
The Generalized Linear and the Ratio form imply a varying elasticity of substitution 
that depends on the levels of F and H and the parameters. 
The CES functional form is normally specified with the restriction that p >_ -1 which 
is required for concavity to ensure the isoquants are well behaved. When the CES 
specification is a complete production function in itself (without being nested into 
another functional form) concavity implies that all the inputs be p- substitutes with 
positive AES. This requires that p >_ -1 because when p < -1 the AES between the 
Z' The traditional form of the CES function is y [6 *F ' + (1 -d) *H ''1 11P, where y is the efficiency 
parameter and ä the distribution parameter (Arrow, et al. 1961). This can be re- specified as 
y' [F _P + 0 *H -'j W" where y' = (6 ") y and 0 = (1- S) /S. Since y' is just a scaling factor which gets 
converted to a constant when taking logs, the CES form can be written as in C.3 above. Similarly in 
the GL specification of C.4, the coefficient for F can also be normalized to one. 
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inputs are negative, implying the inputs are p- complements.28 But when a CES 
aggregator function such as C.3 is nested within a higher level production function, 
such as the translog of Eq. 6.5, the restriction that p >_ -I in the CES nest is not 
strictly required. The appropriate theoretical restriction is that the overall production 
function be concave. This condition depends also on the other parameters of the 
translog function, and hence can be satisfied even if in the CES nest p < -1. 
In the empirical results given below the CES composite for family and hired labour 
is estimated both with and without restriction that p >_ -1. The restriction on p has a 
central bearing on the nature of labour heterogeneity that is the subject of interest. 
When the CES composite is estimated with the restriction p ? -1, it forces F and H to 
be q- complements - i.e., an increase in the input level of F necessarily increases the 
marginal product of H. Hence F and H jointly contribute to increase output in the 
sense captured by a positive HEC.29 But if F and H are to be q- substitutes, as is 
more likely, the CES form must allow for p < -1. 
The Ratio composite is equivalent to Revankar's Variable Elasticity of Substitution 
(VES) production function, for which it can be shown that the (AES) 6FH = 1 + 
(F/H) *(1 /1s) (Revankar 1971). For tt = 0, this form reduces to the homogeneous 
labour case (C.1) with an infinite elasticity of substitution. For non -zero µ, the AES 
between hired and family labour is increasing or decreasing in the ratio of F to H, 
depending on whether µ is positive or negative.30 That the elasticity of substitution 
between F and H could be related to the ratios of F and H is consistent with a 
particular approach to modeling labour supervisory /monitoring costs on the premise 
s A multi- factor non -nested CES production function has the undesirable property that the elasticity 
of substitution for every pair of inputs is exactly the same (Uzawa 1963). The second order 
conditions for the concavity of a multi- factor production function with n inputs requires that at least 
(n -1) of the Allen partial elasticities of substitution must be positive (Sato and Koizumi 1973). 
Therefore in a multi- factor CES, all inputs must be p- substitutes with positive AES. 
29 From Equation 6.4b, the sign of HEC, depends only on the cross -derivative 4. In the CES nest of 
C.3, fFN is always positive when p >_ -1. 
3° The restriction 1 is needed to maintain concavity of the ratio aggregator function. 
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that the hired labourer's work intensity or effort can be increased if family labour is 
also working alongside with hired labour (Frisvold 1994). 
For the GL functional form, the AES between F and H is given by: " 
(6.6) aFH = 1 + (F + 0 H) / Le + 2 * (H *F)'12 ((6* Le) 
In this formulation, the elasticity of substitution depends in a more complicated way 
on the actual levels of F and H, and not just on their ratio. In Eq. 6.7 can be 
negative only if 6 < 0 (though this is only a necessary and not sufficient condition). 
The concavity of the GL form can be violated when 6 < 0 (Diewert 1971). Again this 
restriction is not imposed since the overall translog production function can still be 
concave with 6 < O. 
For the set of functional forms specified above, it is clear that with appropriate 
parametric restrictions on p and 6, both the CES and the GL forms reduce to the 
linear heterogeneous composite (C.2); and the latter obviously reduces further to the 
homogeneous aggregator when O = 1. This means several combinations of the first 
four specifications can be tested in a nested framework. The ratio composite is 
unrelated to the GL, CES or linear forms; it reduces only to the homogeneous case. 
6.4.2. Effective land function 
In addition to the composite function for effective labour, the land input variable is 
also specified as a separable nest allowing for heterogeneity between different types 
of land and also allowing for variation in land use due to differences in the multiple 
cropping intensities of farms. 
The effective land specification is: 
31 In a nested production function structure it is necessary to distinguish the AES between F and H. in 
the g(.) function for the composite Le, and the AES between F and H in the main (first level) 
production function. Eq. 6.6 above gives the formula for the AES in the Le function of the GL 
specification (Deolalikar and Vijverberg 1987). The Le function has only two inputs. In a two -input 
production function the AES is equal to the HEC (Hicks 1970); so aFH can be computed using Eq. 
6.4b for the Le specification in C.5. 
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(6.7) Ae = A -CRINT 
where A, is the physical cultivated area of the farm or the land endowment 
available for crop production. CRINT is the cropping intensity ratio which is 
equal to A/A,, where A is the gross area harvested of different crops, which 
is the sum of the land area allocated to each crop grown on the farm. 
This specification treats the increases in the physical area of the farm differently 
from increases in the harvested area due to more intensive multiple cropping. When 
x =1, Eq. 6.7 is just an identity with effective land being the same as A. If as 
expected x < 1, the returns from increased multiple cropping are less than the returns 
from increasing the physical land area of the farm. This is consistent with decreasing 
returns to multiple cropping given a fixed land area.32 
The cultivated land area available to the farm is further decomposed into three 
different land categories, assuming a linear form. This assumes perfect 
substitutability but which allows for differing productivity, as in the case of the 
labour inputs. The farm management data set of the MPHBS actually identifies four 
different types of land: irrigated paddy land (khet), irrigated upland (pakho), and un- 
irrigated khet and un- irrigated pakho. In the final specification for the effective land 
input function the distinction between irrigated and unirrigated land in the upland 
category did not turn out to be important and is ignored' 
The final specification selected for A, is 
(6.8) A, = AP + yi. AcP + yzAeU 
were P; is irrigated paddy land, P is unirrigated paddy land and U is total 
upland. This specification means y, and 72 are conversion factors which 
measure A, in units of total irrigated paddy land. The expected relationship 
is< 0 < 72 < y, < 1 since even un- irrigated paddy land is usually more 
productive than upland, whether or not the latter is irrigated. 
Z Since the dependent variable m the production function regressions is aggregate output, allowing 
for K c 1 is also an implicit control for variations in the cropping pattern that arise from differences in 
the level of multiple cropping, in contrast to differences in the physical land area across farms. 
This is a reasonable result because upland does not generally have a high water retention rate and 
hence unirrigated land dependent on rainfall may he just as productive as upland which has a more 
dependable irrigation source. 
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Just as in the case of the Le function for effective Iabour, the Ae function for 
effective land input is nested in the overall translog production function of Eq. 6.5, 
which is now defined in terms of four main inputs. 
The estimating equation is 
4 4 4 
(6.9) ln.Q =or 3+Ea;lnXi+1/2EEa,ilnXilnXi+ESkZk 
i=1 i=1 j=1 
where X, is effective labour, X2 is effective land and X, and X4 are 
bullock power and material inputs. As before Z is the set of other 
variables not inter -acted with the set of X. 
6.4.3. Labour heterogeneity test results 
Equation 6.9 was estimated by non -linear least squares for each of the five different 
effective labour composites (Cl to C5), and the common effective land composite. 34 
Table 6.8 presents the main results of interests, focussing on the parameters of the 
labour nesting function which determine the nature of labour heterogeneity, and on 
summary statistics for the fit of a specific model. 
The main inference to be drawn from Table 6.5 is that among the set of nested 
models (C4 -* C2 -* Cl and C3 - C2 -* Cl), the restrictions implied by the 
general linear composite of model C2 are accepted. But the additional restriction that 
makes family and hired labour homogeneous inputs (Model Cl) is clearly rejected. 
In comparison to the simple linear composite (Le = F OH), the more general form 
of a CES composite (C3) or a GL composite (C4) do not offer any additional 
explanatory power to the production function regressions. 
In logarithmic form for the overall translog function, the specification for the effective land 
variable becomes log (Ae) = log (ASP' +y, ASP " +y2A °) + ic'log(CRINT). 
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In the CES nest with p unrestricted, the estimated value of p is -1. 03, but this is not 
significantly different from -1.35 This reduces the CES function to a linear 
composite Similarly in the GL specification the S parameter is not significantly 
different from zero; hence, the GL also reduces to the linear nest. 
At the next step, however, there is a significant difference between the linear 
composite model and the homogeneous model because the 0 parameter is 
significantly less than one. The estimated value of B using Model C2 is 0.751, with 
a standard error of 0.107. The Wald Chi- square test statistic for the hypothesis that 0 
= 1 is 5.44, with a p -value of 0.03. Hence the null of 0 = I is rejected at the 5% 
significance level. The same inference is obtained from the Likelihood Ratio test in 
comparing Model C 1 and C2.36 
In the ratio format the estimate of the µ parameter is positive - which is consistent 
with family labour being more productive than hired labour." But its estimated 
value of 0.042 is not significantly different from zero. Therefore the ratio format can 
also be rejected. Although the ratio and the linear composite (C5 & C2) are not 
nested, the latter is clearly preferable in terms of the log likelihood value.38 
Hence, the preferred labour aggregator function is Le = F + 0H, where 0 is 
significantly less than one. This implies that, although family and hired labour are 
perfect substitutes, there is a constant efficiency difference between the marginal 
35 In the restricted version of the CES nest, the boundary Iimit on p ? -1 is reached, So this is 
equivalent to estimating the CES nest with p = -1 imposed. 
36 Based on the log likelihood values reported for Models C.1 and C.2 in Table 6.8, the likelihood 
ratio test statistic is - 2 * ( 138.56 - 141.06) = 5.02. The critical value of the Chi -square test statistic 
with 1 degree of freedom is 3.8. Therefore this test also shows that the sample data is not consistent 
with the restriction that 6 = 1. 
" A positive i1 implies that for a given level of aggregate labour (F + H), a higher ratio of family 
labour in this total increases the level of effective labour input. A positive r< also implies the AESFK 
is positive, implying F and H are p- substitutes and q- complements. 
38 The ratio specification and the linear composite have the same number of parameters. Therefore a 
smaller residual variance, which leads to higher value of the log likelihood, is equivalent to that 
model being preferred on several model selection criteria, such as the Akaike Information Criteria, 
which depend only on the residual sum of squares and degrees of freedom (Shazam 1993:16). 
Table 6.8 Summary Results on Tests for Alternative Composite Labour Functions in Sample II 
Tests of parametric restrictions 
Composite Parameters Estimated Stand. Wald test 
Model Function of interest value error Restriction statistic p value 
Inference 
Summary statistics on Model fit 
Log 
R sq * likelihood 
C4 GL 0 0.751 0.107 0 =1 5.44 0.03 Reject 0.965 141.06 
S 0.0075 0.087 S =0 0.007 0.93 Do not Reject 
C3 CES (P restricted) 
9 0.780 0.114 0 = 1 3.68 0.05 Reject 0.965 141.06 
P -1* P = -1 *Restriction imposed 
CES (P unrestricted) 
0 0.757 0.115 0 = 1 4.46 Reject 0.967 141.07 
P -1.029 0.144 p = -1 0.04 0.84 Do not Reject 
C5 Ratio 0 0.042 0.034 µ= 0 1.52 0.23 Do not Reject 0.965 139.34 
C2 Linear 0 0.751 0.107 0= 1 5.42 0.02 Reject 0.967 141.06 
Cl Homog- 
eneous 
0 = 1 0.964 138.56 
*R -sq. between observed and predicted values. 
Inference on Nested Models : 
Restrictions on Model C4 and Model C3 which reduce them to Model C2 are not rejected 
The restriction which reduces Model C2 to Cl is rejected 
. 
The restriction which reduces Model C5 to Cl is not rejected. 
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product of family and hired labour, with family labour being more productive. It is 
worth noting that all of the specifications which allowed F and H to be p- 
complements in production with a negative AES ( the GL with S < 0 the Ratio form 
with < 0 and the unrestricted CES with p < -1) were clearly rejected.39 
The above result that family labour is more productive per unit of time is consistent 
with the empirical findings of Frisvold (1994) and Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1983) 
for India. However, the preferred aggregator functional form is different. Deolalikar 
and Vijverberg (1983 and 1987) reject a linear composite and hence find evidence 
for imperfect substitutability between family and hired labour. Foster did not 
actually test alternative specifications of the Le function. He just used the ratio 
format and found 11 was positive and significantly different from zero.4° This also 
implies imperfect substitutability. 
6.5 Complete results for the linear labour composite 
Table 6.9 gives the complete regression results for the linear effective labour 
composite (Model C2 in the set of Eq. 6.5). The only prior restriction imposed is of 
constant returns to scale. The set of estimated parameters makes this specification 
concave at the geometric mean so concavity restrictions have not been imposed a 
priori (as was done in Model 2 of Table 6.3). 
The set of parameters of the TL production function given in Table 6.9 appears 
reasonable. At the geometric mean of the data the estimated input elasticities are 
0.327 for effective labour, 0.487 for effective land, 0.076 for bullock power and 
0.111 for material inputs. These are reasonable estimates of the share of these inputs 
in the value of farm output at the mean of the data. Several of the second order 
39 In the unrestricted CES case, the estimated of p is less than minus one but not significantly 
different from minus 1. This reduces the CES to a linear composite with an infinite AES. 
Frísvolds estimate of t was 0.24. At the sample mean this leads to an AES between F and H of 
1.71 in the effective labour function and 0.33 in the main production function (Frisvold 1994:230- 
231). 
Table 6.9: TL Production Function Parameters with Linear Heterogeneous Labour 
Dependent Variable : Log real composite farm output 
Sample subset : Sample II (all households using some family labour) N = 679 
Prior Restrictions Constant returns to scale 
Estimation Method : Non -Linear least squares (heteroskedasticity corrected errors) 
Model C2 
Le = F+ e H 
Asymp. Asymp. 
Variable Coefficients std. error t- ratio 
Effective labour (Le) cd 0.327 0.0439 7.45 
Effective Land (Ae) a2 0.487 0.0508 9.59 
Bullocks (B) a3 0.076 0.0204 3.73 
Material inputs (M) a4 0.111 0.0218 5.09 
Educ. of Head 0.007 0.0051 1.37 
Big Farm dummy 0.029 0.0217 1.34 
Second order coefficients 
LexLe alt -0.051 0.1048 -0.49 
Ae x Ae a22 -0.21 0.1465 -1.43 
B x B a33 0.033 0.0147 2.24 
M x M a44 0.067 0.0423 1.58 
LexAe a12 0.146 0.1098 1.33 
LexB a13 -0,077 0.0427 -1.80 
LexM al4 -0.018 0.0522 -0.34 
Ae x B a23 0.079 0.0472 1.67 
Ae x M a24 -0.015 0.0602 -0.25 
B x M a34 -0.034 0.027 -1.26 
Labour nest parameters 
e 0.751 0.1068 7.03 
Land nest parameters 
Yi 0.923 0.0461 20.02 
0.836 0.0793 10.54 
Y2 
K 0.743 0.0653 11.38 
R -Sq. between observed & predicted 0.967 
Residual sum of squares 23.71 
Log Likelihood 141.06 
Wald chi -square test statistics on restrictions 
labour homogeneity e =1 df =1 5.437 reject ** 
land homogeneity y,= Y2 =K =1 df = 3 11.56 reject *" 
Cobb Douglas form df = 6 12.27 reject* 
152 
Note: ** indicates the null is rejected at the 5% significance level, * at the 10% level. 
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coefficients are statistically insignificant, but the joint test that the model reduces to 
a Cobb -Douglas specification is rejected. The estimates of the parameters of the land 
composite function are also as expected. The coefficient on the cropping intensity 
component of total land use (x) is less than one. The y, and y2 parameters indicate 
that un- irrigated paddy land has about 92% of the productivity of irrigated paddy 
land, and upland has about 84% of the productivity of irrigated paddy land. ' Each of 
the x, y, andy2 parameter is individually significantly less than one and the joint test 
for land homogeneity (x = y, = y2 = 1) is also rejected at the 5% significance level. 
The main implication of the linearly heterogeneous labour composite is a constant 
difference in the marginal productivity of family and hired labour represented by O. 
The implied values of the marginal products based on the regression parameters and 
computed at the geometric mean of the data are given in Table 6.10. For comparison 
the marginal product of homogeneous labour (based on the composite function C.1) 
is also reported. 
From the estimates for the Cl homogenous labour composite, the marginal product 
of a homogenous labour aggregate, at the mean of the input variables, is Rs. 12.34 
for an additional work -day of a male labourer. This estimated marginal product is 
about 25% higher than the average male wage rate in the sample data, which is Rs. 
9.91 per work -day. This is a relatively large discrepancy in a setting where the 
normal presumption would be that the marginal product of labour would be lower 
°` These estimated relative differences in unit productivity of =irrigated paddy land and upland vis- 
a-vis irrigated paddy land appear to be smaller than expected, given the primacy of paddy cultivation 
in the tarai region of Nepal. One factor contributing to the Iow relative productivity differences is 
that the land input variable is already measured in terms of gross harvested area and not in terms of 
physical units of land. If irrigated land tends to be multi- cropped more often, and if the yield in the 
second or subsequent crop grown outside of the normal seasonal rotation is likely to low, this will 
depress the average productivity of irrigated land (compared to the yield of unirrigated land which is 
cultivated only during the normal season). Secondly, the MPHBS survey data does not contain details 
on the quality and reliability of irrigation facilities on the sample of farms. Since the timing of 
irrigated water supply is the critical issue in boosting crop yields, it may be that differences in the 
yield between irrigated and unirrigated land may be more pronounced in years where there is general 
drought due, say, to the monsoon failure. In a normal year, as in our sample, when the monsoon 
rainfall was adequate, the relative differences in yields could be less extreme if adequate rainfall has 
occurred at critical times in the growing season. 
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than the wage rates reported to be paid out to hired labour. Apart from a general 
indication of surplus labour in the tarai region of Nepal, the specific wage rates 
derived from the MPBHS data are likely to reflect peak- season hired labour wage 
rates than an annual average wage rate.42 
The model with the Le = F + 0 H specification helps to reconcile the observed gap 
between average labour productivity and wage rates. With this specification the 
estimate of the marginal productivity of hired labour at the mean of the data is only 
Rs. 9.19 per male work day. This is slightly lower than the average wage rate. This 
result is more in conformity with profit maximizing behaviour of the sample 
households. Whenever hired labour is used, the estimated marginal product on 
average is close to the market wage rate for hired labour. 
The effect of the efficiency difference between family and hired labour is that it 
makes the effective return to family labour higher in own farm production as a 
substitute for hired labour. Family labour in such situations should act as if the 
effective wage rate for own -farm work is higher than the market wage rate paid to 
hired labour. This should induce a greater labour supply response of family members 
in big farm households. Whether the actual labour supply behavior of family 
members in households that hire in labour is consistent with the specific form of 
labour heterogeneity indicated in the production function estimation with O = 0.75 is 
taken up in Chapter VII. 
42 As described in Chapter V, the wage rates are compiled from the actual wage payments made by 
households that report hiring in labour for each sample village cluster. Since labour hiring in is likely 
to be more common m the peak labour demand seasons, these wage rates will tend to be higher than 
an annual average of the hired labour wage rates, when there is seasonal fluctuation in the wage rates. 
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Table 6.10 Estimated Marginal Products of Labour 
Model Inputs 
Le = F + H 
Labour 
Le =F +gH 
Memo item : 
units Marginal Product 
Value tand. error 
Family Labour (F) 
Hired Labour (H) 
Rs. per day 12.34 1.51 
12.24 1.64 
9.19 2.12 
Average wage rate for male hired labour 9.86 1.86 " 
Source : Marginal products computed at the geometric mean of the Sample Il data 
using regression parameters of Models C.1 and C.2 
Standard deviation of male wage rate in sample 
6.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
Given the critical role that 0 plays in the characterization of labour heterogeneity on 
the production side of the farm household model, and in the subsequent specification 
for the labour supply equation, it is important to establish the robustness of the result 
that 0 is significantly less than one. Table 6.11 presents a sensitivity analysis of the 
estimates of 0 from alternative restrictions placed on the translog production 
function with the linear heterogeneous nest for effective labour. In all specifications 
reported in Table 6.11, the null that 0 = 1 is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
In particular it is heartening that the estimate of 0 appears to be quite insensitive to 
the conversion factor between male and equivalent female work -days. In the main 
production function estimation results reported in Sections 6.3 to 6.5 of this Chapter, 
this conversion factor has been the ratio of the female to male wage rate in each 
sample village (wr). The mean value for wr was 0.85 with a range from 0.64 to 1. In 
the results reported under item 7 of Table 6.11, the TL equation has been re -run by 
replacing the actual reported value of wr in each sample village with an 
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exogenously specified value. Whether this exogenously specified common value of 
wr is 0.6 or 1, the estimate of 0 changes only marginally. More importantly the 
result that the estimated 0 is significantly differ from 1 is not altered by a wide 
variation in wr. Therefore, as long as a linear specification implying perfect 
substitutability between male and female labour is imposed a priori, the specific rate 
at which female labour work -days is converted to equivalent male work days does 
not matter. It does not affect the main result that family and hired labour for both 
sexes are perfect substitutes with a constant higher productivity for family labour. 
Table 6.11 Estimates of the 9 parameter of the Linear Effective Labour Nest 
under alternative functional forms and prior restrictions 
(Le = F + g*H) 
1 Cobb -Douglas unrestricted 
2 Cobb -Douglas with CRTS 
3 Translog unrestricted 
4 Translog with CRTS 
5 Translog with Loca( concavity 
6 Translog CRTS & local conc. 
7 Translog CRTS & local conc. 
a setting wr wage ratio =1 
b setting wr wage ratio = 0.6 









0.718 0.116 5.91 reject 127.7 
0.706 0.119 6.1 reject 126.3 
0.708 0.109 7.18 reject 143.9 
0.751 0.106 5.52 reject 141.1 
0.708 0.109 7.18 reject 143.8 
0.751 0.107 5.44 reject 141.1 
0.753 0.106 5.43 reject 141.0 
0.74 ^ . 0.11 5.59 reject 139.2 
Note: in regressions 1 to 6 female labour units are converted to male labour units using the 
actual values of the female to male wage ratio (wr) observed in the sample villages. 
The average value of this ratio in this sample is 0.85 in Sample II. 
6.7 Elasticities of substitution 
A complete set of the estimates of the AES, the HEC and the factor demand 
elasticities for the TL specification with the linear labour composite function is 
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given in Table 6.12. These are computed at the geometric mean of Sample II using 
the regression parameter estimates of Model C2 in Table 6.9. Ignoring the own -AES 
(values on the main diagonal) all other AES are positive, with one exception. The 
negative AES between bullock power and material inputs indicates these two inputs 
are p- complements. An increase in the price of bullock power reduces the input 
demand for material inputs. Amongst the set of positive AES, the AES between 
bullocks and effective labour is close to one; but all others are smaller than one. 
These estimates are quite different from previous estimates reported for Nepalese 
agriculture. For instance, in the set of AES reported for land, labour, bullock and 
fertilizers in Hamal (1991), all values are positive and higher than or close to one.43 
The matrix of factor demand elasticities derived from the estimated AES is given in 
Panel (b) of Table 6.12 .4a The own -price ealsticities are all less than 0.5, with labour 
being the most price elastic. An own -price elasticity of effective labour of 0.463 
seems to be on the high side but is within the range of estimates observed for other 
countries - Bapna et al. (1984) and Singh Squire and Strauss (1986c1). 
The estimated HEC values reported in Panel (c) show that effective labour is a q- 
complement of land and material inputs. Increased usage of the latter two inputs 
increases the marginal product of labour. But human labour and animal labour are q- 
substitutes. Land is a q- complement for all other inputs, which is to be expected. In 
comparison to the HEC's computed for Sample I in Table 6.7, there is a reversal in 
sign in the HEC between effective human labour and material inputs. The positive 
HECS between human labour and material inputs in Table 6.12 is a more reasonable 
result than the negative HEC in Table 6.7. In both tables, however, the anomalous 
result of a negative HEC between bullock power and material inputs remains. 
43 Haines estimates are not specific to the tarai region agriculture, but for all of Nepalese 
agriculture, using a time series profit function estimation technique with aggregate data (Hamal 
1991:142). 
44 The factor demand elasticities (c) are readily derived from the AES since r4 = 6;i si, where s is 
the share of input/ in the total value of production (Sato and Koizumi 1973). 
Table 6.12 Elasticities of Substitution and Input Demand 
(with Le = F + 6 H effective labour composite) 
(a) Allen partial Elasticities of Substitution 
Effec. Lab. Effec. Land Bullocks Materials 
Effective Lab. -1.415 0.663 1.076 0.533 
Effective Land -0.493 0.173 0.092 
Bullocks -4.801 -0.662 
Materials -1.523 
(b) Factor Demand EIasticities 
Effec. Lab. Effec. Land Bullocks Materials 
Effective Labour -0.463 0.322 0.081 0.059 
Efective Land 0.217 -0.239 0.013 0.01 
Bullocks 0.352 0.084 -0.363 -0.074 
Materials 0.174 0.045 -0.05 -0.169 




















Source: Computed from parameter estimates of Table 6.9 at the mean of the data. 
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6.8 Summary 
The production function estimation results in this Chapter constitute the first step in 
the sequential estimation strategy of a farm household model that allows for labour 
heterogeneity. This first step estimation had two objectives: to test for heterogeneity 
between family and hired labour, and to generate a complete set of the factor demand 
elasticities and elasticities of substitution to describe the production technology. 
The test for labour heterogeneity in itself had two components: a test of the 
separability of the labour inputs in the production function, and a test for the 
preferred specification of an aggregator function that converts family and hired 
labour into a composite labour variable, measured in effective units. The test for the 
separability of hired and family labour was based on a translog function specified 
with family and hired labour as distinct inputs, using a sample of households that 
used both family and hired labour inputs in crop production. The results showed that 
family and hired labour are only weakly separable from the other three main inputs - 
land, bullock power and material inputs. More restrictive types of labour separability 
are not accepted; and in particular the Cobb -Douglas form is strongly rejected. 
The parametric estimates with family and hired labour as distinct inputs show these 
two labour categories are very close substitutes in both a price and quantity sense. At 
the sample mean the estimated partial Allen elasticity of substitution between family 
and hired labour is positive and large (greater than 10). The Hicksian elasticity of 
complementarity is negative. The negative HEC implies that the marginal product of 
one type of labour is reduced through increased application of the other. 
The labour separability results make it feasible to embed the test for labour 
heterogeneity in a production function specification that compares alternative ways 
of aggregating family and hired labour into a composite effective labour (Le) input. 
Five different effective labour functions, allowing for different values of the 
elasticity of substitution and the marginal rates of substitution between family and 
hired labour, were estimated using a nested production function structure. The 
estimation was done over a larger sample of households that includes those cases not 
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reporting any use of hired labour. The preferred effective labour aggregator function 
was the linear composite of the form Le = F + 0 H. The estimated value of 0 was 
0.751 with a standard error of 0.107. This estimate of O is significantly less than 
one, implying that, although family and hired labour are perfect substitutes, they are 
not equivalent in efficiency units. There is a constant difference in their efficiency, 
with family labour being more productive. 
The robustness of the result that 9 is significantly less than one was checked through 
sensitivity analyses, allowing for alternative functional specification and parametric 
restrictions, as well as by varying the rate at which female work -days was converted 
into equivalent male work -days. These changes affect the estimate of 9 only slightly 
and without negating the result that 9 is significantly less than one. 
The finding of a higher productivity of family labour in own farm crop production in 
the tarai region on Nepal is consistent with the results of Foster (1994) and 
Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1987) with Indian and Malaysian data. Both of these 
previous studies, however, found evidence for imperfect substitution between family 
and hired labour which is a result that differs from this study. 
The complete set of the estimated production function parameters (Table 6.9) and 
the matrix of the various elasticities of input substitution derived from the estimated 
parameters (Table 6.11) are quite reasonable. The estimated AES are all less than 
one indicating again that the simpler Cobb- Douglas specification is inappropriate for 
this data set. The estimated HEC values show effective labour is a q- complement for 
land and material inputs but a q- substitute for bullock power. 
Finally, this Chapter also shows there is considerable- scope for functional mis - 
specification in treating different types of labour as distinct inputs in situations where 
the data contains many cases with a zero value for particular labour categories. (See 
Appendix 6.1). A nested production function structure with an effective labour 
variable appears to be superior to an estimation procedure that treats family and hired 
labour as distinct inputs. 
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Appendix 6.1 
The Translog Specification with Family and Hired Labour as Distinct Inputs 
This appendix presents the translog production function estimation results with 
family and hired labour as distinct inputs, using Sample II which contains a large 
proportion of households that do not use any hired labour. A conventional approach 
to resolving the problem of zero values of some inputs in the translog specification 
has to been to convert all zero values to one (or another small positive number).45 An 
adjustment of this type seems particularly unsuitable with the data in Sample II 
because almost 60% of the households will have a zero level of hired labour input. 
This presumption is clearly borne out by the estimation results given in Appendix 
Table 6.13 for the Translog and Cobb- Douglas specification.46 
The parametric estimates, especially for the labour inputs, in Appendix Table 6.13 
vary greatly from the specification that uses the Le = F + OH linear composite for 
effective labour or even the homogenous aggregator. In the Cobb -Douglas estimates 
of Model 6 in Appendix Table 6.13, the output elasticity with respect to family 
labour (a,) is less than 0.06. The elasticity parameter with respect to hired labour is 
less by a factor of ten, and is not significantly different from zero. The effect of these 
parameter estimates is that the marginal product of family labour at the mean of the 
data is now estimated to be only Rs. 3.05 per male work day while that for hired 
labour is Rs. 0.59 per day. These are very unreasonable estimates, given that wage 
rates are about Rs. 9.9 per male work -day and differ markedly from the marginal 
products computed with the homogeneous and linear composites in Table 6.10. 
The translog specification in Model 5 gives more reasonable results than the Cobb - 
Douglas but anomalies remain. The elasticity with respect to hired labour is (0.032) 
is considerably smaller than compared to family labour (0.258) at the mean of the 
data. At this point the estimated marginal product of family labour (Rs. 13.86) is 
4s Jacoby (1993) is one example of this commonly used ad hoc procedure. 
The prior restriction of constant returns to scale is imposed in both models. In the translog 
specification (Model 5) the data are scaled to the geometric mean which results from the conversion 
of the zero values of hired labour to one; and weak separability and local concavity are also imposed. 
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reasonable, but the marginal product of hired labour (Rs. 3.11) is considerably 
underestimated. In the translog the production elasticity parameters (a, and a2) are 
sensitive to the point of scaling of the sample data. If the hired labour variable is 
scaled to the mean, not of Sample II with the arbitrary conversion of zero values to 
one, but to the mean of Sample I (which includes only those households with 
positive inputs of both family and hired labour), then the estimated marginal 
products become reasonable. At the mean of the Sample I data, the estimated 
marginal product of family labour is Rs.14.46 and of hired labour Rs.10.97 using the 
translog specification. While the production technology of the farms which employ 
both types of labour appear to be well represented by this specification it does not 
reflect accurately the common technology of the pre -dominant group of farmers 
who do not use any hired labour. 
Note that despite the unreasonable parameter estimates with family and hired labour 
as distinct inputs, the goodness of fit criteria for Models 5 and 6 are very close to 
that for the specification with a composite effective labour function. In Model C2 in 
Table 6.9 the residual sum of squares is 23.71 and in the translog specification of 
Appendix Table 6.23, the residual sum of squares increases only marginally to 24.1. 
There is no change in the R -Sq. between observed and predicted values. It appears 
the substantial model mis- specification with family and hired labour treated as 
distinct inputs, with zero values converted to one's, could be masked by the standard 
goodness of fit criteria, especially in a non -linear estimation procedure.. ' 
The estimation results in Appendix Table 6.13 clearly illustrate the problem that can 
occur when the ad hoc procedure for converting zero values in situations when such 
zero values occur in a large proportion of the sample. The results with the effective 
labour aggregator function clearly are more economically meaningful even though 
statistically the model fit may not be very different. 
It may be that when the estimation can be done by OLS the wider variety of mis- specification 
diagnostics tests (such as the RESET) could adequately differentiate Models 5 and 6 in Appendix 
Table 6.13 and models with effective aggregator functions. These standard specification tests are not 
applicable for non -linear estimation (Greene 1993), and so have not been applied here to discriminate 
in a more formal way between the specification of Model 5 in Appendix Table 6.13 and Model C2. 
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Appendix Table 6.13 





: Log real composite farm output 
: Sample II (households using some family labour) (N =679) 
: Constant returns to scale 
: Non -Linear least squares with heferoskedastícity corrected errors 
Model 5 Model 6 
additional restrictions: WS* and 
local concavity Cobb -Douglas 
Variable Coeftic. t- ratio Coeffc. t- ratio 
Family lab. (F) a 0.258 8.14 0.0567 4.33 
Hired Lab (H) a2 0.0328 4.75 0.0054 0.87 
Efective Land (Ae) a3 0.501 10.37 0.753 24.90 
Bullocks (B) a4 0.093 4.44 0.055 3.32 
Material inputs (M) a5 0.115 4.47 0.129 5.52 
Educ of Head 0.006 1.12 0.0045 0.74 
Big Farm dummy 0.003 0.11 -0.014 0.63 
Second order coefficients (x 10) 
FxF alt 0.475 5.70 
HxH a22 0.245 4.61 
FxH aI2 -2.110 3.58 
AexAe a33 -1.290 1.57 
BxB a44 0.360 2.41 
MxM a55 0.715 1.70 
FxAe a 13 0.590 2.00 
HxAe a23 0.070 1.89 
FxB a14 -0.510 2.52 
Hx8 a24 -0.060 2.36 
FxM a15 -0.357 1.69 
HxM a25 -0.045 1.63 
AexB a34 0.569 1.68 
AexM a35 0.047 0.98 
BxM 0(.45 -0.359 1.33 
R -Sq. between observed and predicted 0.967 0.963 
Residual sum of Squares 24.1 26.3 
Log Likelihood 133.2 105.6 
Test for Cobb -Douglas form 
Wald test statistic (with 7 DF) 60.00 (reject) 
Estimated labour marginal product at mean (Rs.) 
family labour 13.86 
hired labour 3.61 
3.05 
0.59 
'WS = weak separability of the labour inputs 
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CHAPTER VII 
LABOUR SUPPLY ESTIMATION 
7.1 Introduction and Motivation 
The results in Chapter VI of a production -function -based test for the heterogeneity 
of family and hired labour as inputs in Nepalese tarai region agriculture indicated 
that family and hired labour are perfect substitutes in farm production but with 
different productivity. The production function estimation was based on choosing 
among alternative functional forms for creating an effective labour (Le) composite 
function, which aggregated family (F) and hired labour (H) inputs. The preferred 
aggregator function was a linear composite, Le = F + 0 H. The estimated value of O 
was 0.75 which was shown to be significantly less than one. When measured in 
effective units, one unit of hired labour is equal to 0.75 units of family labour.' 
The production function based result on labour heterogeneity has important 
implications for the appropriate methodology as well as model specification in 
estimating the labour supply component of the farm household model. As discussed 
in Chapter III, the main methodological implication is that the linear form of the 
labour heterogeneity still makes the farm household model recursive in its 
production and consumption components. The constant efficiency difference 
between hired labour and family labour implies a farm household model structure 
wherein the effective wage rates faced by household members will differ according 
to the labour market exposure of the household in the hired labour market - i.e. 
whether the household is a net buyer or net seller of labour. The efficiency 
difference, however, is independent of the levels of labour and other inputs used on 
the farm since O is a constant. Hence, the "effective" wage rate faced by family 
labour applied to the farm is still parametrically given to the household. 
Consequently, the labour supply estimation can be done separately from the 
As noted in Chapter I, this thesis does not delve into alternative explanations for the higher 
productivity of family labour. One common justification is that the effort applied per unit of time is 
likely to be lower for hired than for family labour (Feder 1985). Another reason could be that family 
labour acquires some farm -specific experience (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985). 
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production side of the model, but with the necessary adjustment to the observed 
market wage rates for the difference in productivity represented by O. 
This Chapter presents the estimation procedure and regression results for the labour 
supply behavior of farm household members taking into account the observed 
heterogeneity between family and hired labour in farm production. The resulting set 
of estimates of the parameters of the labour supply function completes the 
description of the behavioural response of the farm household. However, another 
equally important motivation for this Chapter is to provide independent 
corroboration of the result derived in Chapter VI that family and hired labour are 
heterogeneous inputs in farm production. 
The production function based test for O < 1 is robust with respect to several 
alternative functional specifications and parametric restrictions (Table 6.5). While 
this is strong evidence for labour heterogeneity, it is not conclusive in the sense that 
it does not rule out alternative explanations of why the estimated O could be less than 
one in the production function regression results. The main concerns are of data 
aggregation bias and unobserved quality differences in the family and hired labour 
inputs that are independent of their family or hired status. 
The farm management data utilized in the regression analyses of Chapter VI is given 
only at the aggregate household level in the MPBHS. Individual characteristics of 
persons who supply the family and hired labour on a particular farm are not 
observed. There could be some unobservable quality differences between family and 
hired labour that give rise to a difference in their marginal productivity 
independently of the distinction between family and hired labour categories. For 
instance, in a particular household family labour may consist solely of prime age 
workers, while the hired labour input may be of young teenagers or older adults. 
Similarly education levels of family and hired labour may be different. Another 
source of unknown bias in the estimate of O may arise from the aggregated nature of 
the farm level production function estimated in Chapter VI, since labour requirement 
and productivity will differ across crops. Therefore it is important to find additional 
166 
evidence for the lower marginal productivity of hired labour independently of the 
production function estimation. The labour supply regressions presented in this 
Chapter provide a mechanism for such an independent verification. 
It is feasible to test whether the observed labour supply behaviour is consistent with 
the heterogeneity between family and hired labour detected in the production 
function estimation by comparing alternative labour supply model specifications. A 
labour supply model that equates the opportunity cost of family labour in all 
households to the observed market wage rate for off -farm work is consistent with 
family and hired labour being homogeneous production inputs. Model specifications 
using effective wage rates (based on B) that vary according to the labour market 
exposure of the household are consistent with labour heterogeneity. Standard 
diagnostics for model selection can be used to check whether the common wage 
labour supply model performs better than the varying effective wage model. If these 
model selection tests find in favour of the varying wage model, this result can be 
interpreted as conforming with the productivity differences in family and hired 
labour inputs in farm cultivation.' 
The superior performance of a labour supply model with varying effective wage 
rates does not necessarily prove there has to be a difference in efficiency between 
family and hired labour in the production function. Such a result could also be 
consistent with other explanations which lead to differences in the effective wage 
rate for family labour to work on its own farm and the wage rate applicable for work 
on the hired labour market. A "wage gap" of this type could arise from differences in 
tastes between working on one's own farm and working on the hired labour market 
(Lopez 1984), fixed costs to seeking outside work (Cogan 1981), etc. The tests for 
the labour supply model specifications are not designed to discriminate between 
alternative sources or explanations for varying effective wages. They only 
z The only direct connection between the labour supply estimation and the production function 
estimation is that the actual value of the 6 parameter estimated in the latter is used to create the 
effective wage and non labour income variables for the labour supply regressions. Since the labour 
supply data module has not been utilized in generating the estimate of 6, this is an independent data 
set that can be checked for conforming evidence of 6 being less than one, if not necessarily 
confirming that there is a genuine difference in the efficiency of family and hired labour. 
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discriminate between models relying on a common market wage and models that 
specify varying effective wage rates, based on whether households are net buyers or 
sellers of labour. A result that labour supply behaviour conforms with the evidence 
in the production function for labour heterogeneity increases the likelihood that there 
is a genuine efficiency difference between family and hired labour. If the results 
reported in Chapter VI were due solely to other unobserved factors not taken into 
account in the production function estimations, it would be an unlikely co- incidence 
if these extraneous factors also led to a labour supply model characterized by higher 
effective wage rates for family members on farms that employ hired labour.' 
A secondary objective of this chapter is to obtain accurate estimates of the 
parameters of interest of the labour supply functions (i.e., wage and income 
elasticities for various household types) by correctly specifying the appropriate 
effective wage that correctly defines the leisure- labour equilibrium faced by different 
households. It is of some interest to check how these elasticities will differ between 
specifications that recognize labour heterogeneity (and hence the resulting wage - 
gap) and those which treat both types of labour as homogeneous inputs. 
In the following sections, the next (7.2) briefly discusses how the household's 
optimal labour supply /leisure demand conditions are affected by labour 
heterogeneity; and, in particular, how the effective wage rates at the equilibrium are 
related to the O parameter. Section 7.3 provides a brief summary of the individual 
and household level data used in the labour supply function estimations. Section 7.4 
discusses the specifications of the alternative models and the related model 
identification issues. Section 7.5 provides the labour supply regression results for 
male household members, including model selection tests and estimates of the wage 
and income elasticities of labour supply from the alternative models. Section 7.6 
gives a similar set of results for the labour supply of female household members. 
Section 7.7 concludes the chapter. 
3 The precise form of the wag gap created by the 6 efficiency difference factor is illustrated in Figure 
7.1 in Section 7.2. The labour supply model specification tests reported in this Chapter cannot 
discriminate between alternative underlying explanations that give rise to Figure 7.1. But they can 
rule out other explanations that result in an arbitrary wage gap model inconsistent with Figure 7.1. 
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7.2 Labour Supply Implications of Linear Heterogeneity 
The effect of the linear aggregator function for effective labour (Le = F - A H with 
A < 1) is that one unit of family labour when applied to the family farm can 
substitute for 1/0 units of hired labour, without affecting output. Let w denote the 
market wage rate paid per unit of hired labour. For the farm household which is 
hiring in labour, the effective wage rate that can be applied to family labour devoted 
to the family farm is w/O (because one unit of F substitutes for 1/0 units of H for 
which the hired wage cost is w /A). Moreover, since the 1/0 conversion factor is 
independent of the actual levels of family and hired labour (and other inputs) applied 
on the farm, there is a constant difference in the marginal product of hired labour vis 
a vis family labour. The marginal rate of substitution between family and hired 
labour (which is the ratio of the two marginal products) is constant for all 
households. The first order conditions for the optimal levels of family and hired 
labour inputs can be derived as if the household faced a wage rate of w for hired 
labour and an internal wage rate of w/A for family labour when applied to its own 
farm (see Section 3.5 in Chapter III). Even though w/A is a shadow wage rate which 
applies only to an artificial internal household labour market for family labour, the 
family labour supply behaviour can be modeled as if the household were to take the 
w/A wage as parametrically given to the household (when the market wage rate w 
can be assumed to he exogenous). 
This maintains the recursive nature of the farm household model whereby labour 
supply decisions can be modeled independently of other production input choices. 
Consequently, the traditional estimation strategy can be followed, where the 
production function and labour supply /consumer demand systems are estimated 
separately, with a minor adjustment to market wage rates to derive the effective 
wage rates that represent the consumer -household's labour /leisure equilibrium. 
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A second major implication is that the efficiency difference between family and 
hired labour as production inputs affects the effective wage rate, and hence labour 
supply decisions, only of households who hire in labour (or are at the margin of 
deciding to employ the first unit of hired labour). For a small farm household that 
supplies family labour on its own farm and works as well on the off -farm hired 
labour market at a wage rate of w, the optimal family labour input on own farm 
cultivation is conditioned by the market wage rate, w and is not affected by the 0 
parameter. Hence, the effect of the efficiency difference between family and hired 
labour as production inputs on the labour supply behaviour of farm households 
depends on the net labour market position of the household. 
There are three mutually exclusive household categories based on the net labour 
market position. If M represents the amount of family labour supplied on the hired 
labour market (at wage w) and H represents the amount of labour hired in (again at 
wage w), the three mutually exclusive household categories are: 
Category 1: family labour hired out (M > 0) and no labour hired in (I-I = 0). 
This category represents landless and small farmers who are net 
sellers of labour. 
Category 2: family labour not hired out (M = 0) and extra labour hired in (H > 0). 
This category represents big farmers who work on their own farms 
and also hire in labour. 
Category 3 family labour not hired out (M = 0) nor extra labour hired in (H = 0). 
This category represents "autarchic" households who equate labour 
demand and supply on the family farm solely from family sources. 
The possibility of both M > 0 and H > 0 is explicitly ruled out if 0 <1 and the wage 
rate for hiring in and hiring out are the same (as assumed in this study). Since one 
unit of family labour is equal to 1/0 units of hired labour, if the two wage rates are 
the same, the household always gains by transferring its labour from market wage 
work (activity M) to own farm work (activity F) so that it can reduce hired labour 
demand by 1/0 units for every unit of labour so transferred.' 
The theoretical inconsistency of both M and H being positive for a household ignores seasonal 
variation in labour supply and demand and changes in the net labour market exposure of a household. 
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The prediction that, in the presence of labour heterogeneity with family labour being 
more productive than hired labour, farm- households should not simultaneously hire 
in and hire out labour is a strong result. It can be readily tested with the sample data 
of this study. Table 7.1 bears out that the tarai region sample households indeed do 
not report simultaneous hiring in and hiring out of labour. Out of 686 own -farm 
operator households for which a matched set of labour demand and labour supply 
data could be assembled for the subset of the MPBHS sample used in this study, 
only 22 households - about 3% - report using hired labour as well as some member 
of that household working on the off -farm labour market. Most cases of both hiring 
in and hiring out are found in the smallest land size category, where the amounts of 
hired labour used are very small. Out of 199 big and medium farm size households 
only three report simultaneous hiring in and hiring out labour. 






Size (N) matched 
data 
2 3 




Hiring OU f Hiring IN 
labor and OUT 
5 6 
BIG 103 77 69 2 1 
MEDIUM 123 122 87 10 2 
SMALL 227 214 89 62 8 
MARGINAL 281 273 48 179 11 
ALL cultivators 734 686 293 253 22 
(3 % of col. 3 total) 
LANDLESS 273 240 0 240 0 
TOTAL 1007 926 293 493 22 
Note : The total reported in co umn is the number of households for which both the labour 
supply and labour demand data could be matched from the different parts of the MPHBS 
data records. Labour supply records for some landless households are missing. 
Given that the survey data refers to the entire annual cropping cycle, and given the 
very time specific nature of agricultural operations and strict gender- related division 
of labour, this is a striking result, which is consistent with the type of labour 
heterogeneity detected in the production function estimation in Chapter VI. 
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The equilibrium conditions for labour demand and supply for each of these three 
household categories were illustrated in Figure 3.4 in Chapter III for the case where 
0* (the marginal rate of transformation between family and hired labour at the 
optimum labour allocation) was less than one. The theoretical derivation in Chapter 
III was based on a general form of labour heterogeneity in a production function 
with a separable labour nest. The specific linear composite indicated by the 
empirical results of Chapter VI further simplifies the theoretical structure and 
estimation strategy. It is not necessary to compute 0* at the optimum labour 
allocation for each sample household to define the effective wage rate applicable for 
the labour supply equilibrium. The applicable effective wage rate can be simply 
determined from the constant O parameter and the observed market wage rate.' 
Figure 3.4 makes it clear the wage rates which define the equilibrium labour supply 
position on the labour supply curve are different for the three household types. For 
Category 1 (landless and small farm) households, where total labour supply is 
greater than own -farm demand (M > 0), both the implicit valuation of family labour 
and the marginal return to own labour in farm production are equal to the wage rate 
(w) received on the hired labour market (Fig 3.4a). This result is independent of the 
value of 0. At the optimum labour allocation, the real cost of labour in all household 
activities is equalized to the market wage rate. 
For Category 2 households (big farms where labour is hired in) the optimal use of 
hired labour equates the marginal product of hired labour to the hiring -in wage rate 
(w); whereas the allocation of family labour to own farm production equates the 
marginal returns to w/0 (Fig. 3.4c). 
For Category 3 (autarchic) households which neither hire in nor hire out any labour 
the equilibrium conditions set the effective wage rate for the labour supply equal to 
5 As indicated in Eq. 3. 20, in the general case 0* is a function of the optimum levels of F and II. In 
the case of the linear composite for effective labour 0* becomes a constant, equal to the estimated 
value of 0 (0.75) in Chapter VI for all households, and this value is independent of all input levels. 
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the marginal product of labour on the family farm. This common value for the real 
cost of labour and the marginal product (w) lies between w and w/B (Fig,3.4b); and 
this shadow wage rate (w) can vary from household to household, even if they face 
the same market wage rate. For autarchic households, a small change in the market 
wage rate will have no effect on equilibrium labour supply or demand as long as the 
autarchic nature of the household is preserved. That is, if the wage change is not 
large enough to make the autarchic household change its status into a Category 1 or 
Category 2 household. The underlying farm- household model is not separable for 
autarchic households even with a linear form of labour heterogeneity. 
The effect of the lower efficiency of hired labour on the own -farm labour allocation 
decision of the three different categories of farm households can be summarized in 
terms of the wage at which an unit if effective labour is available to each household 
type. This is illustrated in Figure 7.1, where labour is measured in effective units on 
the horizontal axis. As in figure 3.4, the VV curve denotes the marginal rate of 
substitution between leisure and consumption for a representative individual worker 
in a farm household. The stepped bold line wSS'S" represents the supply price at 
which an effective unit of labour is available to the three different farm households. 
The classification of the labour market exposure of the farm household is based on 
the amount of labour required for own -farm cultivation which determines where the 
demand for effective labour (or the marginal product of effective labour) schedule 
intersects with the supply curve. 
As drawn, YS reflects the demand for effective labour on a small farm that has extra 
labour to sell on the off -farm labour market at wage w. For such a household, the 
price at which a unit of effective labour is available for own farm cultivation is also 
w (since units of family and effective labour are equivalent). When the farm size is 
large enough to require hired labour for cultivation, the supply price for a unit of 
effective Iabour becomes w /ll. Such a farm is represented by the YB schedule for the 
demand for effective labour. The large farm faces an effective wage rate of w/B 
because a standard unit of hired labour at wage w represents only B units of effective 
labour. The intersection of the marginal product of labour curve denoted as YA with 
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the upward sloping section SS' of the supply curve represents an autarchic household 
that neither sells nor buys any labour. The marginal product of family labour, and 
hence its shadow price, for the autarchic household is between w and w /A. Figure 7.1 
indicates that if preferences for leisure and production technology are constant for aII 
households, the sole basis for the classification of households according to their 
exposure in the hired labour market will be farm size, which determines the 
horizontal distance at which the marginal product curve intersects the supply curve. 





O Ld s Ld LdB 
Effective Labour days -* 
Figure 7.1 also clearly shows that the effect of the B factor in the difference in 
productivity of family and hired labour is equivalent to a wage gap in the price at 
which an effective unit of labour is available to different farm size categories.' 
6 There is a straightforward equivalence between the wage gap in Figure 7.1 and the price gap created 
by the difference between c.i.f import and f.o.b. export prices in a model of international trade with 
transport costs. The small farmer who sells labour in the off- farm market is exactly analogous to an 
exporting country where the domestic supply price is the f.o.b. price. The big farmer who "imports" 
hired labour is equivalent to an importing country that has a domestic supply price given by the 
higher c.i.f. price. In between is an autarchic country that does not trade if its domestic supply price is 
in between the f.o.b. and the c.i.f. price. (See Dixit and Norman 1980). 
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The per hectare labour input in effective units applied to these three different farm 
categories will vary because the wage rate that each of the three household category 
faces is different. There is a rising supply price of labour only among the autarchic 
households. For the small and big farm households, although there is a gap in the 
effective wage they face, the supply of effective labour is available at a fixed price. 
Within the set of big farm households that rely on hired labour, there is no further 
difference in the wage cost: all big farms face the common wage of w/9 for one unit 
of effective labour.' 
7.3 Data Summary 
The main points related to the design and structure of the MPBHS data and variable 
definitions used in this study were discussed in Chapter V. The specific issues 
relevant to this Chapter were the definition of labour supply adopted in the MPBHS 
coding manual and the derivation of household specific market wages rates for male 
and female labour from the farm management module of the survey.' This section 
provides some additional information about how the actual sample of individuals 
used for estimating the Iabour supply regressions separately for male workers and 
female workers is constructed. It also provides a summary description of the main 
variables of interest in both samples. 
The labour supply regressions are based on the individual case records in the 
MPBHS for economically active household members. This data records the total 
days of work in different categories for each of two six- monthly cropping season 
survey cycles. The full MPBHS data contains employment details for all 
economically active persons aged 10 or above. The sample used for the labour 
supply regressions in this Chapter is further restricted in three ways to individuals 
who are: (i) aged 15 to 60, (ii) are in a familial relationship with the household head, 
and (iii) whose usual occupation codes are related to farm cultivation. 
This assumes there are no quantity constraints to the supply of hired labour at the market wage, w. 
e See Section 5.3(b) in Chapter V for details. 
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The age group restriction is imposed to ignore the occasional labour supply records 
for children aged 10 to 15 and the elderly. Also excluded are individuals not related 
to the household head. One important category thus excluded is the group of 
domestic and farm servants reported to reside in the household of their employer. 
The labour supply for such individuals would differ from that of family members in 
the household. The contractual arrangements for permanent or semi -permanent farm 
labourers can be complex, and their labour supply behaviour need not be related to 
an observed market wage rate for hired casual labourers.' The final occupational 
code restrictions are imposed because the effective wage rates for family labour are 
to be created from the observed wage rate for hired labour in farm cultivation. This 
wage rate need not be a good proxy for the marginal returns to extra work in other 
village occupations - shopkeepers and caste -based professional occupations such as 
shoemakers, blacksmiths, etc.10 
The final adjusted sample size available for the labour supply regressions consists of 
2,542 person- season records for male family members and 2,288 person- season 
records for female family members. Given that both summer and winter season 
records are available for most individuals, this represents a sample size of about 
2,500 economically active family members, from the 1,007 sample households, in 
the specific labour force categories chosen above. 
In the case of female family members, data was also compiled for those individuals 
aged 15 to 60 who are reported as economically inactive in order to generate a 
sample which includes active and inactive family members to counter potential 
sample selection bias in the regression results. A total of 481 women aged 15 to 60 
Bardhan and Rudra (1981) provide details of the terms of various forms of "attached" labour 
contracts in West Bengal. A similar variety of contractual modes also occurs in the Nepal tarai 
region for which data was not collected in the MPBHS. Hence the labour supply of farm servants 
cannot be separately modeled in this study. 
10 The specific occupation codes used to restrict the sample to agricultural workers from the detailed 
occupation coding list of the MPHBS were codes 61 (farmers) and 62 (agricultural and animal 
husbandry workers) and 99 (common labourers). The last category would include some non- 
agricultural labourers such as porters and coolies, but their wage rates are likely to be closely related 
to the daily wage rate for hired agricultural labourer. 
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were reported to be economically inactive. When compared to the final sample of 
about 1200 economically active women aged 15 to 60, this represents a non - 
participation rate of about 28 %. There is no corresponding problem of potential 
sample selection bias in the sample of male family members. Only 26 cases of 
economically inactive men aged 15 -60 were recorded in the entire sample." 
A summary description of the main variables used in the labour supply regressions 
for both the male and female samples is given in Table 7.2. It also provides a 
breakdown of the data for the main variables by the three categories of households 
based on their labour market exposure. Table 7.2 clearly shows the average number 
of days worked is strongly related to labour market exposure. In both male and 
female samples, average work -days is highest for Category 1 households (labour 
hire out) followed by Category 2 (labour hire in) and lowest in the autarchic 
(Category 3) households. The association between labour market exposure status and 
average farm size is also evident. Individuals in the labour hiring out sample come 
from landless and small farmer households, with an average farm size of 0.88 
hectares. Individuals in the autarchic category have an intermediate average farm 
size of 2.2 hectares, while average farm size in the labour hiring in sample is 4.67 
hectares. There is a similar relationship between per capita non -labour income and 
the labour market exposure categories, since this income category includes the 
imputed returns from land ownership (farm profit). Table 7.2 reveals a large 
variation in the non -labour income variable. This helps to accurately estimate the 
income effect on labour supply. The sample variation on real wage rates is also high, 
reflecting regional patterns. For instance, in the sample of male workers the real 
wage rate ranges from 2.63 to 7.3 (kilograms of paddy a day).12 
" This is a very small proportion of the final sample of almost 1300 active male individuals used for 
the male labour supply regressions. 
'The entries in Table 7.2 differ slightly for the male and female samples, since these means are un- 
weighted averages summed over working individuals not households. 
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Table 7.2: Labour Supply Data Summary for Male and Female Family Workers 
Variables Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
Male Workers Sample ( N = 2542) 
Total labour supply # (all categories) 88.6 41.7 0 177 
Category 1 Households (hire out) (n = 1240) 108.5 38.7 0 177 
Category 2 Households (hire in) (n = 813) 78.1 36.3 2.2 173 
Category 3 Households (autarchic) (n = 489) 60.4 33.9 5 171 
Real Household non -labour income ## 5511 6318 27 46,180 
Per capita real non -labour income ## 619 629.6 7 5,905 
Category 1 Households (hire out labour) 255 242.1 7 2,359 
Category 2 Households (hire in labour) 1123 802.2 152 5,905 
Category 3 Households (autarchic) 681 294.6 145 2,543 
Average market wage rate for hired labour 
Real female wage rate (Kg. of paddy /day) 4.19 0.74 2.63 7.43 
Real male wage rate ( ) 4.51 1.06 2.65 8.19 
Age 34.9 12.9 15 60 
Family size 8.56 5,2 1 28 
Number of adult male workers per household 2.32 1.37 1 7 
Number of adult female workers per household 
Total farm cultivated area 2.52 3.01 0 33 
Category 1 Households (hire out labour) 0.88 1.39 0 9 
Category 2 Households (hire in labour) 4.67 3.79 1.47 33 
Category 3 Households (autarchic) 2.98 2.47 1.2 13 
Female Workers Sample (N = 2288) 
Total labour supply # (all categories) 56.5 35.4 0 180 
Category 1 Households (hire out) (n = 1103) 68.0 38.8 0 174 
Category 2 Households (hire in) (n = 724) 51.4 28.8 0 180 
Category 3 Households (autarchic) (n = 461) 45.5 31.1 2 170 
Real Household non -labour income ## 5471 5932 27 46,180 
Per capita real non -labour income ## 575 494.2 7 3,769 
Category 1 Households (hire out labour) 252 223.1 7 1,448 
Category 2 Households (hire in labour) 994 543.7 76 3,769 
Category 3 Households (autarchic) 729 389.1 108 2,542 
Average market wage rate for hired labour 
Real female wage rate (Kg. of paddy /day) 4.22 0.72 2.63 7 
Real male wage rate ( ) 4.57 1.07 2.65 8 
Age 31.9 11.7 15 60 
Family size 8.64 5.4 1 28 
Number of adult male workers per household 
Number of adult female workers per household 
Number of children aged 0 -5 2.06 1.77 0 9 
Number of children aged 6 -9 0.8 0.9 0 6 
Economically Inactive female individuals: (n = 481) 
Per capita real non -labour income 704.1 931 90 5,905 
Family size 8.56 5.2 1 28 
Number of adult male workers per household 2.03 1.25 1 7 
Number of adult female workers per household 2.69 1.39 1 10 
Age 34.1 14.9 15 60 
# This is the average number of work -days in each of two 6 monthly cropping season. 
## Nominal income (in Rupees) deflated by the village price of paddy per kg. 
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7.4 Model Specification and Identification 
From Eq. 4.11 (in Section 4.3 of Chapter 1V) the specification of the labour supply 
equation in the second step of the farm household model estimation strategy, based 
on the prior estimate of O obtained in the first step, is given by 
(7.1) Ls = e ( w* (e), T(6) + E, S, ß) + e 
where w *(e) = w for Category 1 households 
= w!9 for Category 2 households 
= co where w < w < wie for Category 3 households 
rc(e) + E = non -labour income, including imputed farm profits. 
ß = the labour supply parameter set. 
For the empirical implementation of Eq. 7.1 a linear labour supply function is 
specified where the total labour days worked by an individual is regressed on the 
real effective wage rate, real per -capita non -labour income, and a set of individual 
and household level characteristics. The linear labour supply is chosen partly for the 
sake of simplicity and partly to aid in model identification. Because of the 
multiplicative form in which the 9 factor affects the effective wage rate, a log -linear 
form cannot be used since the wage adjustment is converted into an intercept effect. 
The labour supply estimation is done separately for male and female household 
members, allowing for cross wage effects. The general estimating equation is: 
(7.2) Lsiw, = oc + ß t w* ß2 w*fk, + y PNLYh + T'S + ei, 
Lsju = total work days reported for an economically active member i 
in household h for crop season k (k = summer or winter).'3 
PNLYh = real per capita household non -labour income for household h 
13 The sample of individuals included in the labour supply regressions is further restricted to family 
members aged 15 to 60 who report their main occupation as being agricultural workers or own 
account farm operators. 
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S = a vector of individual and household characteristics which includes 
family size and composition, age and education level of the 
individual family relationship dummies, etc. 
, w* ¡ = effective real male and female wage rates for household h in season 
k, which depend on the labour market exposure of the household as 
follows (suppressing the kh subscripts) 
w *' = w' if household is a net seller of labour (Category 1) 
w *' = w' /8 if household is a net buyer of labour (Category 2) 
w *' = wlkiq for autarchic households (Category 3) 
(with A <) Q < 1) 
where j = m (for male) or f (for female) 
and q indexes the number of autarchic sample households. 
The effective wage rates also enter into the computation of non -labour income since 
the imputed cost of family labour applied to farm production must be deducted from 
gross farm profits.14 
The market wage rate for hired agricultural labour computed from the MPHBS can 
be distinguished by three different categories: (i) by sample household (ii) by 
gender, and (iii) by each of two six -monthly cropping seasons (the summer and 
winter cycle) for which farm management data was collected separately. This 
structure for the wage data allows some variation even in market wage rates for 
households within a single sample village cluster. All households in a specific 
sample cluster are not imputed an average village specific wage. Where a particular 
household reports hiring labour for crop production in a specific season, the market 
wage rate for that household is computed as the average of the actual wages paid out 
during that cropping season. A village level average wage is then computed as the 
unweighted average of the hiring -in wage rate reported by all such households in the 
sample village. This average wage paid to hired labour is then imputed as the village 
level wage received by individuals in the small farm and landless households for 
14 See Section 5.3 in Chapter V. The variable PNLY in Equation 7.2 is just NLY in Equation 5.3 
divided by family size and the village specific price of paddy. This converts a nominal household 
level variable to a real per- capita level variable. 
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whom no household level hired wage is reported directly in the MPHBS data.16 All 
household members in a specific gender group get assigned the same wage rate since 
individual level wage rates are not reported in the survey. 
Once the nominal household -level wage rates (for male and female members) are 
computed in this manner, they are deflated by a village- specific price of paddy. For 
simplicity, the real wage conversion is based only on the price of paddy rather than 
the price of a composite consumption good for which complex indexing procedures 
would have been necessary.16 
The real market wage rates (w /p) derived in this manner are converted into real 
effective wage rates (w * /p) based on the categorization of households by their net 
labour supply position. The description of a household's net labour supply position 
(Category 1 to 3) is based on data for the whole annual survey period and does not 
vary by cropping cycle. The Category 1 to 3 description also carries over to all 
individuals in the same household." Apart from the gender distinction, all 
individuals in a household are assumed to face the same market and effective wage. 
Since individuals in each gender group are assumed to be perfect substitutes for each 
other in own farm production, and individuals across gender groups are also perfect 
substitutes with a productivity difference related to the ratio of the market wage 
rates, it should not matter which particular family member works on the farm and 
which one works on the hired labour market. 
15 Since rural labour markets are very localized, the wage reported to be paid out by a labour hiring 
household is likely to be the wage received by the neighboring households that work on the hired 
labour market. In such a setting the fixed costs and other transactions costs to working on the 
neighbour's farm will tend to be negligible. See Section 5.2 for a fuller discussion of this issue. 
16 In the tarai region of Nepal rice is the major food consumption item. In many areas of the Nepal 
tarai wages to agricultural labour are often paid out in kind in units of paddy. The wage reported in 
the MPHBS are in part derived from the monetary conversion of in -kind wages paid in paddy. 
" For instance, consider a sample household with two economically active males and one female 
member, where only one of the male individuals reports working as a hired labourer. The market 
wage rate for male labour is assigned as the effective wage rate for the other male worker also. The 
market wage rate for female labour is assigned as the effective wage rate for the female member, 
even though the latter two have not themselves reported individual work in the hired labour market. 
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Given a prior estimate of 0 and the reported market wage rates, the effective wages 
are well defined for households in Categories 1 and 3. But the effective wage rate 
for autarchic households in Category 2 is not defined because ?;9 cannot be 
identified since it varies across households. It is not appropriate either to use the 
market wage rate, w, adjusted by some constant factor because small changes in w 
will have no effect on the labour supply of individuals in autarchic households. If the 
market wage rate is attributed to the labour supply equilibrium of autarchic 
aL households, the expected values of wage coefficients (13) are zero since 
S 
= 0 
for individuals in Category 3 households. 
Section 7.4 below presents some preliminary regression results based on a sample 
that includes the autarchic households to detect whether this condition is met. But 
the observations on the autarchic households are dropped in subsequent regressions. 
Alternative model specifications 
Focussing on individuals in Categories 1 and 3 only, four separate models can be 
defined. These differ on whether the common observed market wage or the varying 
effective wage rate is used; and whether or not slope and intercept dummies are 
allowed for the two household categories. These alternative models can be 
represented in the framework of Eq. 7.2 as follows (ignoring for the moment the 
subscripts and the distinction between male and female wage rates): 
Model A: common market wage; common parameters 
(7.3A) Ls = a + [3 w + 7PNLY + ... 
Model B: common market wage; varying parameters 
(7.3B.1) Ls = al +ß' w +y1PNLY(w) + for Category 1 
(7.3B.2) Ls = a2 + 132 w + y2PNLY(w) + .., for Category 2 
Model C: different effective wage rates; common parameters 
(7.3C.1) Ls = a + 13 w + y PNLY(w /0) + .., for Category I 
(7.3C.2) Ls = a + 13 (w /0) + y PNLY(w /0) 4- ... for Category 2 
for Category 1 & 2 
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Model D: different effective wage rates; varying parameters 
(7.3D.1) Ls = ai + w +y'PNLY(w /O) +.., for Category 1 
(7.3D.2) Ls = a2 + 32 (w /O) + y2PNLY(w /13) + .., for Category 2 
Note : PNLY(w) is PNLY derived from valuing the cost of family labour at 
wage w; and PNLY(w/O) is derived using the effective wage rate w /O. 
All four model specifications above can be represented within the general 
framework of Equation 7.2 through the use of appropriate dummy variables for the 
intercept and slope terms. For Models B, C and D several different variants occur 
within each set, depending on the combinations of dummy variables used. For 
instance in Model C, while the wage slope parameter 11 is assumed to be constant 
across individuals in Category 1 and 2 households, the y or the a parameter for the 
intercept may be allowed to differ for individuals in Category 1 and 2 households. 
Within the general structure specified in Equations 7.3, Models A and B are nested; 
and so are C and D. The selection of the appropriate model within each choice set 
can be based on testing the coefficients on the appropriate dummy variables that give 
rise to differences in the parameter estimates for Categories 1 and 2. The main 
interest in this Chapter, however, is to verify whether the labour supply specification 
based on varying effective wage rates (Models C, D) is preferred to the specification 
based on the unadjusted market wage rate for both household categories (Models A, 
B). These sets are not nested within each other. They differ in that the value of some 
of the right hand side variables are different for a subset of the observations. This 
can be treated as a difference in model specification when the equation is estimated 
over the full sample of individual members belonging to both categories. 
Given the multiplicative form of the effective wage (w /O) for Category 2 
households, the version of Model C that allows the intercept (a term) to vary for 
Category 1 and 2 households would be indistinguishable from Model B, were it not 
for the fact that PNLY is computed in a different manner in Model C (and D). 
Otherwise, the 13 coefficient for the wage term for Category 2 households in Model 
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C would differ from the ß coefficient for Category 2 households in Model B by the 
constant 9.18 Hence it would not be possible to identify whether Equation 7.3B.2 or 
Equation 7.3C.2 had been estimated. 
The fact that model identification depends critically on the values of PNLY being 
different in these two specification is a potential problem since the differences in 
NLY computed on the basis of w or w/O are Iikely to be minor. This problem is 
further compounded if PNLY turns out to be correlated with the error term of 
Equation 7.3 so that it would be necessary to use an instrumented version of PNLY 
for which the differences between PNLY(w) and PNLY(w /O) could be even smaller. 
The Wu- Hausman test (Hausman 1979) is used to verify whether the wage rates and 
the non -labour income can be treated as exogenous variables. 19 
7.5 Labour Supply Regression Results: Male Family Members 
Table 7.3 summarizes the preliminary regression results for male labour supply 
using the observed market wage rate for the full sample of individuals in all three 
household categories - net sellers, net buyers and autarchic households with respect 
to their labour market exposure. The results are presented for Model A (with 
common parameters for all households) and two versions of Model B that allow for 
different intercepts and slope dummies for the wage and PNLY variable. Model B1 
allows only for an intercept dummy while Model B2 allows for both intercept and 
own -wage slope dummies.20 The regression models of Table 7.3 include other 
If PNLY and all other variables in Models B and C were to be the same then the coefficient 3I in 
Eq. 7.5.B1 would be the same as 3 in Eq. 7.5C.1, and 132 in Eq. 7.5B.2 would be equal to WO in Eq. 
7.5C.2; hence the two models could not be distinguished. 
19 The Wu- Hausman test for exogeneity of regressors is based on a test statistic which measures the 
difference in the values of the estimated parameters of a model that results when the suspected 
endogenous variables are substituted for by their instrumented values. Under the null of exogeneity, 
the difference in the estimated parameters should be small (Hausman 1978) 
30 The standard errors reported in Table 7.3 are OLS errors with White's heteroskedasticity consistent 
adjustments. The two -step error correction is not required because all variables are based on the 
observed market wage rate. 
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variables whose estimated coefficients are not reported in that table. Most of these 
other variables are dummy variables for ethnic groups and regions.' 
Although the parameter estimates in Model A and B1 appear reasonable (positive 
own -wage effects and negative income effects on labour supply), Model B2 which 
allows for the full set of slope and intercept dummies is clearly superior to Models A 
and BI. Since Models A BI and B2 are nested within each other the preferred 
specification can be determined by verifying the significance of the extra dummy 
variables with appear in Models B1 and B2. The full results for Model B2 (given in 
Appendix Table 7A.2) show that five out of the six intercept and slope dummies are 
highly significant leading to significantly different wage and income effects for the 
three household categories. The model fit also improves greatly as one allows for 
additional dummy intercept and slope terms. The adjusted R2 increases from 0.29 for 
Model A to 0.41 for Model B2. 
In Model B2 the own -wage coefficients are of the expected sign (positive) and 
significantly different from zero for Category 1 and 2 households. The own -wage 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero for autarchic households. This last 
result is as predicted.22 There is a similar difference in the income effects for the 
three household categories. The coefficients on the non -labour income variable are 
significantly negative for Category 1 and 2 which is consistent with leisure being a 
normal good. The income effect on labour supply for autarchic households however 
has a positive sign, although the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. 
This discrepancy in the income effect of autarchic households is not a theoretically 
expected result. It does, however, add to the inference based on the own -wage 
21 The regression results for some specifications with the full set of variables are given in the 
Appendix Tables for this Chapter. 
22 The result of an insignificant own -wage coefficient for individuals in autarchic households is based 
on a specification where the cross -wage effect for male labour supply is significantly negative, even 
for autarchic households. If the female wage rate variable is dropped from Model B2, the own -wage 
effects of male labour supply are still significantly positive for Category 1 and 2 households. For 
Category 3 (autarchic) households the own -wage coefficient becomes negative, but its value is 
insignificant. So whether the female wage cross effects are included or not, the inference from Model 
B2 is similar. The labour supply behavior of individuals in autarchic households is insensitive to the 
observed market wage rate, while there is a significant positive effect in other household categories. 
Table 7.3 Male Labour Supply Regressions with common market wage rates 
Data subset: Males, All Categories (1,2,3) Model A 
Estimation: OLS (heterosked.consistent errors) common parameters 
Model BI 
intercept dummies only 
Model B2 
intercept & slope dummies 
VARIABLE name Estimated 
Coefficient t -ratio 
Estimated 
Coefficient t -ratio 
Estimated 
Coefficient t -ratio 
Male wage rate 2.777 1.53 5.505 3.50 
(hire out) Category 1 (sample N1 = 1240) 6.301 3.26 
( hire in) Category 2 (sample N2 = 813) 9.869 5.05 
(autarchic) Category 3 (sample N3 = 489) 0.599 0.38 
Female wage rate -4.002 -1.94 -4.034 -2.16 -4.529 
-2.37 
Non Labour Income (x 100) -1.631 -10.26 -0.621 4.31 
Category 1 -3.307 
-6.88 
Category 2 -0.369 -2.52 
Category 3 0.439 1.01 
FAMILY SIZE 0.885 2.45 1.331 3.93 1.313 2.76 
Number Male workers -10.003 -9.66 -10.148 -10.56 -9.728 -8.56 
Number Female workers 0.612 0.61 0.104 0.15 0.487 0.53 
AGE 1.343 3.37 1.125 2.97 1.052 2.81 
AGESQ -0.025 -5.26 -0.021 -4.66 -0.021 -4.53 
EDUCYR -1.145 -2.29 -0.325 -0.07 -0.360 -0.79 
HOUSEHOLD HEAD DUMMY 7.023 1.66 3.271 0.82 4.058 1.01 
SEASON DUMMY -4.194 -3.02 -4.166 -3.22 -4.162 -3.27 
INTERCEPT 108.2 11.45 
Category 1 106.4 11.98 110.5 11.56 
Category 2 80.8 9.04 61.3 6.24 
Category 3 68.8 7.50 87.5 7.94 
Adjusted R Square 0.29 0.39 0.41 
Standard error of the estimate (SIGMA) 35.20 32.73 32.21 
Breusch -Pagan HETEROSKESD. TEST Chi. Sq. (df 19) 44.60 * (df 21) 68.28 * (df 25) 148.80 
RESET (2) TEST F (df 1, 2523) 64.09 * (df 1, 2521) 5.09 * (df 1, 2517) 6.18 
Wu- Hausman Test for Exogeneity of 
Non - labour income Chi. Sq. (df 25) 18.60 
Non labour income and wage rates Chi. Sq. (df 25) 27.22 oo 
* signifies the relevant test statistic is significant at the 5% significance level. "' 
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effects discussed above suggesting that the labour supply behaviour of the male 
workers in autarchic households appears to be quite distinct from that of individuals 
in households that report some labour selling or buying. 
The non -labour income variable used in the regressions of Table7.3 is the actual 
value derived from valuing all family labour at the market wage rate. The Wu- 
Hausman test for the exogeneity of the non - labour income variable (as well as the 
wage rate) is reported in Table7.3.for Model B2 - the preferred model. The test 
statistic is not significant, indicating these variables are not correlated with the error 
term 23 No specification bias results from using the computed values of per capita 
non -labour income variable; hence, instrumental variable techniques need not be 
used for the non -labour income variable computed on the basis of the observed 
market wage rates. This is a useful result that facilitates identification between 
Models B and C subsequently. 
The coefficients on other regression variables do not differ greatly between the three 
models in Table 7.3. The observed relationships with these other variables are 
plausible. Individual labour supply increases with age but at a decreasing rate 
(implied by the negative coefficient on the age - squared term). The coefficient on 
years of education is negative in Model B2 but it is not significantly different from 
zero. The cropping season dummy is significant, with a slightly smaller labour 
supply intercept for the winter cropping cycle. The (male) household head supplies 
extra labour compared to other male family members. Controlling for family size, a 
larger number of available male family workers reduces the labour supply of each 
individual male worker. But a similar relationship does not occur with respect to the 
number of female workers in the household. This is an indication of work sharing 
within gender groups. 
23 The critical value of the Wu- Hausman test statistic (which is XZ with 25 degrees of freedom) is 
37.65 at the 5% level of significance, and 34.38 at the 10% significance level. Since the computed 
values of the test statistic in Table 7.3 are less than these critical values, the null of exogeneity is not 
rejected. 
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In spite of the reasonable parameter estimates in Table 7.3, the RESET specification 
test indicates substantial model mis- specification for all three models that are based 
on the observed market wage rate. The mis- specification error is the largest for 
Model A which imposes common parameters for all household categories. 
Table 7.4 provides a comparison of the regression results for alternative model 
specifications based on assigning different effective wage rates for Category 2 
households. The sample of individuals in autarchic households is dropped for these 
regressions because the effective wage rate is not identified in terms of the 
A parameter for autarchic households. 24 Model B in Table 7.4 is the same 
specification as Model B2 in Table 7.1 with the autarchic observations dropped. 
Models C and D use the w/A effective wage for individuals in labor hiring 
households. All three specifications allow intercept and non -labour income slope 
dummies since these were significant effects in the preliminary results in Table 7.3. 
With this specification, the only difference between the three models presented in 
Table 7.4 relates to the definition of the effective wage rate and whether or not own - 
wage slope dummies are allowed." 
In comparing Models C and D, which are nested, the own -wage coefficients for 
labour selling and labour hiring households are not significantly different. Once the 
higher effective wage rate is allowed for Category 2 households, there is no 
significant difference in the own -wage slope parameter for individuals in Category 1 
and 2 households.26 Hence, Model D reduces to Model C. 
24 The autarchic households contain 489 records out of a total of 2542 person- season records in the 
full sample. Dropping the sample of individuals from autarchic households does not create a 
specification bias for the estimates reported in Table 7.4 since the labour supply coefficients are 
assumed to be different for individuals in the autarchic households. 
zs Table 7.4 does not report the estimate and standard errors for the actual intercept and slope dummy 
variables. These dummy variables have been added to the estimated base category parameters to 
compute the actual parameter value for each category. The dummy variable coefficients for several 
specifications are reported in the Appendix Tables where the full regression results are given. 
26 In. Model D the dummy variable for the own -wage slope coefficient for Category 2 households is 
minus 0.129 with an adjusted standard error of 1.68. This value is not significantly different from zero. 
Table 7.4 Male Labour Supply Regressions with alternative effective wage rates 
Data subset: Males, Categories 1& 2 
(excludes autarchic) 
Estimation: OLS (heterosked.consistent errors) 
Model B 
common market wage 
intercept & slope dummies 
Model C 
varying effective wage 
no wage slope dummy 
Model D 
varying effective wage 
intercept & slope dummies 
VARIABLE name Estimated 




Coefficient t -ratio 
Male wage rate 5.687 3.53 
(hire out) Category 1 (sample NI = 1240) 8.861 3.75 5.796 3.06 
( hire in) Category 2 (sample N2 = 813) 12.469 5.25 5.667 5.05 
Female wage rate -8.556 -3.46 -1.691 -1.05 
-1.720 -1.06 
Non Labour Income ( x 100) 
Category 1 -3.435 -5.82 
-3.125 -6.30 
-3.217 -6.27 
Category 2 -0.468 -3.06 -0.448 -2.98 -0.448 -2.97 
FAMILY SIZE 0.770 1.89 1.044 2.76 1.043 2.76 
Number Male workers -10.289 -8.80 
-9.433 -8.58 
-9.428 -8.56 
Number Female workers 1.622 1.47 1.896 1.87 1.897 1.87 
AGE 1.658 3.74 1.398 3.32 1.398 3.32 




-0.325 -0.61 0.065 0.12 0.063 0.12 
HOUSEHOLD HEAD DUMMY 7.023 1.66 4.040 0.90 4.029 0.90 
SEASON DUMMY -4.062 -2.75 -4.330 -3.11 -4.339 -3.11 
INTERCEPT 
Category 1 110.1 9.72 94.1 10.11 94.0 9.80 
Category 2 61.2 5.98 47.1 4.42 46.7 4.06 
Adjusted R Square 0.32 0.39 0.39 
Standard error of the estimate (SIGMA) 33.35 31.54 31.53 
Breusch -Pagan HETEROSKESD. TEST Chi. Sq. (df 22) 95.17 * (df 21) 44.02 * (df 22) 44.09 
RESET (2) TEST F (df 1, 2031) 2.17 (df 1, 2032) 2.03 (df 1, 2031) 2.04 
Model selection Diagnostics 
Akaike Final Prediction Error 1125.3 1005.7 1006.7 
Schwartz Criteria 1199.3 1071.8 1075.8 
* signifies the relevant test statistic is significant at the 5% significance level. 
* 
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In comparing Model C with Model B (which uses the observed market wage rate 
with varying slopes), Model C is the preferred specification on the basis of several 
diagnostic statistics - higher adjusted R square, smaller Akaíke prediction error and 
also on the basis of the J test for non -nested models reported in Table 7.5.27 In the 
preferred Model C, the Wu- Hausman test for exogeneity of the non -labour income 
variable based on the effective wage rates - PNLY(w /G)- is insignificant again.28 
Table7.5 Male Labour Supply: Non -nested J tests between Model B and Model C 29 
Additional Estimated Stand. t Inference 
Variable Coefficient error statistic 
Model B predicted values 1.38 0.33 4.16 Reject Model B 
extended from Model C in favour of C 
Model C predicted values 0.56 0.42 1.35 Do not reject C 
extended from Model B in favour of B 
Clearly Model C is the preferred specification over Model B. 
Although Model C is preferred on statistical grounds, the comparison of the income 
and wage elasticities based on Model C and Model B given in Table 7.6 do not lead 
to very striking differences, with one exception. The cross wage elasticity with 
27 The standard procedure for carrying out the Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) J test for two 
competing non -nested models is to run an extended regression for each model that includes as an 
extra regressor the predicted values from the competing model. Model selection is based on the 
significance of the coefficient on the predicted value variables. This test does not always guarantee 
that one model will be preferred to the other (Maddala 1992: 515). 
The Wu- Hausman test statistic for the joint exogeneity of the non -labour income and effective 
wage rates in Model C was 24.22. This is less than the critical value of X2 with 21 degrees of freedom 
at the 5% and 10% significance levels. The test statistics for exogeneity tests of the non- labour 
income and the effective wage rates separately were also insignificant. 
29 The standard errors in Table 7.5 are based on OLS with Whites heteroskedasticity adjustments 
only. They do not account for 6 being a pre -estimated (as is done in Table 7.6). The two step error 
correction has little bearing on the model selection diagnostics such as the .1 tests because the 
adjustment in the standard error of specific parameters are very minor. Changes occur in the error for 
the real wage variable only. 
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respect to the female wage rate is insignificant in Model C while it is significantly 
negative in Model B. Table 7.6 also presents the elasticity values computed from a 
Model C specification that drops the female real wage variable from the male labour 
supply equation. This version of Model C restricts the cross -wage elasticity of male 
labour supply with respect to the female wage rate to be zero. 
Table 7.6 Estimated Wage and Income Elasticities of Male Labour Supply 
(standard errors below in italics) 
Model B 
Household: 
: common market wage and varying slope parameters 
Elasticity with respect to: 
own wage income female wage 
compensated 
own wage 
(hire out) Category 1 0.355 -0.078 -0.323 0.644 
0.095 0.013 0.0934 0.109 
(hire in) Category 2 0.675 -0.067 -0.438 0.671 
0.128 0.0219 0.1206 0.128 
Model C : varying effective wage; no wage slope dummies 
Category 1 0.228 -0.070 -0.064 # 0.488 
0.065 0.011 0.061 0.078 
Category 2 0.410 -0.061 -0.113 # 0.404 
0.116 0.203 0.101 0.116 
Model C : varying effective wage; no wage slope dummies; no cross -wage effect 
Category 1 0.181 -0.071 0.443 
0.057 0.011 0.074 
Category 2 0.326 -0.061 0.320 
0.102 0.021 0.102 
Note: Computed at mean of data excluding individuals in autarchic households 
# denotes not significantly different from zero. 
Category 1 cases are individuals in households which are net sellers of labour 
Category 2 cases are individuals in households which are net buyers of labour 
The results for these two alternative specifications of Model C are similar with a 
slightly higher own -wage effect for the specification that allows for a negative cross- 
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wage effect. 30 The own wage elasticities in Model B give slightly higher estimates 
than those based on either version of Model C. The estimates for the income 
elasticities are very similar in all model specification as well as for both categories 
of households. The computed income elasticity values are very low in all cases - 
less than 0.1 in absolute value. 
Table 7.6 shows significant differences in the computed elasticities at the mean of 
the data for male workers in Category 1 and 2 households. The higher positive 
valued uncompensated own -wage elasticities for Category 2 are consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that a backward bending labour supply curve (negative own 
wage elasticities) is possible only for net sellers of labour (Category 1).31 
The full results for Model C with and without the female wage variable are 
presented in Appendix Table 7A.3 with the 2 step estimator error correction to 
account for the fact that 0 is a pre- estimated parameter with some error. In addition 
to the expected signs on the wage and income variables, the effects of the other 
variables are also reasonable. Holding family size constant, a higher number of male 
workers in the family reduces the workdays of an individual worker; but there is no 
corresponding effect from the number of female workers in the family. Work -days 
increases with age but at a decreasing rate. The diagnostic statistics indicate that in 
spite of the inflexible responses inherent in a linear Iabour supply equation, the 
RESET test does not detect functional form mis- specification in Model C (nor B).32 
3o Standard errors of the elasticity values noted in Table 7.6 for Model C are based on the 2 step 
adjusted covariance matrix accounting for the fact that that O is a pre -estimated parameter. For the 
details of this procedure see Section 4.4 in Chapter IV. 
3( Strauss (1986:76) 
32 This result indicates that the source of the significant RESET test in Table 7.3 was the sample of 
individuals in autarchic households. Their labour supply behaviour is apparently not correctly 
captured by a linear specification, even when allowing for specific intercept and slope dummies with 
respect to the market wage rate and non -labour income variables. There is a strong possibility that 
individuals in autarchic households could be constrained on their off -farm labour supply behaviour. 
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In summary, the specification of a labour supply function for male family members 
that is consistent with the prior estimate of the higher efficiency of family labour in 
own farm production performs better than a model which assumes a common wage 
and constant parameters for all households. 
7.6 Labour Supply Regression Results: Female Family Members 
This section presents the results of the labour supply regression for female family 
members of the sample households. The estimation of the female labour supply 
regressions has an additional step to correct for the sample selection bias that may 
result from the large proportion of individual female family members who are 
reported to be economically inactive in the MPHBS employment data. 
Out of the 1688 female family members enumerated in the sample households, 
almost 30% (481) individuals are economically inactive, according to the definitions 
adopted in the MPHBS.33 This is a significant proportion. That sample selection 
bias may occur when the labour supply equations are estimated with the sample of 
only the economically active individuals is well known (Heckman 1979, 1980). To 
correct for this possibility, Heckman's two -step estimation procedure (Heckit) is 
used for the labour supply estimation for female family members. 
In the first step of the Heckit procedure, a probit model for labour force participation 
is estimated using the full sample of economically active and inactive female 
individuals. In the second step, the labour supply (work -days) equation is estimated 
for the sample of economically active women only, but with an added explanatory 
variable (the inverse Mill's ratio) which controls for the possible correlation of the 
error terms between the participation and labour supply equations.34 
" See Chapter V, Section 53(b) for the definitions for economically active persons adopted in the 
MPHBS data and for the categories of work identified. 
° The source of the sample selection bias is not due to the lack of randomness in the reduced sample 
of the economically active individuals only. Rather, the problem occurs due to the correlation 
between the error terms in the model that determines labour market participation and the model that 
determines the amount of labour supplied. If there is no correlation between these two error terms, 
the inverse Mill's ratio variable is insignificant, the estimates based on OLS are consistent (Heckman 
1979). 
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(a) probit labour force participation model 
The maximum likelihood probit estimate of the female labour -force participation 
equation is given in Table 7.7(a). The binary dependent variable is defined so that 
those who are economically active are coded as 1, therefore a positive coefficient 
means an increase in the probability of labour market participation. Since the 
estimated probit coefficients do not directly give the marginal effects of a change in 
the explanatory variables, these are computed separately in Table 7.7(a) at the mean 
of the data, together with the implied elasticities." 
A proper implementation of the Hecht procedure requires that some of the 
explanatory variables in the probit equation be unrelated to the variables in the 
labour work -days equation (Heckman 1980). While a completely independent set of 
instruments is not available, the variable definitions used to denote non -labour 
income in the probit equation are different. In addition, since the Heckit two -step 
method already includes a special procedure for adjustments in the variance - 
covariance matrix for the parameters of the labour supply equation in the second 
step, the labour force participation equation is modeled to be independent of the 0 
parameter estimated in the production function. The wage rate variable used in Table 
7.7(a) is the observed market wage. A dummy variable category for households that 
use hired labour is created. Similarly the non -labour income variable excludes farm 
profit so that an effective wage valuation of family labour need not be made at this 
step. A proxy for the imputed farm profit component of non -labour income is gross 
harvested area, with a dummy variable to control for households that are tenants. 
The returns to farm operation will be substantially less for tenant households than 
for owner -cultivators due to land rental payments. 
The probit regression results indicate that a higher market wage rate, a higher non- 
labour income and a larger farm size increase the probability of labour market 
participation. The squared term of area harvested in significantly negative, implying 
the effect of increasing farm size will eventually be negative. Age has a similar 
n The derivation of the marginal effects from the probit parameters follows Greene (1993:643 -46). 
Table 7.7(a) 
Data subset: 
Estimation method : 
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Female Labour Force Participation Equation 
Female all categories, including inactive persons (N=1688) 












Female real wage rate 0.1154 0.055 2.11 0.0360 0.1997 
Family size 0.0236 0.015 1.57 0.0074 0.0862 
Number Male workers 0.0410 0.038 1.07 0.0128 0.0355 
Number Female workers -0.1639 0.039 -4.22 -0.0512 -0.1734 
Age 0.1029 0.013 7.82 0.0321 1.3783 
Age Squared -0.0015 0.000 -8.47 -0.0005 -0.7412 
Non -labour Household income 
(excludes imputed farm profit) 
0.0022 0.001 2.35 0.0007 0.0481 
FARM AREA harvested 0.4081 0.223 1.83 0.0001 0.0667 
FARM AREA harvested squared -0.0004 0.000 -3.99 0.0000 -0.0582 
CONSTANT -0.7949 0.347 -2.29 -0.2481 -0.3273 
Dummy Variable Categories : 
Western Region 0.6405 0.080 7.96 0.1999 0.0552 
Far -western Region -0.7312 0.140 -5.23 -0.2282 -0.0452 
Household Head 0.2909 0.183 1.59 0.0908 0.0029 
Unmarried dummy 0.1651 0.203 0.81 0.0515 0.0042 
Labor hire in dummy -0.2377 0.363 -0.66 -0.0742 -0.0371 
Presence of children aged 0 -5 -0.1169 0.081 -1.44 -0.0365 -0.0389 
Presence of children aged 6 -9 0.0094 0.066 0.14 0.0029 0.0022 
Tenant Household 0.3572 0.114 3.14 0.1115 0.0155 
LOG- LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -1369.5 
LOG- LIKELIHOOD(0) _ -1727.9 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST = 716.806 WITH 29 D.F. 
MADDALA R- SQUARE 0.220 
CRAGG -UHLER R- SQUARE 0.315 
MCFADDEN R- SQUARE 0.207 
ADJUSTED FOR DEGREES OF FREED 0.199 
PREDICTION SUCCESS TABLE 
ACTUAL 
0 1 
0 199. 86. 
PREDICTED 1 282. 1121. 
ALL CASES 481 1207. 
NUMBER OF RIGHT PREDICTIONS = 1320 
PERCENTAGE OF RIGHT PREDICTIONS = 0.78 
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non -linear effect on labour market participation, with the age term being positive and 
the age squared term being negative. Other demographic variables also have 
plausible effects. The coefficients on family size and the number of male workers are 
positive, but not significant. A larger number of female workers in a household, 
however, reduces the probability of labour market participation for a particular 
individual. This implies unequal work sharing among female members in a 
household. The presence of children aged 0 -5 in a household reduces the probability 
of female labour market participation, but there is no statistically significant effect of 
the presence of children aged 6 to 9. The dummy variable for tenant households is 
significantly positive. The coefficient on the dummy for hiring in labour is negative 
but insignificant. Several of the regional dummies are significant. 
The model fit statistics indicate a reasonable fit for a binary dependant variable 
model. The Mcfadden R -sq. is 0.2. The prediction success table shows that while 
the overall percentage of right predictions is high (at 78 %), the bulk of the right 
predictions are for individuals who are economically active. Among the 481 
individuals who are not economically active, the number of right predictions is only 
about 41 %. Most of the prediction errors result from not being able to correctly 
predict non -participation for specific individuals. Nevertheless, given that most of 
the explanatory variables used in the probit regression are household level variables, 
while the data show differences in the labour force participation among female 
members of the same household, the probit model performs reasonably well. 
(b) labour supply (days worked) models 
The labour supply regressions for female workers are also done only for individuals 
in Category 1 and Category 2 households. Observations from the autarchic 
households are dropped from the final regression because the effective wage rate is 
not observed for such individuals. Using the market wage rate for individual female 
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workers in autarchic households leads to anomalous results, just as in the case of the 
labour supply regression for male household members 36 
Another adjustment made in the female labor supply regressions is to drop the cross - 
wage term - the male wage rate variable. With both wage rates included in the 
regressions, neither becomes significant in most specifications. Since in the final 
specification of Model C for male workers, the female cross wage term was 
insignificant, it is also theoretically consistent to drop the male wage rate from the 
female labour supply regressions.37 
The labour supply regression results for female family members are presented in 
summary form in Tables 7.7(b), (c) and (d) for model specifications B, C and D, 
respectively. Under each model specification there are two sets of parameter 
estimates: one based on OLS, ignoring the sample selection problem; the other is 
based on the second step of the Hecht procedure with the inverse Mill's ratio (IMR) 
as an additional variable. 
Model B equates the opportunity cost of family labour to the observed market wage 
rate for female Iabourers, but allows for intercept and slope dummies for individuals 
in Category 1 and 2 households. The standard errors of the coefficients reported for 
Model B are White's heteroskedasticity consistent errors for the OLS estimates, 
6 In the version of Model B in Table 7.4, estimated over the sample of all female workers from the 
three households categories with appropriate intercept and slope dummies, the estimated own -wage 
coefficient for the labour supply of individuals in autarchic households is 0.525, with a standard error 
of 0.686. This estimate is not significantly different from zero, while the coefficients for the other 
two categories are significantly positive. Also, the RESET test statistic value of 18.985 indicated 
substantial mu- specification in Model B for female workers from all three household categories (as 
was the case in Model B for male workers). 
7 The precise theoretical restriction that is consistent with utility maximization is that the 
compensated cross -wage effects for male and female labour supply should be symmetric. (See the 
derivation in Kawaguchi (1994) ). For this restriction to hold, it is not necessary that both of the 
uncompensated cross wage effects be zero, as is imposed by the specification above where the cross - 
wage variable is dropped from the labour supply equation for each gender. However, given that the 
income effects (the coefficients on the non -labour income variable) for both male and female 
individuals are approximately the same, the symmetry of the compensated wage effect depends 
crucially on the symmetry of the uncompensated effects. Hence, if one uncompensated cross -wage 
effect is zero, the other must also be close to zero in order to met the symmetry condition for the 
compensated cross -wage effect. 
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since heteroskedasticity is indicated in all model specifications. For the Hecht 
estimates of Model B, the reported standard errors are based on the standard 
adjustment required when the IMR is an additional variable because the IMR is also 
a generated regressor.38 The Heckit standard errors do not explicitly control for 
hetero- skedasticity. Models C and D, however, use the effective wage rate variable 
based on the w/B adjustment for Category 2 households. Hence, in Tables 7.7(c) and 
(d) an additional set of corrected standard errors is reported to account for the fact 
that B is an estimated parameter from the production function equation.39 
The parameter estimates of all specifications are very similar. The own -wage effect 
on female labour supply is significantly positive, and the non -labour income effect is 
significantly negative, as with the male labour supply results. The intercept dummy 
and the slope dummy for the non -labour income variable for Category 2 households 
is always significant.40 
In all specifications the IMR variable is insignificant. The estimated correlation 
between the error terms in the labour force participation equation and the labour 
days equation is around 0.3. The Heckit model is still meaningful even though the 
coefficient on IMR is not significant. A likely reason for this insignificant 
coefficient is that the other regressors in the labour supply equation are similar to the 
regressors in the probit equation. This can lead to a high degree of multi -collinearity 
between the IMR variable and the other regressor in the labour supply equation, 
resulting in an insignificant coefficient for IMR. Because of this possibility the 
Heckit specification is preferred to the OLS. 
The procedure for deriving the Heckit corrected standard errors is given in the Shazam Manual 
(Shazam 1993:262 -65). 
39 In these adjustments to the standard errors, each particular effect is taken to be additive. Hence the 
errors reported under the hetcov +B Adj. columns for the OLS estimates in Table 7.7 are White's 
heteroskedasticity consistent errors (computed under the Hetcov option in Shazam) to which is added 
the positive definite matrix which results from the adjustment for the fact that A is pre -estimated. (See 
Eq. 4.14 in Chapter IV). Similarly the Heckit corrected errors and the B adjustment corrections are 
added together in the heckit +8 Adj. columns. 
The Wu- Hausman test for the exogeneity of the wage and income variables is not significant in the 
female workers sample either. 
Table 7.7(b) Female Labour Supply Regression: Model B 
Data subset: Categories 1& 2 (N = 1827) 
(excludes autarchic) 
common market wage 
intercept & slope dummies 
VARIABLE name ois 
coef 
hetcov 
se t ratio 
heckit 
coef se t ratio 
Female wage rate 
(hire out) Category 1 4.194 1.828 2.29 4.742 1.794 2.64 
( hire in) Category 2 8.061 1.670 4.83 8.016 1.670 4.80 
Non Labour Income ( x 100) 
Category 1 -2.289 0.511 -4.48 -2.280 0.469 -4.87 
Category 2 -0.318 0.219 -1.45 -0.324 0.219 -1.48 
FAMILY SIZE 2.810 1.123 2.50 2.825 1.162 2.43 
Number Male workers -7.265 1.385 -5.25 -7.035 1.505 
-4.67 
Number Female workers -3.877 1.468 -2.64 -4.254 1.573 -2.70 
No. of Children aged 0 -5 -3.463 1.247 -2.78 -3.547 1.313 -2.70 
AGE 1.316 0.393 3.35 1.680 0.546 3.08 
AGESQ -0.024 0.005 -4.58 
-0.030 0.008 -3.86 
EDUCYR -1.732 1.020 -1.70 -2.855 1.751 -1.63 
HOUSEHOLD HEAD DUMMY 13.891 4.748 2.93 14.844 4.602 3.23 
SEASON DUMMY -6.627 1.377 -4.81 -6.632 1.377 -4.82 
Inverse Mills Ratio 7.931 8.429 0.94 
INTERCEPT 
Category 1 45.0 10.4 4.33 35.7 14.3 2.50 
Category 2 35.4 9.3 3.81 25.9 11.5 2.25 
Adjusted R Square 0.300 0.300 




Breusch -Pagan HETEROSKESD. TEST 166.7 * Chi -Sq with 28 D.F. 168.58 * Chi -Sq with 29 D.F. 
RESET (2) TEST 2.90 F with 1, 1799 D.F. 2.67 F with 1, 1798 D.F. 
Model selection Diagnostics 
Akaike Final Prediction Error 895.4 895.9 
Schwartz Criteria 980.2 983.8 
Correlation between participation and labour supply equations (p) 0.271 
Table 7.7(c) Female Labour Supply Regression: Model C 
Data subset: Categories 1& 2 (N =1827) varying effective wage 
(excludes autarchic) no wage slope dummy 









se t ratio 
Female wage rate 5.120 1.200 1.274 4.02 5.374 1.257 1.370 3.92 
Non Labour Income (x 100) 
Category 1 -2.356 0.502 0.503 -4.69 -2.326 0.465 0.466 -4.99 
Category 2 -0.510 0.220 0.220 
-2.32 -0.516 
FAMILY SIZE 2.852 1.122 1.122 2.54 2.885 1.160 1.160 2.49 
Number Male workers -7.322 1.386 1.386 -5.28 
-7.067 1.497 1.499 -4.71 
Number Female workers -3.954 1.467 1.467 -2.70 -4.424 1.569 1.569 -2.82 
No. of Children aged 0 -5 -3.590 1.245 1.247 -2.88 
-3.695 1.311 1.313 -2.81 
AGE 1.333 0.393 0.393 3.39 1.764 0.528 0.529 3.33 
AGESQ -0.025 0.005 0.005 -4.63 -0.031 0.007 0.007 -4.15 
EDUCYR -1.700 1.014 1.015 -1.67 -3.037 1.700 1.708 -1.78 
HOUSEHOLD HEAD DUMMY 13.775 4.777 4.777 2.88 14.909 4.576 4.577 3.26 
SEASON DUMMY -6.628 1.377 1.377 -4.81 -6.635 1.377 1.377 -4.82 
Inverse Mills Ratio 9.586 8.046 8.087 1.19 
INTERCEPT 
Category 1 41.6 8.9 9.1 4.59 32.0 12.1 12.4 2.58 
Category 2 41.2 8.7 8.9 4.63 28.3 11.7 11.9 2.38 
Adjusted R Square 0.301 0.301 
Standard error of the estimate (SIGMA) 29.66 29.65 
Log Likelihood -8766.1 
-8765.4 
Breusch -Pagan HETEROSKESD. TEST 166.8 * Chi -Sq with 27 D.F. 168.7 * Chi -Sq with 28 D.F. 
RESET (2) TEST 3.66 F with 1, 1800 D.F. 3.26 F with 1, 1799 D.F. 
Model selection Diagnostics 
Akaike Final Prediction Error 893.7 894.0 
Schwartz Criteria 975.4 978.7 
Correlation between participation and labour supply equations (p) 0.325 
Table 7.7(d) Female Labour Supply Regression: Model D 
Data subset: Categories 1& 2 varying effective wage 





hetcov + 9 Adj. 
se t ratio 
heckfit 
coef 
heckit + B Adj. 
se se t ratio 
Female wage rate 
(hire out) Category 1 4.062 1.832 1.833 2.22 4.622 1.791 1.792 2.58 
( hire in) Category 2 5.889 1.251 1.557 3.78 5.853 1.497 1.722 3.40 
Non Labour Income ( x 100) 
Category 1 -2.306 0.510 0.510 -4.52 -2.296 0.468 0.468 -4.91 
Category 2 -0.507 0.219 0.223 -2.27 -0.513 0.253 0.253 -2.03 
FAMILY SIZE 2.890 1.123 1.123 2.57 2.905 1.161 1.161 2.50 
Number Male workers -7.380 1.386 1.386 -5.32 -7.145 1.503 1.503 -4.75 
Number Female workers -3.989 1.469 1.469 -2.72 -4.376 1.571 1.571 -2.79 
No. of Children aged 0 -5 -3.599 1.245 1.247 -2.89 -3.685 1.311 1.312 -2.81 
AGE 1.312 0.393 0.393 3.34 1.684 0.545 0.545 3.09 
AGESQ -0.024 0.005 0.005 -4.57 -0.030 0.008 0.008 -3.87 
EDUCYR -1.648 1.015 1.015 -1.62 -2.797 1.748 1.748 -1.60 
HOUSEHOLD HEAD DUMMY 13.731 4.759 4.759 2.89 14.706 4.589 4.589 3.20 
SEASON DUMMY -6.629 1.377 1.377 -4.81 -6.634 1.377 1 .377 -4.82 
Inverse Mills Ratio 8.121 8.421 8.422 0.96 
INTERCEPT 
Category 1 46.0 10.4 10.4 4.41 36.4 14.3 14.3 2.56 
Category 2 37.6 12.0 12.0 3.14 27.9 12.0 12.0 2.32 
Adjusted R Square 0.301 0.301 
Standard error of the estimate (SIGMA) 29.64 29.64 
Log Likelihood -8765.7 -8765.2 
Breusch -Pagan HETEROSKESD. TEST 167.8 * Chi -Sq with 28 D.F. 169.4 * Chi -Sq with 29 D.F. 
RESET (2) TEST 3.42 F with 1, 1799 D.F. 3.18 F with 1, 1798 D.F. 
Model selection Diagnostics 
Akaike Final Prediction Error 894.2 894.8 
Schwartz Criteria 979.0 982.5 
Correlation between participation and labour supply equations (p) 0.276 
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The tests for model selection below as well as the computed values of the various 
elasticities of female labour supply are based on the Heckit specification. Since the 
differences in the estimated parameters with and without the lMR variable are small, 
this choice of a preferred specification is not very consequential. 
In terms of model selection, as before, Models C and D are nested but B is an 
independent model with a different wage variable.' The additional own -wage slope 
dummy coefficient for Category 2 households in Model D is insignificant in both the 
OLS and Heckit estimates42. Therefore Model D reduces to Model C with a common 
wage coefficient for individual households in Categories 1 and 2, but with the 
effective wage rate being w/0 for individuals in Category 2 households. As before, 
the model selection choice is between B (with a common market wage rate and 
varying wage coefficients) and Model C (with an adjusted effective wage rate and 
common coefficients) with the implied difference in the non -labour income variable 
as well. 
In comparing Model C with Model B, the RESET test does not reject either 
specification. Model C has a higher adjusted R- square and a smaller residual 
variance than Model B that has one additional parameter. Because of this, Model C 
is preferred by the Akai prediction error and the Schwartz criteria (which are smaller 
for Model C). The non -nested J test also clearly shows that Model C is preferred to 
Model B, as indicated in Table 7.8. The full regression results for Model C for the 
female workers sample is given in Appendix Table 7A.4 
As in the ease of the regressions for the male workers, all estimated versions of Models B, C and D 
for the female workers also allow for an intercept dummy and slope dummy for the non -labour 
income variable for Category 2 households. Therefore, the basis for choosing among the alternative 
model specifications for the female regressions will also depend solely on the defmition of the 
effective wage rate variable and inclusion of the wage slope dummy variables. 
42 The estimated coefficient in Model D for the female wage rate slope dummy for Category 2 
households is 1.82 with an standard error of 2.1 in the OLS specification, and 1.23 with a standard 
error of 2.2 in the Heckit specification. The p- values associated with the t- statistic for the test on 
these coefficients being significantly different from zero are 0.34 and 0.54, respectively. Therefore, 
the null of a common wage coefficient for all individuals, but based on a model with effective wage 
rates, is not rejected by a wide margin 
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Table7.8 Female Labour Supply: Non -nested J tests between Model B and Model C 
Additional Estimated Stand. t Inference 
Variable Coefficient error stastistic 
Model B* predicted values 6.91 1.02 6.77 Reject Model B 
extended from Model C in favour of C 
Model C * predicted values -2.06 1.69 1.25 Do not reject C 
extended from Model B in favour of B 
* Based on the Hecht specification for both models, using unadjusted standard errors 
While Model C is the preferred specification, the resulting differences between the 
elasticities of labour supply between Models B and C are fairly minor (unlike the 
case for the male labour supply elasticities where there were some significant 
differences). The labour supply elasticities for female workers are given in Table 7.9 
using the coefficients of the Heckit specification.43 The relatively large difference 
observed in Model B for the two household categories on the uncompensated and 
compensated own -wage elasticities is reduced slightly with the effective wage 
specification in Model C. But in both specifications the difference in the elasticity 
for individuals in Category 1 and Category 2 households are statistically significant, 
even though both elasticities are derived from the same estimated parameter.44 The 
higher own wage elasticity of labour for Category 2 in comparison to Category 1 
households (which consist mainly of landless and small farm households) is the 
expected result (Rosenzweig 1980). 
The elasticities reported in Table 7.9 are conditional elasticities. They indicate only the effect on 
the labour supply of women who are already participating in the labour market. In the Heckit 
specification the effect of, for instance, a wage change has two dimensions: it increases the 
probability of participation among in- active women, and it increase the work -days of those who are 
already working (McDonald and Moffitt 1980). The first of these effects is ignored on the 
calculations of the elasticities in Table 7.9. 
44 The difference arises because the mean levels of the average days of work are quite different for 
individuals in Category 2 and Category 1 households. See Table 7.2. 
203 
In comparing Table 7.9 with the corresponding elasticities of male labour supply 
given in Table 7.6, the own -wage elasticities under the preferred Model C are higher 
for female workers than for males. Similarly the income elasticity of labour supply is 
also slightly higher for female workers. A higher wage and income elasticity for 
female labour supply compared to male workers is an expected result commonly 
found in both developed and developing country settings (Killingsworth and 
Heckman 1986, Bardhan 1979). 
Table 7.9 Estimated Wage and Income Elasticities of Female Labour Supply 
(standard errors below in italics) 
Model B: common market wage, varying slope parameters; no cross -wage effect 
Elasticity with respect to 
Household Category: own wage income 
compensated 
own wage 
(hire out) Category 1 0.280 -0.0823 0.402 
0.098 0.018 0.120 
(hire in) Category 2 0.665 -0.0773 0.662 
0.149 0.044 0.139 
Model C: varying effective wage; no wage slope dummies; no cross -wage effect 
Category 1 0.317 -0.0851 0.558 
0.075 0.018 0.141 
Category 2 0.594 -0.1064 0.431 
0.104 0.043 0.082 
Note:computed at the mean of the data excluding individuals in autarchic households. 
7.7 Summary 
The labour supply regression results in this Chapter represent the second step in the 
sequential estimation strategy of a farm household model that allows for labour 
heterogeneity. This step had two objectives. First, to generate a complete set of the 
labour supply elasticities to describe, in aggregates form, the preferences of the farm 
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households.' Second, to provide additional evidence for the labour heterogeneity 
results of Chapter VI by verifying whether the observed labour supply behaviour was 
theoretically consistent with the finding of a higher productivity of family labour. 
An effective labour composite nest of the linear form (Le = F + O H) implies a higher 
effective wage is applicable for family labour in own -farm work as a substitute for 
hired labour. The underlying farm household model becomes recursive since the wage 
gap is given by a constant (0), and the effective wage rate becomes exogenous to the 
household's production and labour supply decisions. A two step estimation strategy, 
however, is still required because some of the regressors in the labour supply equation 
are based on the 0 parameter estimated in the production function. 
An independent verification of the production function estimation result that O < 1 
can be made by comparing alternative labour supply model specifications. For both 
the male and female workers sample, the model allowing for labour heterogeneity 
(Model C) is always preferred to the model based on homogeneous labour (Model 
B) with a common market wage rate for all households. This result is verified 
through several diagnostic statistics on model specification, including the J test for 
non -nested models which gives a clear verdict in favour of Model C. 
In the specifications based on the effective wage rate, the wage slope dummy 
variable for labour hiring households is not significant (in Model D). This means the 
effective wage rates based on the 0 parameter estimated from the production 
function are correctly defined. If the true effective wage rates for family labour in 
households using hired labour were substantially different from w /0, the wage slope 
dummy variable in Model D would have been significant. This is additional 
evidence for the value of O estimated in the production function being consistent 
with the labour supply behaviour of farm household members. 
45 These labour supply estimates in effect represent the consumer equilibrium of the farm household 
expressed implicitly in a demand system with a composite consumption good and leisure. Hausman 
(1981) has derived the direct and indirect utility functions underlying a linear labour supply function. 
Stern (1986) also discusses the utility implications of a linear labour supply function. 
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Another implication of 9 < 1 is that households should not engage simultaneously in 
hiring in and hiring out of labour. This prediction is strongly supported. Only about 
3% of the sample household report simultaneous labour hiring and hiring out, even 
though the incidence of labour hiring in is not limited to big farmers. 
Another important finding is that the estimated values for the wage and income 
elasticities for labour supply differ between the specifications based on the effective 
wage variable and those based on the market wage rate. The differences are more 
striking for the elasticities of male labour supply. 
In addition to model selection tests, the overall regression results for the model based 
on effective wage rates are very reasonable. The estimated parameters indicate 
significantly positive own -wage effects and negative income effects; and female 
labour supply is more elastic than male Iabour supply with respect to both wage and 
income. There are also substantial differences in the wage and income elasticities of 
labour supply for individuals who are in households that are net buyers and net sellers 
of labour. These are in the theoretically predicted direction. The labour supply 
regression equations for autarchic households using the observed market wage rate do 
not give meaningful results, which is also a theoretically expected outcome. 
In conclusion, a simple linear labour supply model with adjusted wage rates provides 
a reasonable description of the labour supply behaviour of farm- household members 
in the tarai region of Nepal.46 The regression results for both male and female family 
members is consistent with the prior estimate of a higher efficiency of family labour 
in own farm production. These results provide independent corroboration for the 
labour heterogeneity indicated in the production function estimation. 
46 The linear labour supply equation specifications used in this Chapter are very simple. The prime 
interest was to find corroborating evidence for labour heterogeneity. Other interesting questions in 
the labour supply behavior of farm households - i.e., a more flexible response of labour supply to 
wage and income changes, intra- family labour allocation rules, female labour supply decisions being 
conditional on male labour supply, allowing for individuals to be constrained in their off -farm work- 
days, household fixed effects, etc. - were not addressed. These issues and other more elaborate 
analytical structures and estimation procedures for modeling the labour supply behaviour of farm 
households, together with Iabour heterogeneity, would be a fruitful area for further research. 
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APPENDIX 7.1 
Complete Labour Supply Regression Results for Selected Model Specifications 
This appendix presents the full set of parameter estimates and diagnostic statistics 
for some selected model specifications for which only summary regression results 
were presented in the main body of Chapter VII. 
This appendix contains four tables that are as follows: 
Appendix Table 7A. I gives the definition of the variable names used in the 
complete regression results. 
Appendix Table 7A.2 presents the full results for Model B2 of Table 7.3 in 
the main text of Chapter VII. This Model B2 is estimated for the sample of 
male workers from all three household categories - labour selling, labour 
hiring and autarchic, using the observed market wage rates for hired labour to 
represent the opportunity cost of family labour for all individuals. 
Appendix Table 7A.3 presents the complete results for Model C of Table 7.4 
in the main text of Chapter VII. This Model C is estimated for the sample of 
male workers from only the labour selling and labour hiring households, 
using the effective wage rates based on 6. Two versions of Model C are 
estimated, with and without the female cross -wage variable. 
Appendix Table 7A.4 presents the complete results for Model C estimated 
for the sample of female family workers from the labour selling and labour 
hiring households, using the effective wage rates based on B. This table is 




VARIABLE DEFINITIONS for Appendix Regression Tables 
AGE age of individual 
AGES() age squared 
CONS CONSTANT 
DISDM21 dummy variable for western region districts 
DISDM23 dummy variable for far western region districts 
DMRLHH3 dummy for own children of houeshold head 
DMRLHH4 dummy for parents of household head 
DMRLHH6 dummy for siblings of household head 
DMRLHHI dummy for household head 
EDUCYR 
ETHOHDM dummy for low caste status of Hill region origin 
ETHTLDM dummy for low caste status of Terai region origin 
FMNOFLF2 number of economically active female adults aged 15 -59 
FMNOMLF2 number of economically active male adults aged 15 -59 
FMSIZE 
HHAUTDM same as LS3 
IMR inverse Mill's ratio variable 
LHIUSEDM same as LS2 
LS2 dummy variable for Category 2 households (net buyers of labour) 
LS2XPFNT LS2 interacted with PFNLTR42 
LS2xPFNY LS2 interacted with PFNLYR42 
LS2xRWGM LS2 interacted with RLWGRTM2 
LS3 dummy variable for Category 3 households (autarchic) 
LS3xPFNY L:S3 interacted with PFNLYR42 
LS3xRWGM LS3 interacted with RLWGRTM2 
LSI dummy variable for Category I households (net sellers of labour) 
N0005 numer of children aged 0 to 5 in household 
NOC69 numer of children aged 6 to 9 in household 
PFNLYR42 real per capita household non labour income, including net farm profit 
computed by deducting value of own family labour at market wage rates 
PFNLTR42 real per capita household non labour income, including net farm profit 
computed by deducting value of own family labour at effective wage rates 
given by RLWGF2TH and RLWGM2TH 
PHASEDM dummy for seasonal phase of survey data (2 phases) 
RLWGF2TH = RLWGRTF2 for LS I category housheolds 
(RLWGRTF2 /0 ) for LS2 category housheolds 
RLWGM2TH = RLWGRTM2 for LS I category housheolds 
_ (RLWGRTM2 /0 ) for LS2 category housheolds 
RLWGRTF2 Daily wage rate for female hired labour, deflated by price of paddy 
RLWGRTM2 Daily wage rate for male hired labour, deflated by price of paddy 
UNMARRDM dummy for unmarried person 
Dependent = total labour days of work on own farm or in hired labour market reported 
variable on a monthly basis for each of two seasonal cropping cycles 
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Appendix Table 7A.2 
Labour supply Regressions 
Data subset: Males All categories (LS1, IS2, LS3) 
Model 82 common market wage, varying slopes and intercepts 
Estimation method: OLS with White's heteroskedasticity consistent errors 
VAI-0AtILE 
NAME 
ES I IMA l ED 
COEFFICIENT 
S I ANUARD 
ERROR 
I -HA TIO 
2517 DF P -VALUE 
RLWGR I M2 5.301 1.965 3.21 0.001 
RLWGRTF2 -4.529 1.910 -2.37 0.018 
FMSIZE 1.31 0.328 4.00 0.000 
PFNLYR42 (x100) -3.307 0.481 -6.88 0.000 
FMNOMLF2 -9.782 0.949 -10.31 0.000 
FMNOFLF2 0.488 0.921 0.53 0.597 
AGE 1.052 0.375 2.81 0.005 
AGESQ -0.021 0.005 -4.53 0.000 
DISDM21 9.00 1.698 5.30 0.000 
DISDM23 -29.55 3.233 -9.14 0.000 
PHASEDM -4.16 1.271 -3.27 0.001 
DMRLHHI 4.06 4.030 1.01 0.314 
DMRLHH3 1.70 3.523 0.48 0.630 
DMRLHH4 4.50 6.455 0.70 0.486 
DMRLHH6 -3.064 3.935 -0.78 0.436 
EDUCYR -0.36 0.455 -0.79 0.428 
UNMARRDM -11.7 2.859 -4.08 0.000 
ETHOHDM 4.47 2.483 1.80 0.072 
ETHTLDM 4.87 1.949 2.50 0.012 
Own wage slope dummies 
categ 2 LS2xRWGM 3.568 1.839 1.94 0.052 
categ 3 LS3xRWGM -5.702 1.651 -3.46 0.001 
Income slope dummies (x100) 
categ 2 LS2xPFNY 2.938 0.5 5.88 0.000 
categ 3 LS3xPFNY 3.746 0.65 5.77 0.000 
CONS 110.5 9.561 11.56 0.000 
Intercept dummies 
categ. 2 LHIUSEDM -50.6 7.986 -6.34 0.000 
categ. 3 HHAUTD -22.9 8.206 -2.80 0.005 
R- SQUARE = 0.4109 R- SQUARE ADJUS I ED 0.4051 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE -SIGMA 32.216 
GOODNESS OF FIT TEST FOR NORMALITY OF RESIDUALS - 60 GROUPS 
CHI -SQUARE = 40.3648 WITH 32 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
HETEROSKEDASTICITY TESTS 
E * *2 ON YHAT: CHI -SQUARE 4.360 WITH I D.F. 
E * *2 ON X (B -P -G) TEST: CHI -SQUARE = 148.808 WITH 25 D.F. 
RAMSEY RESET SPECIFICATION TESTS USING POWERS OF YHAT 
RESET(2)= 6.1795 -F WITH DF1= 1 AND DF2 =2517 
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Appendix Table 7A.3 
Labour Supply Regressions 
Data subset: Males, Categories 1& 2 (excludes autarchic) (N = 2053) 
Model C varying effective wage, no wage slope dummies 
Estimation method OLS with White's heteroskedasticity consistent errors 
and the 2 step error correction for estimated 0 
Version 1 
with female wage 
2 











RLWGF2TH -1.691 1.604 -1.05 -- -- -- - 
FMSIZE 1.044 0.378 2.76 1.066 0.462 2.31 0.021 
PFNLTR42 x 100 -3.125 0.496 -6.30 -3.143 0.497 -6.32 0.000 
FMNOMLF2 -9.433 1.099 -8.58 -9.476 1.136 -8.34 0.000 
FMNOFLF2 1.899 1.014 1.87 1.870 1.037 1.80 0.072 
AGE 1.399 0.421 3.33 1.391 0.421 3.31 0.001 
AGESQ -0.023 0.005 -4.59 -0.023 0.005 -4.57 0.000 
DISDM21 8.325 1.792 4.65 8.029 1.894 4.24 0.000 
DISDM23 -25.426 4.086 -6.22 -24.849 4.192 -5.93 0.000 
PHASEDM -4.334 1.393 -3.11 -4.335 1.394 -3.11 0.002 
DMRLHH1 4.033 4.463 0.90 4.370 4.448 0.98 0.326 
DMRLHH3 1.274 4.120 0.31 1.530 4.122 0.37 0.711 
DMRLHH4 9.086 7.072 1.29 9.270 7.097 1.31 0.192 
DMRLHH6 -4.774 4.526 -1.06 -4.274 4.491 -0.95 0.341 
EDUCYR 0.065 0.500 0.13 0.079 0.502 0.16 0.875 
UNMARRDM -7.332 3.337 -2.20 -7.264 3.350 -2.17 0.030 
ETHOHDM 3.065 3.119 0.98 3.104 3.118 1.00 0.320 
ETHTLDM 4.425 2.110 2.10 4.351 2.143 2.03 0.042 
Catgory 2 Income slope dummy 
LS2XPFNT x 100 2.676 0.511 5.24 2.696 0.514 5.25 0.000 
CONS 94.1 9.810 9.59 92.400 10.630 8.69 0.000 
Category 2 Intercept dummy 
LHIUSEDM -47.0 5.310 -8.85 -47.300 8.155 -5.80 0.000 
Adjusted R Square 0.39 0.39 
Standard error of the estimate (Sigma) 31.53 31.53 
Breusch -Pagan Heterosked.Test 44.03 reject null 
(x2with Df = 22) 
RESET (2) Test (F with Df =1 & 2031 2.03 
35.03 reject null 
(x2with Df = 21) 
F (1, 203 2.50 
Model selection Diagnostics 
Akaike Final Prediction Error 1005.7 1005.2 
See Appendix Table 7A.1 for the variable definitions. 
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Appendix Table 7A.4 
Labour supply Regressions 
Data subset: Female, Categories 1 and 2 (N = 1827) 
Model C varying effective wage, common own -wage slope 
Estimation method : Heckit 
Heckit 




Heckit + 0 Adj 
Standard T -Ratio 
Error 1798 Df 
RLWGF2TH 5.3737 1.2570 4.28 1.3700 3.92 
FMSIZE 2.8845 1.1600 2.49 1.1600 2.49 
PFNLTR42 (x 100) -2.3258 0.4650 -5.00 0.4658 -4.99 
FMNOMLF2 -7.0669 1.4970 -4.72 1.4990 -4.71 
FMNOFLF2 -4.4239 1.5690 -2.82 1.5690 -2.82 
AGE 1.7643 0.5275 3.35 0.5292 3.33 
AGESQ -0.0308 0.0074 -4.17 0.0074 -4.15 
DISDM21 15.1070 2.6550 5.69 2.6600 5.68 
DISDM23 -43.1060 4.1660 -10.35 4.1950 -10.27 
PHASEDM -6.6350 1.3770 -4.82 1.3770 -4.82 
DMRLHHI 14.9090 4.5760 3.26 4.5770 3.26 
DMRLHH3 8.6481 4.9620 1.74 4.9640 1.74 
DMRLHH4 6.9594 3.9040 1.78 3.9050 1.78 
DMRLHH6 21.0860 7.I280 2.96 7.1430 2.95 
EDUCYR -3.0366 1.7000 -1.79 1.7080 -1.78 
UNMARRDM -3.2926 4.9530 -0.66 4.9560 -0.66 
LS2XPFNT ( x 100) 0.0181 0.0052 3.49 0.0052 3.48 
ETHOHDM 7.6905 3.2150 2.39 3.2150 2.39 
ETHTLDM 3.4114 2.5610 1.33 2.5640 1.33 
N0005 -3.6948 1.3110 -2.82 1.3130 -2.82 
NOC69 0.0376 1.2930 0.03 1.2930 0.03 
ETHTHDM -0.0365 2.4620 -0.01 2.4730 -0.01 
ETHRUDM 16.6350 3.4730 4.79 3.4730 4.79 
ETHUNDM 
-2.7452 2.6810 -1.02 2.6820 -1.02 
LHIUSEDM 
-17.9 6.6910 -2.68 6.7820 -2.64 
1MR 0.0959 0.0805 1.19 0.0809 1.19 
CONS 46.4 12.110 3.83 12.420 3.74 
Adjusted R Square 0.3013 
Standard error of the estimate (SIGMA) 29.65 
Log Likelihood 
-8765.4 
Breusch -Pagan HETEROSKESD. TEST (Ch.Sq. with Df =28) 166.8 
RESET (2) TEST (F with D 1, 1798) 3.56 
Model selection Diagnostics 
Akaike Final Prediction Error 894.0 
Schwartz Criteria 978.7 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 The Research Question and Motivation 
The main research question addressed in this thesis is whether it is important to 
distinguish between family and hired labour as production inputs in the traditional 
peasant agricultural production systems of the southern plain (tarai) region of Nepal. 
The prime motivation behind this question is to test the validity of the conventional 
specification of the farm household model that treats family and hired labour as 
homogeneous inputs, allowing the production and consumption decisions of farm 
households to be modeled recursively. Another motivation is to explain the variation 
in labour input across farm size so commonly observed in traditional agriculture. 
Farm household models that reflect the integrated complex behavioral responses of 
a joint producer and consumer agent are an important analytical tool for policy 
makers in developing countries. A recursive farm household model, in which 
production and consumption/labour supply decisions need not be modeled jointly, 
offers considerable empirical estimation advantages. Econometric estimation of non- 
recursive models is analytically cumbersome and the behavioural parameters of 
interest often involve non- linearities in the estimating equation even if the 
underlying model is linear in both the production and labour supply components.' 
Hence, the recursive feature has great practical advantages and increases the 
popularity of farm household models for policy applications. Nevertheless, it is 
important to test that the empirical basis for the recursive structure is indeed well 
founded in a wide range of country settings. While there are several other grounds 
under which the separable property of farm household models breaks down, the 
main concern is the completeness of rural labour markets and competitive wage 
determination, and whether hired and family labour inputs are homogeneous inputs 
in farm production. 
' This potential problem has been highlighted by Jacoby (1993: 908 footnote 5). 
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When family and hired labour must be treated as heterogeneous inputs the recursive 
structure of production and consumption choices usually breaks down. There will be 
a separate supply and demand equilibrium for family labour in which the household 
is no longer a price taker. The labour supply of the household is affected by its 
production decisions, and similarly its factor demands are affected by the 
household's consumption/leisure preferences.2 
8.2 Methodology 
The estimation methodology follows a two step procedure. In the first step an 
aggregate farm production function is estimated through which the heterogeneity of 
family and hired labour is tested. Several alternative specifications that allow for 
imperfect substitution between family and hired labour and varying marginal 
products are estimated. Heterogeneity tests of the two types of labour are carried out 
through standard tests of statistical significance of the parametric restrictions that 
lead to a model with homogeneous labour inputs. The estimated parameters of the 
preferred production function are also be used to derive the relevant factor demand 
elasticities that define the production side of the behavioural response of the farm 
household. 
In the second step, a structural labour supply model is specified that is consistent 
with the type of labour heterogeneity detected in the production function estimation. 
This typically means the variables used in the labour supply regressions will be 
derived from parameters estimated in the production function. The main variable of 
interest derived through this process is the appropriate "shadow" wage rate that 
reflects the true cost of family labour at the equilibrium labour supply position of 
different types of households. A key question is how this shadow wage rate is 
related to the observed market wage rates for family and hired labour. The answer 
usually varies for different households based depending on whether they are net 
2 As noted in Chapter III, an intuitive way to understand the recursive property is that it necessarily 
holds as long as there are markets for all commodities and inputs, and the household is a price taker 
in all these markets, and the household owned or produced inputs and commodities are perfect 
substitutes for the market purchased versions. 
213 
buyers or sellers on the hired labour market. The labour supply equations are then 
estimated with these appropriate shadow or effective wage rates and the other 
variables that may also depend on the computed effective wage rates. The parameter 
estimates from these labour supply regressions together with the correctly specified 
variables then describe the labour supply behaviour of the sample household in a 
manner consistent with utility maximization and with the specific type of labour 
heterogeneity modeled in the production function. 
The income and wage elasticities derived from the labour supply regression 
functions complete the set of parameters of the farm household model. Accurate 
estimates of the parameters of the labour supply function are of interest in 
themselves. However, these labour supply regressions can also be used to verify 
whether the labour supply model specification, based on the assumption of labour 
heterogeneity is superior to the conventional specification, based on the assumption 
of homogeneous labour. In the latter specification the observed market wage rate for 
hired labour would be an appropriate measure also of the opportunity cost of family 
labour. Hence, the comparative statistical performance of alternative labour supply 
model specifications that allow for a common wage (consistent with family and 
hired labour being homogeneous inputs) and varying effective wages (consistent 
with labour heterogeneity), can independently corroborate the result that family and 
hired labour are not homogeneous inputs in farm production. 
The two -step estimation procedure adopted in this thesis is based on the strategy 
proposed by Jacoby (1993) where he implements this method for estimating a fully 
non -recursive farm household model in which family and hired labour are treated as 
completely separate inputs. The same sequential approach can be used to estimate a 
farm household model structure by estimating, in the first step, a farm production 
function in which is embedded a test for the heterogeneity of family and hired 
labour. Then in the second step the labour supply function is specified and estimated 
in a theoretically consistent manner, if heterogeneity is indicated. 
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Herein lies the methodological novelty of this thesis. On the one hand, while the 
conventional approach to estimating farm production functions is simply to 
aggregate family and hired labour into a homogeneous total labour input, there are 
many exceptions which estimate production functions by treating family and hired 
labour as completely separate inputs, implying but not formally testing the extent to 
which they are imperfect substitutes. On the other hand, in labour supply estimations 
the conventional approach has been to assume that the observed market wage rate is 
the appropriate opportunity cost of labour for all individuals. But a relatively small 
number of studies have used alternative derivations of a "shadow" wage rate variable 
to model the on -farm component of the labour supply behavior of farm household 
members. The two parts of these exceptional treatments have not been combined 
directly in a theoretically consistent manner - i.e., to relate the shadow wage rates of 
family labour to the observed market wage rates for hired labour based on the extent 
of the efficiency differences between hired and family Iabour detected in the 
production function estimates. That was the task carried out in this study. 
8.3 Data Source 
The data utilized for the empirical component of this thesis come from a large 
nationally representative household budget survey conducted by Nepal Rastra Bank. 
The data collected in this survey has been recognized to be of a very high quality 
and comprehensive in its treatment of farm income, inputs and outputs (World Bank 
1992). The actual household sample used in this study is a subset of the national 
survey data limited to about 1,000 rural households (of which about 700 have 
operational land holdings) from the southern plain (tarai) region of Nepal. 
In the tarai region there is a greater inequality of land ownership and higher 
incidence of hired Iabour use than in the farms of the northern hill and mountainous 
regions of Nepal. The primarily subsistence farm households in the northern regions 
engage in a whole range of other ancillary activities apart from on -farm crop 
production. It is difficult to correctly specify the inputs and outputs for these other 
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activities. As a result, the question of heterogeneity between family and hired labour 
in Nepalese agriculture is better addressed in the context of the tarai region. 
The production function estimates are based on the aggregate annual crop output for 
the land- operating households. The labour supply regression are based on the 
seasonal work days reported by all economically active adults aged 15 -64 in the full 
sample of households (including the landless) whose main occupation was reported 
as an agricultural worker or own -farm operator. This led to about 2500 individual - 
season labour supply records for the male family workers and 1830 person- season- 
records for the female workers in the final labour supply regressions. 
8.4 Summary of Analytical Results 
There are three separate requirements that must be fulfilled for two production 
inputs, X, and X2, if they are to be homogeneous: 
(a) X, and X2 be separable3 from other inputs in the production function 
(b) the elasticity of substitution between X, and XZ is very large 
(c) the ratio of the marginal products of X, and X2 is equal to one (at all 
levels of applications of X, and X2). In other words, a one unit increase in the 
application of X, has the same effect on output, ceterus paribus, as a one unit 
increase in XZ has. 
The estimation results with respect to family and hired labour reported in this thesis 
do not reject conditions a and b; but c is clearly rejected. 
The tests for the heterogeneity between family and hired labour were carried out in 
Chapter VI, using a translog production function specification. Two different sets of 
estimations were carried out. The first set was restricted to a sub -set of the sample 
3 For a production process utilizing n inputs, separability of inputs X, and X, from the other inputs 
implies that the marginal rates of substitution between X, and X, are independent of the levels of the 
other n -2 factors. This implies that the ratio of the marginal products of X, and X, is invariant to the 
level of the other inputs. This notion of "separability" is, of course, a completely different concept 
than the "separability" or recursive property of farm household models. 
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households that reported the use of both family and hired labour in crop production. 
For this sample sub -set the translog production function was estimated with family 
and hired labour as two distinct inputs in addition to three other inputs (land, bullock 
power, and material inputs) which were interacted with the two labour inputs :4 
The results from the first set of estimations clearly indicated that family and hired 
labour inputs were weakly separable from the three other inputs. Stronger forms of 
separability, including the Cobb -Douglas restriction of the translog production 
function, were rejected. The weak separability result means that a unit change in the 
application of the latter three inputs leaves unchanged the ratio of the marginal 
products of family and hired labour. Another key finding was that the estimated 
value of the marginal product of family labour was statistically higher than the 
marginal product of hired labour, computed at the geometric mean of the data; and 
the marginal product of hired labour was close to the observed market wage rates. 
The weak separability of the labour inputs in the production function implies that the 
two types of labour can be consistently aggregated into a composite labour input. In 
the second set of estimations, several alternative functional forms for the composite 
labour aggregator function were specified, and the translog function with a nested 
aggregate labour input was estimated utilizing the entire sample of land cultivating 
households, including those that did not use any hired labour inputs. 
The empirical results showed that the preferred labour input aggregator function 
was a linear composite given by Le = F + 0 H, where Le is effective or composite 
labour, F is family labour days and H is hired labour days. The estimated value of 0 
was 0.75, and it was shown to be significantly less than one. This preferred form 
implies that, although family and hired labour are perfect substitutes in farm 
production, they are not equally productive. When both are measured conventionally 
in time units, the application of an extra unit of family labour has a Iarger effect on 
4 Each of the family and hired labour input sub -totals is an aggregation of male and female labour 
within in each category. This aggregation is done using the ratio of the reported village -level female 
wage rate to the male wage rate for hired labour to convert female labour days into equivalent male 
labour days. The mean value of this ratio was 0.85 in the sample data. 
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output than an extra unit of hired labour. When hired and family labour are measured 
in effective units, one unit of hired labour substitutes for 0.75 units of family labour. 
The higher productivity of family labour inputs can be readily justified on the 
grounds that the effort applied per unit of time is likely to be lower for hired than for 
family labour when supervision of hired labour is costly (Feder 1985). Another 
reason could be that family labour acquires some farm -specific experience, which 
leads to higher labour productivity (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985). However, the 
estimation work of this study, was not designed to discriminate between alternative 
explanations for the Iower productivity of hired labour. The detailed information 
required to do so was not available in the survey data used. 
A key implication of the Le = F + 0 'H labour aggregator function is that the 
difference in productivity between hired and family labour is constant and 
unaffected by the levels of other inputs. The analytical structure of the farm 
household model with heterogeneous labour inputs derived in Chapter III showed 
that under such conditions the farm household model is still recursive. The only 
difference with the conventional model with homogeneous wages is that the 
effective wage rates for family labour will differ according to the labour market 
exposure of the household in the hired labour market. 
For a landless or a small farm household which at the margin supplies labour on the 
hired labour market, the effective wage rate which determines its total labour supply 
equilibrium will be the observed market wage rate, w, for hired labour. For big farm 
households that are net buyers of hired labour, the effective wage rate they face for 
the supply of their own family labour is w /B, since at the margin one unit of family 
labour can substitute for 1/0 units of hired labour. 
The result that 0 is less than one in the production function estimation implies it 
would be irrational for the sample households simultaneously to hire in and hire out 
labour. This would be inconsistent with the higher productivity of family Iabour. 
There would be efficiency gains from transferring the hired -out labour into own 
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farm cultivation, substituting for the hired -in labour. This prediction is borne out by 
the sample data. Only about 3% of the approximately 700 land- operating 
households report hiring in labour as well as some member of the household 
working on the hired labour market. Given that the survey data refers to the entire 
annual cropping cycle, and given the very time specific nature of agricultural 
operations and the strict gender -related division of labour, this is a striking result 
which is consistent with the efficiency difference between family and hired labour. 
The estimation results for the labour supply component of the farm household 
model, reflecting the 0 efficiency difference between family and hired labour, was 
presented in Chapter VII. The labour supply variable includes all reported workdays 
on own farm cultivation as well as hired labour market work over each of two 
seasonal survey rounds. The labour supply regression equations were estimated 
separately for individual male and female family members without imposing any 
cross restrictions. A probit sample selection correction was made for the labour 
supply regression equation for female workers to take account of the large 
proportion of women who report to be economically inactive. 
The labour supply regression results with the O adjusted effective wage rates (Model 
C) are very reasonable for both the male and female regressions. The own wage 
elasticities of labour supply are positive (0.2 to 0.4 for male workers, and 0.3 to 0.6 
for female workers) and within the range of estimates obtained by others for farm 
households in developing countries. Labour supply decreases with the level of non- 
labour income (implying leisure is a normal good); but these elasticities are rather 
small ( -0.07 to -0.1), which is again consistent with previous studies. The differences 
in the estimated elasticities between the two genders and between small (labour 
hiring -out) and big farm (labour hiring -in households) are also as expected. The 
absolute values of the wage and income elasticities for female workers are higher 
than for males. The uncompensated own wage elasticities are higher for big farmers 
who hire in tabour than for small farmers and landless labourers. The effects of 
other variables on labour supply are also as expected. Work days increase with age 
but at a decreasing rate. The number of young children reduces female workdays 
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but has no effect on male labour supply. Family size and ethnic /caste group dummy 
variables are also significant. 
Regarding tests of model selection, there are only slight differences in the overall fit 
of the various labour supply models specifications and in the values of the estimated 
parameters. But the varying effective wage model is clearly preferred over the 
common wage version on the basis of standard model selection diagnostics (J tests 
for non -nested models and the Akaike Information Criteria). This result holds for 
both the male and female labour supply regressions. These model selection findings 
offer an independent corroboration of the efficiency differences between family and 
hired labour inputs in the farm production process. The evidence that the labour 
supply behaviour conforms to the production function estimation results supports the 
conclusion that there is a genuine efficiency difference between family and hired 
labour. The labour supply results reduce the likelihood that the estimate of O < 1 in 
the production function is caused by other unobserved factors not taken into account 
in the production function estimations. 
8.5 Some Implications 
Apart from the methodological issue of the appropriate specification of a farm 
household model that allows for heterogeneity between family and hired labour, 
there are several other important implications of the finding that a substantial 
efficiency difference exists between family and hired labour as production inputs in 
the tarai region of Nepal. 
An immediate implication is with regard to the measurement of farm level 
efficiency. One of the celebrated "stylized facts" about agricultural production in 
developing countries is that small farms are cultivated more intensively (i.e. with 
higher levels of variable inputs used per hectare) than bigger farms. This often leads 
to an observed inverse relationship between farm size and productivity in terms of 
output per hectare. The relatively greater application of inputs on smaller farms is 
most pronounced in the case of labour. Per hectare labour input on small farms is 
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consistently higher than on bigger farms over a large range of farm sizes; and this 
result holds whether or not average yields on small farms are higher (Berry and 
Cline 1979). The usual explanation for the higher labour input on smaller farms has 
been labour market imperfections which lead small farms to apply too much family 
labour to their own farms, relative to the prevailing market wages at which big farms 
hire in labour (Sen 1975, Carter 1992). Such "dualism" in traditional agriculture can 
occur if, for instance, wage rates are not bid down competitively to clear the hired 
labour market so that small farm family members are constrained in the amount of 
off -farm work they can find. The labour allocation equilibrium on the small farm is 
then given by the equality of the marginal product of labour with the real 
opportunity cost of on -farm work, at a level below the observed market wage rate. 
This type of market failure explains the higher labour intensity on small farms since 
their real cost of labour is lower than the market wage rate for hired labour 
applicable on the big farms.5 
The efficiency difference between family and hired labour provides an alternative 
explanation for the relatively lower per hectare input of labour on the bigger farms, 
without relying on labour or other factor market failures. The efficiency difference 
means that the effective wage rate faced by big farmers who hire in labour is larger 
than the wage rates faced by small farmers who also work on the off -farm wage 
market. The small farmer equates the returns from farm cultivation to the market 
wage rate (w) at which he is able to work on the off -farm labour market. The big 
farmer faces a higher effective wage rate (w /B) than the small farmer does in terms 
of equivalent units of labour because of the lower productivity of hired labour. 
Although family labour is applied more intensively to substitute for the less efficient 
hired labour, there is a rising utility cost to increased family labour application. 
Consequently, total per hectare labour input, measured in conventional units, is 
higher on small farms cultivated solely by family members than on big farms that 
rely on hired labour, even when wage rates are competitively determined and the 
hired labor market clears. 
5 This is sometimes referred to as a greater "self- exploitation" of peasant labour on small family 
farms (Sen 1975). 
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It is important to distinguish between the factor market imperfection and the effort 
related efficiency difference explanations because they imply different opportunity 
costs of labour in agriculture. For instance, under the factor market imperfection 
hypothesis, if a member of a small farm household migrates to an urban area, the 
farm output loss will be minimal. The marginal product of family labour on the 
small farm is hypothesized to be less than the rural market wage rate. Also, given the 
presumed factor market imperfections, other family members who are constrained 
on the off -farm labour market can possibly supply extra labour to make up for the 
migrating member. Under the efficiency difference hypothesis, marginal products 
and the real cost of leisure foregone are equated to the effective wage rates on both 
small and big farms, with the proviso that the effective wage rate is higher by the 1/6 
factor on the big farms. So the withdrawal of family labour from either the big or 
small farm will involve a higher opportunity cost.6 
Theoretically, both factor market imperfections and efficiency differences could 
exist simultaneously. One does not rule out the other. The main focus of this thesis 
was not to discriminate between alternative explanations for dualism in traditional 
agriculture. Nevertheless, the estimation results of this study which clearly indicate 
labour heterogeneity, also provide strong evidence against the factor market 
imperfection hypothesis. Based on the estimated production function parameters in 
Chapter VI, the marginal product of family labour on small farms is approximately 
equal to the market wage rate. The labour supply regression results in Chapter VII 
showed the market wage accurately reflects the opportunity cost of family labour in 
small farms (Category 1 households, which also includes the landless). There is no 
direct evidence that shortage of work at the going off -farm wage forces members of 
small farm households to devote all their labour supply to the family farm. 
6 Unless, of course, the household's equilibrium labour allocation with heterogeneous labour also 
satisfies the "surplus labour" equilibrium in the sense defined by Sen (1966), with a flat schedule for 
the real cost of family labour. (The real cost of labour measures the marginal rate of indifferent 
substitution between consumption and leisure as represented by the VV curve in Figure 4.1B). In an 
initial equilibrium on a flat section of the real cost of labour schedule, the withdrawal of some family 
members from the agricultural labour force induces other family members to work longer hours, 
since there is no increasing cost to higher labour supply. Surplus labour exists in the sense that some 
workers can be transferred out of the farm sector without reducing labour input and farm output. 
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Another important implication of the labour heterogeneity finding - and one which 
has very significant policy relevance- is that aggregate outcomes in the agricultural 
sector, for instance, total production, total labour absorption, and equilibrium rural 
wage rates, would be sensitive to changes in the distribution of individual household 
endowments of land and labour. For instance, if family labour is more productive 
because it applies more effort per unit time than hired labour, then, a re- distributive 
land reform program which transferred land to small family- labour -operated farms 
from big farms relying primarily on hired labour would increase the average labour 
intensity of cultivation. It would increase the total absorption of labour in the 
agricultural sector and agricultural output without the necessity of drawing any 
additional resources into the agricultural sector. 
8.6 Suggestions for Further Research 
The main shortcoming of the research presented in this thesis is that the exact source 
of the efficiency difference detected between family and hired labour has not been 
analyzed directly. From the available data set it is not possible to discriminate 
between alternative explanations for the higher efficiency of family labour - i.e., 
differences in the intensity of effort applied, farm specific- experience of older 
generations, or some other unobservable heterogeneity. Data sets with more detailed 
information on specific characteristics and family and hired labour employed on 
each farm and the specific tasks they do may be able to discriminate among these 
alternative explanations. A key variable may be the supervisory role that family 
labour plays over hired labour. The MPBBS data set from Nepal Rastra Bank did 
not distinguish between the actual physical fieldwork and supervisory role of family 
labor inputs. Where this distinction is available in the data, if it can be shown that 
the efficiency of hired labour is improved with greater supervisory input from family 
members, as in (Frísvold 1994), then it would be more direct evidence for the 
shirking explanation for the lower efficiency of hired labour detected in our 
estimations. 
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The potential importance of the supervisory role of family labour in the presence of 
hired labour inputs also suggests that family labour may provide a different type of 
labour service - one which combines elements of "management services" with units 
of ordinary labour. While the later component could be easily substitutable with 
hired labour, the management services component is likely to be imperfectly 
substitutable. Further empirical research work with appropriate data sets that can 
distinguish these two components of family labour would be a useful extension of 
the results in this thesis. One viable way to deal with the problem of the essential 
jointness of the management services and ordinary labour units of family labour 
could be to estimate production functions with the labour input of the main family - 
based farm manager (or decision maker) as a separate labour input variable. This 
specification could then be used to test whether the farm manager's labour input is 
heterogeneous with respect to hired labour, or indeed with the labour input of other 
family members. 
Another area for further research is to develop and estimate more elaborate 
specifications for the labour supply of individual household members which is 
consistent with labour heterogeneity. The labour supply regressions in Chapter VII 
were based on a simple linear model. Additional structure can be imposed on the 
labour supply equations to reflect an underlying utility function that allows for a 
more flexible non -linear response of leisure demand to wage rates. This would 
provide more robust results on whether the effective wage rates for family labour 
varies according to the hired labour market exposure of the farm households, in the 
presence of other possible sources of varying wage and income responses of labour 
supply.? 
Other refinements to the simple labour supply specification used in this study can be 
made by considering a joint family labour supply model for individual members of a 
7 Stern (1986) provides a menu of alternative functional forms for labour supply functions and their 
underlying properties that would be a useful staring point. Only a limited number of specifications 
allow for a flexible wage and income response. 
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household, where the work days of a single person are affected by the work days put 
in by other household members according to some age -sex grouping (as in Newman 
and Gertler 1994). Another adjustment would be to test for and then incorporate 
constraints on the number of days for which hired work is available, given the 
seasonal nature of agricultural operations; and to estimate the labour supply 
functions with binding time constraints, where applicable, and to test for behavioural 
responses conforming to labour heterogeneity with this more general specification. 
Another fruitful line of extension of this research would be to embed the structure 
and parameters of the farm household model estimated in this thesis into a larger 
simulation model of the agricultural economy of the tarai region of Nepal. The 
simulation model could then look specifically at the household -specific welfare 
effects and aggregate outcomes of alternative land reform policies that re- distributed 
land from big farms dependent on hired labour to family based cultivators. The 
general equilibrium effects, allowing for wage rates to change in response to changes 
in land distribution, are unclear and worthy of analysis. Of particular interest would 
be household- specific welfare effects. Even if the land transfers increased the 
aggregate labour absorption, there could still be a reduction in demand for hired 
labour that would lead to a reduction in the market wage rates for hired labour, and 
hence adversely affect landless households that were not beneficiaries of the land 
transfers. The direction and exact magnitude of such general equilibrium effects will 
depend on the precise values of the elasticities of labour demand and supply for the 
different classes of farm households. The research work reported in this thesis has 
made an initial contribution towards specifying the appropriate analytical framework 
and carrying out the relevant estimation work to obtain accurate estimates of these 
elasticities and other relevant parameters required for the simulation model. 
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